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One of the issues that has been debated in the literature is market heterogeneity. 
Traditional financial models adopt a popular assumption that markets are efficient 
and that participants act rationally such that their actions are homogeneous. 
Nevertheless, behavioural finance literature provides significant evidence of 
behavioural patterns and biases which render the assumption of homogeneity too 
simplistic and idealistic. Heterogeneity in financial markets can be defined as 
significant diversity in expectations of asset prices.  
I examine two aspects of heterogeneity in this thesis: trader’s performance and 
trader’s expectations. I also investigate whether traders possess genuine trading 
skills and how market volatility as well as a trader’s personal behavioural biases 
affect their skills. Using a dataset of more than twenty-one thousand retail FX 
traders on the EUR/USD market I find significant evidence of heterogeneity in 
performance and expectations, which persists throughout their trading career. I 
show that while around 68% of traders have the ability to correctly predict future 
price changes more than half of the time, only around 22.8% have the ability to 
generate overall positive returns. In addition, around 27% of traders have the 
ability to favourably adjust their position size based on the magnitude of the 
change in market prices. Moreover, I find that volatility has a detrimental impact 
on performance. Nevertheless, as this uncertainty becomes seasoned, 
individuals learn to understand it and adjust for it in their trading decisions. Finally, 
I find that skilled traders are herd initiators such that they are closely watched and 
copied by others. I also show that skilled traders exhibit the disposition effect, 
whereby they are more likely to realise small gains and hold on to large losses. 
 In addition, skilled traders are also sensation seekers, indicating that they tend to 
use leverage to exploit price change; however, they tend to avoid extreme levels 
of leverage which can be detrimental to the performance and reputation. Skilled 
traders are more likely to be inconsistent in the amount of leverage and margin 
they use, which is explained by their ability to adjust their leverage ratio 
depending on the state of the market and their confidence in their trading 
decision. 
This thesis contributes to the literature on the micro dynamics of retail FX 
markets. My findings highlight that importance of understanding trader behaviour 
which provides insight into the decision-making process of individual traders and 
how these decisions are affected by endogenous behavioural factors as well as 
external market factors.
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Section 1. Introduction 
Traditional financial theory is based on the notion that traders act rationally. This 
means that all market participants have the same expectations of asset returns, 
and their sole objective is to maximise risk-adjusted returns. Moreover, these 
individuals have access to the same publicly disclosed set of market information, 
and asset prices reflect all information such that participants are unable to 
achieve above average risk-adjusted returns. Under this scenario, financial 
markets are considered to be highly efficient, and the performance of participants 
is homogeneous.  
The assumption of homogeneity is at the core of many popular financial 
frameworks, such as modern portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model 
(Markowitz, 1952a; Treynor, 1961; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). 
Nevertheless, many academics have argued that homogeneity is a very strong 
assumption, which does not hold, especially in the presence of speculative 
markets (Frechette and Weaver, 2001). This is because individuals exhibit 
different performance outcomes, and in many cases irrational behaviour 
depending on the state of the market. Moreover, individuals may interpret the 
same piece of information differently due to their personal biases, thus leading to 
different conclusions about financial markets. As such, there has been a growing 
branch of literature, which advocates that financial markets are in fact 
heterogeneous and that one should take into account this phenomenon when 
examining asset returns as well as the performance of investors (Abbey and 
Doukas, 2015; Hayley and Marsh, 2016). 
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Little research has been conducted to investigate the heterogeneity of traders in 
retail FX markets, mainly due to the lack of access to transaction level data. 
Nevertheless, two recent papers by Abbey and Doukas (2015) and Hayley and 
Marsh (2016) have examined this phenomenon, and have found significant 
evidence of heterogeneity in performance among retail FX traders. However, 
these studies have focused on the heterogeneity in performance using daily 
aggregated data which does not allow them to control for trade specific 
characteristics (Hayley and Marsh, 2016) or using a factor based model (Abbey 
and Doukas, 2015). Moreover, the previous studies did not investigate 
heterogeneity in trader expectations which allows us to examine the dispersion 
of trader forecasts around the daily consensus. 
The dataset used in this thesis contains transaction level information, which 
allows me to investigate heterogeneity at the transaction level, as well as 
heterogeneity in trader expectations. Specifically, I aim to answer the following 
research question: Is there significant heterogeneity in performance and 
expectations among retail traders in the EUR/USD foreign exchange market? 
Using a detailed transaction level dataset, I adopt the methods used in the 
literature to investigate heterogeneity in performance (Hayley and Marsh, 2016), 
and heterogeneity in expectations (Ito, 1990), among 21,300 retail FX traders in 
the EUR/USD market. Retail FX traders typically open positions for short periods 
of time (which can range from few minutes to several days), hence given the 
short-lived nature of their trades these traders do not follow a buy and hold 
strategy. Moreover, retail FX traders are usually less skilled and have access to 
less sophisticated tools and data compared to institutional traders. After 
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controlling for trader characteristics, I find significant evidence of heterogeneity in 
performance among traders and in expectations of future EUR/USD spot prices1. 
Moreover, I find that persistence in heterogeneity increases as traders move 
forward in their trading career. 
The evidence presented on heterogeneity among these retail traders raises the 
question of whether some individuals possess genuine skill. In other words, 
“knowing that the population is heterogeneous with some traders being skilled 
and others unskilled” (Hayley and Marsh, 2016). 
One of the most intriguing puzzles in finance is to identify traders who possess 
genuine trading skills. While skill can be broadly defined as an individual’s ability 
to add value to a certain investment, testing for such ability is not a simple task. 
The main obstacle is selecting appropriate statistics to measure skill.  
In other words, do some traders have the ability to consistently (more than half of 
the time) and correctly predict future price changes in the foreign exchange 
market? This brings us to the second research question: Do (some) retail FX 
traders possess genuine trading skills, such that they are able to consistently 
predict future price movements (in a market that has often been described as 
following a random walk), add value in absolute terms and adjust the size of their 
position based on their confidence in their forecast?  
Many academics have used the percentage of winning trades or success rate 
(SR) as an indication of a trader’s ability to consistently predict future price 
                                            
1This thesis does not investigate market efficiency per se, however there is significant evidence 
showing that foreign exchange markets including EUR/USD can be characterised fairly close to 
random walk (Pukthuanthong-Le and Thomas, 2008). 
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changes. This measure indicates whether a trader possesses superior skill, 
which may take the form of private information or advanced modelling techniques; 
however, it does not capture a trader’s ability to add value in absolute terms. To 
remedy this, others have proposed using the return on investment (ROI) in order 
to measure the value added by the trader over time. A third performance measure 
that has been applied in the literature is the big hit ability (BHA), which measures 
a trader’s ability to adjust the size of his position contingent on his confidence in 
his expectation about future market prices (Hartzmark, 1991). 
In this analysis, I use all three of these measures in order to obtain a complete 
assessment of currency traders’ skills. In general, I find that although around 68% 
of retail FX traders can consistently predict future price changes, only 22.8% of 
individuals possess the ability to generate positive overall returns as indicated by 
their ROI. In addition, the mean ROI across all traders is -28.8%, which means 
that retail FX traders on average lose money. Finally, with respect to BHA, I find 
that traders exhibit negative BHA on average, with only 27% of traders showing 
positive BHA. 
One important factor that affects the skills of traders is market volatility (Olson, 
2004; Qi and Wu, 2006). Hence, I examine how heightened market volatility 
impacts the skills of retail FX traders in order to answer the third research 
question: How does heightened market volatility affect the skills of individual FX 
traders? 
I investigate how market volatility impacts traders’ predictive ability as well as 
their ability to generate positive returns. To do so, I estimate a series of models 
where I examine the effect of volatility on the day a position was opened in 
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addition to the lagged volatility of the previous 10 trading days2 (short-term trading 
horizon) on the success rate (i.e. predictive ability) and the ROI of the trader for 
each trading day. I also use a binary volatility variable to capture the effects of 
high market uncertainty on trader skill and performance. 
In general, the results show that traders are unable to correctly integrate recent 
market uncertainty in their predictions; however, as this information becomes 
seasoned for several days they are better able to use it to gauge future price 
movements. Furthermore, I find that high market uncertainty has a negative 
impact on a trader’s ability to predict future price movements. This may be due to 
lack of good quality information during times of market turbulence in addition to 
behavioural biases such as fear, which drives traders to make decision-based on 
sentiment rather than sound economic analysis. 
With respect to the impact of volatility on the traders’ returns (ROI), the models 
have a poor fit and most parameters are statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, 
there is some evidence that high market volatility negatively affects a trader’s 
ability to generate positive returns. In general, the results show that market 
volatility is detrimental to both a trader’s ability to correctly predict future price 
changes, as well as their ability to generate positive economic returns. 
Another element that also plays an important factor in shaping a trader’s skills is 
his behaviour. This brings forth the final research question of my thesis: How do 
behavioural biases impact the skills of retail FX traders?  
                                            
2 I conduct autoregressive analysis on the lagged volatility parameters and find significant 
coefficients only up to 10 lags. As such, my models include volatility lags of 10 periods. 
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I examine the relationship between five behavioural biases, namely herd 
initiations, the disposition effect, sensation seeking, inconsistent behaviour, and 
information advantage and the skills of traders, which are captured by three 
measures: Success Ratio (SR), Return on Investment (ROI), and Big Hit Ability 
(BHA). This analysis allows us to better understand how these behavioural biases 
affect the decision-making process of traders and how they impact skill. 
In general, I find that traders who possess all three skills are herd initiators, 
meaning that they are closely watched and copied by others. In addition, these 
traders also exhibit the disposition effect such that they are more likely to realise 
small gains and hold on to large losses. This may be interpreted as a beckoning 
mechanism such that these traders realise many small gains to signal to others 
that they possess superior trading skills. Skilled traders are also sensation 
seekers, meaning that they tend to use leverage to exploit price changes; 
however, they tend to avoid extreme leverage levels, which can be detrimental to 
their performance. Moreover, skilled traders tend to be inconsistent in the amount 
of leverage and margin they use. This may be interpreted as the skilled traders’ 
ability to adjust the amount of leverage used depending on the state of the market 
and their confidence in their decisions. Finally, I find that traders who have high 
SR tend to execute trades that quickly move into-the-money, while those with low 
SR tend to have longer trade durations before the trade covers the spread cost. 
This analysis allows us to better understand the behavioural biases of skilled and 
unskilled traders and how these biases play a role in shaping the decision-making 
process and skill set of a trader. 
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This thesis contributes to the literature on the performance and behaviour of retail 
traders in the foreign exchange market. First, my findings show significant 
heterogeneity among retail traders in the EUR/USD market. This evidence 
challenges traditional financial theory, which states that market participants have 
homogeneous expectations for asset returns and risks. On the contrary, I show 
that heterogeneity is a constant and persistent characteristic of the retail 
EUR/USD market. As such, traditional FX pricing models may be improved by 
incorporating the microstructural dynamics of the FX market, which can be 
explained by the diversity and magnitude in expectations on either side of the 
market. My second contribution sheds light on the skills of retail FX traders. In 
particular, my findings show that while many traders possess the ability to 
correctly forecast the direction of future price movements, very few have the 
ability to add positive returns in absolute terms. This highlights the importance of 
investigating both the ability to be on the correct side of the market and the ability 
to generate positive returns, which would allow us to distinguish between those 
who are genuinely skilled and those who are simply lucky. Moreover, it is crucial 
for retail traders to be aware of these typical performance patterns so that they 
can better manage their expectations and wealth when trading. As individuals 
understand that exchange rates tend to move in a random manner and that 
predictive ability may be very short-lived, they will learn to better manage their 
risk and adapt to changes in market conditions. The third contribution of my thesis 
underscores the importance of accounting for market volatility when making 
trading decisions. In general, market turbulence may create potentially profitable 
opportunities; however, extreme volatility can also be detrimental to performance. 
Hence, individuals should be constantly aware of the current state of the market 
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to better manage their risk exposures. Moreover, if past volatility can be used to 
predict future volatility, such information can be used to the advantage of the 
trader to improve performance by trading only when the likelihood of success is 
relatively high. This analysis links the literature on trader performance, which 
predominantly focuses on the endogenous characteristics of the individual, to the 
literature on the exogenous dynamics of market volatility. Investigating the 
relationship between the endogenous and exogenous factors would allow us to 
better understand the performance and behaviour of traders and encourages 
further research to improve traditional financial models to include both factors. 
The final contribution of my thesis highlights the behavioural biases of skilled 
traders and how they affect performance using a novel perspective. To the best 
of my knowledge this is the first study to investigate multiple behavioural biases 
simultaneously in the context of retail FX traders. I show that common 
behavioural biases such as herd initiation, disposition effect, sensation seeking, 
inconsistent behaviour, and information advantage can explain whether certain 
traders possess superior trading skill. By understanding these behavioural biases 
and how they affect performance, individual traders can learn to be aware of 
whether they are likely to exhibit these biases and take precautionary measures 
to avoid being subjected to the negative effects associated with them. For 
instance, traders exhibit the disposition effect when they realise small gains and 
hold on to losses. A trader who realises this can learn to avoid closing winning 
positions prematurely and limit their losses using stop loss orders. These 
behavioural patterns can also be used by brokers to categorise clients into 
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different performance groups in order to hedge against those who are likely top 
performers based on their behavioural characteristics.  
In summary, this thesis underscores the heterogeneous characteristics of 
individual retail FX traders and calls for future work to further investigate the 




Section 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Heterogeneous Traders 
In finance, heterogeneity is the notion that traders’ behaviour is not always 
rational — in other words, traders do not share common beliefs about the market 
which may be due to information asymmetry. If market participants differ in 
behaviour and in the level of information, different expectations should occur, 
validating the existence of heterogeneity. If financial markets consist only of 
homogeneous agents with the same forecasting beliefs and information, then 
there should only be directional/systemic markets, which is clearly not the case 
according to observational evidence. 
2.1.1 Asymmetric Information as a Source of Heterogeneity 
Asymmetric information is present whenever one market participant has greater 
material knowledge than another. Asymmetric information is incorporated into the 
market over time in a non-uniform way. This creates an imbalance of power in 
transactions and causes asymmetry. Even if information is in the public domain, 
participants tend to interpret information asymmetrically according to their own 
preferences or beliefs. 
Grundy and Kim (2002) and Biais et al. (2010) contended that asymmetric 
information can be a source of heterogeneous expectations among traders. The 
existence of private information through price changes provides a positive 
variability creating a heterogeneous economy. Price variability can change 
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significantly from the influence of asymmetric information (absence of change in 
supply or the arrival of information beyond those already observed).  
Despite nearly homogenous information-processing systems, investors attained 
different levels of access to information sets related to the current state of the 
financial markets (Lucas, 1973; Kyle, 1985; Mankiw and Reis, 2003; and Carroll, 
2003). In general, investors do not process macroeconomic news in a 
standardised way, within the same time-frame. It is assumed that market 
participants absorb market information in discriminatory ways, best suited to their 
personal circumstances. Therefore, market participants reach different 
conclusions and form vastly different market expectations, despite the fact that 
they are exposed to the same set of publicly available information.  
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005) defined heterogeneous market participants as 
agents who possess incomplete information and have different opinions about 
future market dynamics within financial markets. This theoretical model allows for 
agents’ heterogeneous beliefs. It assumes that investors use different forecasting 
rules and they can switch to the most profitable rules after evaluating relevant 
probabilities. Similarly, Iori (2002) noted that heterogeneity ensures that traders 
do not make the same spontaneous decisions. 
Macdonald and Marsh (1996), Laster et al. (1999) and Patton and Timmermann 
(2010) concluded that heterogeneity also arises because forecasters do not 
always provide all the relevant data since they consider this information to be 
private. Speculative market participants can be divided into different expectation 
categories with distinct degrees of heterogeneity. Therefore, heterogeneous 
beliefs reflect the assumption that agents have an exponential function with 
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different valuation expectations. In an earlier paper, Goodman (1979) showed 
that Foreign Exchange (FX) investors are heavily reliant on technical analysis, 
which can raise the level of heterogeneity among them — especially if there is a 
propensity for other market participants to implement fundamental analysis in 
their trading decisions. Goodman demonstrated that the foreign exchange market 
is inefficient, with strong evidence that technically-oriented services have strong 
predictive performance and that speculative runs do occur. In other words, 
historical, technical market information can be used by traders in a speculative 
manner to predict future foreign exchange prices. Economically-oriented foreign 
exchange rate forecasting services were found to be inaccurate with a lack of 
conclusive evidence that they can effectively manage foreign exchange 
exposure. A similar conclusion was reached by Frankel and Froot (1990) and De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). Traders have a tendency to use forecasting 
techniques that can lead to “excessive volatility” which reflect heterogeneous 
beliefs or asymmetric information. 
Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Næs and Skjeltorp (2006) discovered that 
traders’ heterogeneity is a catalyst that intensifies the volume-volatility relation. 
They provided empirical evidence that “the assumption that agents interpret 
information identically is overly restrictive” and that agents have different 
interpretations of the same public information. To a limited extent, the volume-
volatility relation is explained by the disparity in ‘beliefs’ amongst market 
participants or by the existence of asymmetric information. 
As such, a significant portion of the literature stresses that market imperfections 
and individual behavioural tendencies lead traders to arrive at different decisions, 
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even though they might be exposed to the same set of information. This is the 
result of an individual’s endogenous capacity and thought-process, which 
produces a unique decision, resulting in heterogeneous expectations of the 
market. 
2.1.2 Heterogeneity in Trader Behaviour  
Heterogeneity can arise because individuals respond differently to the same 
event, as a result of personal biases. These biases have a direct impact on the 
trading characteristics of the trader’s strategy. For instance, Keim and Madhavan 
(1995) used a unique dataset of equity transactions from 21 institutions and 
provided evidence that liquidity traders (indexers, etc.) prefer to use market 
orders, while investors (whose information value decays), slowly use limit orders. 
As a result, institutions in their sample differed in their trading styles and 
motivation.  
Other researchers argued that heterogeneity can be observed by categorising 
individuals according to their behavioural biases. For example, Cabrales and 
Hoshi (1996) divided investors into “optimists” who expect prices to go up and 
are risk-takers, and “pessimists” who prefer to trade more conservatively. In this 
way, the model with heterogeneous beliefs is useful in explaining various 
anomalies observed in financial markets. 
Researchers, including Lasselle et al. (2005), Koutmos (2012), and Goldbaum 
and Zwinkels (2014), argued that individuals can generally be categorised as 
either rational utility maximisers (adaptive traders who respond to trading activity 
conducted by other market participants), or as naive traders (non-adaptive 
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traders that do not). This categorisation is based on the notion that some 
individuals are skilled and able to use market information effectively to make 
informed decisions, while others take a reactive approach to past information or 
simply trade on sentiment. Such differences in heterogeneous trading behaviour 
help to explain the wide spectrum of financial phenomena such as excess 
volatility, market bubbles and violent corrections in market prices of all asset 
classes, including stock markets. Furthermore, Locke et al. (2000) examined 
professional futures traders and found that heterogeneity arises because agents 
have different trading skills and knowledge. Differences in trading activity and 
trader success is due to the disposition effect, which is mostly found among the 
less successful traders. In particular, the authors found that the least successful 
traders hold on to losses for longer time frames compared to more successful 
traders, who quickly realise and limit losses. 
The quantity and quality of knowledge an investor has can directly impact their 
behavioural biases. For instance, Goodfellow et al. (2009) used data from the 
Polish stock market and showed that individual investors tend to ‘herd’ (i.e. tend 
to trade in the same direction) more than institutional investors — their actions 
are often irrational and they tend to underperform — while institutional investors 
trade according to market fundamentals (Wermers, 1999; Sias et al., 2001; Kim 
and Wei, 2002; Bushee and Goodman, 2007; Schmeling, 2007) and achieve 
significantly different trading performance compared to retail investors. 
While the above-mentioned studies look at these biases in a static manner, others 
examine how biases dynamically change over time. Ito (1990) argued that 
individual biases may be driven by a slow learning process, such that traders 
15 
 
adjust their strategies based on their past activity. Ito found significant evidence 
of heterogeneity in expectations among forecasters over the duration of the study. 
Similarly, LeBaron (2001, 2003, 2012) found that the level of market volatility is 
directly impacted by the level of heterogeneity in the learning ability of market 
participants. Feedback traders (positive feedback momentum and negative 
impact contrarian) increase volatility which increases the required rate of return. 
If the expected return is not impacted, the rate of demand for shares will 
decrease. Higher volatility will cause prices to move away from the fundamental 
values affecting the demand for fundamental traders. 
In general, the literature shows that endogenous factors and processes, such as 
knowledge and learning, can significantly alter an individual’s behaviour and 
ultimate decision. This means that, even with the same set of information, traders 
may arrive at different conclusions due to the way they process that information, 
learn from it, and adapt their behaviour accordingly. Given the evidence in the 
literature supporting this argument, one would expect that traders’ expectations 
will be significantly diverse thus creating a persistent heterogeneous 
marketplace. As such, financial models should incorporate this heterogeneity to 
better capture market dynamics and explain the differences in performance 
among traders. 
2.1.3 Market Impact on Heterogeneity 
Pyo (2014) argued that heterogeneity is prevalent in all economic areas and 
ignoring it would result in a lack of proper micro-foundation for explaining 
aggregate outcomes (Kirman, 1992). The author proposed a stock market model 
16 
 
that incorporates different types of stock trading behaviour in relation to market 
events. The results showed that stock market performance metrics are sensitive 
to different types of traders (dividend trader, technical trader, and network trader) 
and memory length i.e. that the current firm profitability relative to past profitability 
inherently involves the selection of an extent of past data usage. Moreover, 
Yamamoto and Hirata (2012) investigated the impact of a country's structural 
economic changes, including global financial crisis influence and monetary 
policy, on forecasters' expectations. By categorising market participants in their 
sample into buy-side and sell-side professionals, they were able to examine the 
determinants of expectation heterogeneity or dispersion. Both buy-side and sell-
side professionals possess different information subsets with different 
interpretations of the same information in their forecasts, contributing to 
expectation heterogeneity. They demonstrated that when expectations are 
formed interactively this contributes to heterogeneity expectations in the 
Japanese stock market. Beine et al. (2007) mentioned that aside from 
interventions, heterogeneity could be born from uncertainties surrounding the US 
economy, that can subsequently influence exchange rates and affect both DEM-
EUR (German mark and Euro) and DEM-USD (German mark and United States 
dollar).  
In a more recent study, Lim et al. (2016) found that foreign participants may act 
heterogeneously in different countries’ financial markets. The authors examined 
heterogeneity among different types of foreign investors in the stock market: 
foreign institutions, foreign individuals and foreign nominees and how they affect 
the Malaysian market. Foreign investors were found to have superior skills in 
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processing systematic market information thereby improving the information 
environment of the local exchange. 
The evidence in the literature supports heterogeneous beliefs arising from traders 
having different occupations, roles, and investment objectives. Thus, given an 
individual’s trading mandate, their expectations may differ from those of other 
market participants. It follows that every individual has a unique investment goal, 
thus perceptions of the market are likely to be heterogeneous.  
2.1.4 Heterogeneity in Forecasts and Trading Strategies 
Rekik et al. (2014) stated that heterogeneity in forecasts is able to create market 
instability and complicate pricing dynamics. Using the Artificial Neural Networks 
learning mechanism and creating an artificial stock market, they showed market 
participants having heterogeneous beliefs and preferences. Specifically, the 
authors showed that the irrational behaviour of investors explains many financial 
anomalies, which cannot be explained by traditional market models. The authors 
built a model comprised of three types of investors: ‘fundamentalists’, ‘non-
fundamentalists’ and ‘loss-averse’ investors. As such, the difficulty of prediction 
arises due to the complexity and non-linearity of investors psychology. 
Consequently, the Artificial Neural Networks learning mechanism takes on the 
role of traders, who generate expectations about future market movements, and 
executes orders based on these expectations. The findings showed that the 
existence of heterogeneous agents with different expectations provides a better 
understanding of the price dynamics in financial markets. 
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Gandhi and Padial (2014) proved that belief in heterogeneity affects returns, 
where they showed that the majority of the population consists of canonical 
traders (70%) who hold virtually homogenous beliefs, with the remainder of 
traders exhibiting significant levels of belief dispersion. Moreover, Tan et al. 
(2015) mentioned that due to arbitrageurs' heterogeneous beliefs regarding the 
fundamental value of a security, traders tend to “ride the bubble”, instead of 
correcting the asset’s price. The population in their analysis was divided into two 
major groups of players in the markets: rational arbitrageurs and noise traders. 
Their model assumed that arbitrageurs used varying levels of leverage, which 
meant traders were experiencing variability in pay-offs and optimal waiting 
periods. In a related study, Naimzada and Ricchiuti (2014) concluded that 
heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental asset values could lead to market 
instability (chaotic price fluctuations). They showed that there are interactions and 
correlations between agents with the same rules, but with different beliefs in 
fundamental asset values. Using survey data of foreign exchange market 
expectations, Boswijk et al. (2007) and Goldbaum and Zwinkels (2014) classified 
responses into two groups: the fundamental strategy “by which predictions 
concerning future exchange rates are based on exchange rate fundamentals” 
and the chartist strategy “by which market-based information serves as a 
predictor of future exchange rates”. The authors concluded that the cause of 
heterogeneity in the forecasts, is the switching between fundamental and chartist 
strategies. Proaño (2013) also noted that chartist and fundamentalist types of 
forecasting can affect financial markets. Proaño assumed that FX traders are 
following two types of behavioural rules: the fundamentalist rule (taking into 
account only certain macroeconomic fundamentals) and the chartists or technical 
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analysts (taking into account only past developments of the nominal exchange 
rate). Furthermore, Menkhoff and Schmeling (2010) examined individual 
interbank market participants and the reaction to the counterparties by analysing 
the counterparties’ direction and size of order flow. In particular, they found 
evidence that large and small traders differ in their use of information. Large 
traders react strongly to publicly available information whereas small traders rely 
on private information. Therefore, public information is a strong determinant of 
individual trading decisions. 
Several studies have investigated heterogeneity based on the type of strategy 
adopted by traders. For example, Beine et al. (2009) observed heterogeneity 
among the chartists while Kaltwasser (2010) found heterogeneity among 
fundamental traders. Kaltwasser (2010) developed a model that applies to 
heterogeneous agents. It assumed that institutional traders and large banks have 
different beliefs about fundamental prices. The author also concluded that there 
is “No doubt, traders live in a world where trend followers do exist”. In another 
study, Pyo (2014) categorised traders into three different theoretical types: 
dividend traders, technical traders, and network traders, depending on the factors 
chosen (firm profitability, past returns or the investment behaviour of other 
agents). Furthermore, the author implied that stock market performance metrics 
are very sensitive to investor type and memory length.  
In a more recent study, Chien (2015) distinguished between passive traders 
(holding fixed portfolios of stocks and bonds) and active traders (portfolios 
adjusted in response to changes in investment opportunities in the markets). It 
was observed that active institutional traders frequently generate greater profits 
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than passive traders while different trading strategies result in a strong level of 
heterogeneity in financial markets. 
The literature presents evidence that heterogeneity arises due to traders adopting 
different trading strategies. As such, every specific strategy or trading philosophy 
will likely result in a different trading decision, thus leading to a heterogeneous 
population as long as traders choose non-similar strategies. One can expect that 
the wider the range of trading strategies available to traders, the greater the 
degree of heterogeneity. 
2.1.5 Heterogeneity in Risk Tolerance  
Several studies have investigated heterogeneity from a risk perspective. For 
instance, Shefrin (2001) argued that heterogeneity in risk tolerance is different 
from heterogeneity in beliefs or expectations. The author proposed a model in 
which traders have different expectations, risk tolerance levels and time horizons 
— finding that traders become more risk tolerant during upward trending markets. 
On a related note, Mankiw et al. (2003) argued that ‘disagreement’ may be a key 
to macroeconomic dynamics because many macroeconomic models assume 
market participants will form the same expectations from the same information. 
They established that expectations are not homogeneous and thus the models’ 
assumption was rejected. Hence, the amount of disagreement varies over time 
and some people form expectations based on outdated information (the sticky-
information model). 
In a more recent study, Bougheas et al. (2015) conducted an experiment to 
examine investors’ risk-taking and information aggregation in groups who face a 
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common risk. Their analysis had two main findings. First, the behaviour of most 
investors is consistent with Bayesian rationality; however, several subjects 
showed significant reverse confirmation bias. This means that these individuals 
seemed to place less weight on external sources of information when it was in 
consensus with their private signals, and gave more weight to conflicting external 
information that differed from their own private conclusions. Moreover, this 
tendency is more pronounced when individuals were able to communicate freely. 
When communication is restricted, the evidence on reverse confirmation bias 
declines to the same level as confirmation bias. This phenomenon could be 
interpreted as individuals acquiring a probability heuristic during discussions with 
other market participants. The second main finding of this study was that when 
individuals communicate freely there is a high consensus among decisions. This 
may be due to the persuasive arguments of certain individuals and their ability to 
influence the decisions and thought processes of other market participants. 
The evidence in the literature supports variations in risk tolerances among 
traders, which mainly arises from the overall state of the market and how an 
individual’s expectation relates to the market consensus. In general, when the 
market is performing well, traders are willing to tolerate more risk. This suggests 
that risk tolerance of an individual is not static, but rather changes as a function 
of market conditions. Such a statement implies that risk management practices 
should also be dynamic and be adapted to current market conditions. 
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2.1.6 Empirical Literature on Heterogeneity 
2.1.6.1 Heterogeneity at the Macro Level 
There is a mass of literature that examines heterogeneity in foreign exchange 
rates at the macro level. The general argument of these studies is that there are 
various competing models and types of traders with varying expectations, whose 
trading activities determine the equilibrium exchange rate. For instance, 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) studied the influence of heterogeneity on 
exchange rate dynamics. The authors applied a standard monetary model of 
exchange rate determination, incorporating money market equilibrium, Purchase 
Price Parity (PPP) and interest rate parity. The authors identified two drivers of 
heterogeneity: ‘dispersed information about fundamentals’ and ‘non-
fundamentals’. Specifically, the exchange rate was found to be driven primarily 
by fundamentals only over longer horizons, with only a small number of non-
fundamentals being the main source of exchange rate volatility when information 
is heterogeneous. 
Ahrens and Reitz (2005) built on the work of Frankel and Froot (1986) and 
proposed the chartist and fundamentalist regime-switching model. DM/US 
German mark/dollar exchange rates from 1982 to 1998 (daily and monthly three-
month forward exchange rate returns) were used for empirical examination. The 
authors used data from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International 
Financial Statistics to calculate the fundamental value (PPP). Both the chartist 
and the fundamentalist parameters for forecasting were tested. Under the 
premises of their model, spot market speculation consisted of a covered interest 
23 
 
transaction and forward market speculation. For the time period covered (January 
1982 to December 1998) the empirical results showed that daily German-US 
forward rates could be explained by the heterogeneous expectations exchange 
rate model. In a related study, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005) examined chartist 
and fundamental models of spot rate market forecasting and the decisions to 
switch between them. The authors created an exchange rate model that showed 
non-linearity in the dynamics of the foreign exchange market. The main reason 
for this is the existence of transaction costs in goods markets. Investors have 
different expectations in this model and do not always act rationally. Firstly, the 
authors defined the fundamental exchange rate, assuming that it behaves like a 
random walk without drift. Then, two types of traders were distinguished: 1) 
fundamentalists who forecast the future market rate movement with respect to 
the fundamental rate, following a negative feedback rule, and 2) chartists who 
follow a positive feedback rule, extrapolating past exchange rate movements and 
inferencing into the future. The authors used the method proposed by Brock and 
Hommes (1997, 1998) to measure the profitability underpinning different types of 
traders. According to the amount of profits, investors may decide to change their 
trading style. The risk associated with the forecasting rule of the chartists and 
fundamentalists and their combined expectations, “the market expectation of the 
exchange rate change” was also estimated, with transaction costs also being 
taken into consideration. The authors showed that even minimal market 
disturbance could influence the exchange rate dramatically (a chaotic region was 
found during the sensitivity analysis). Another chartist-fundamentalist model was 
proposed by Manzan and Westerhoff (2007). They assumed that traders have 
heterogeneous expectations of the exchange rate and are able to switch between 
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two regimes according to their preferences. The authors used monthly exchange 
rates from the beginning of 1974 to the end of 1998, for six currencies: the 
German mark (DM), Japanese yen (JY), Canadian dollar (CD) French franc (FF) 
and the British pound (BP) against the US dollar. Exchange rate series were 
simulated for all used currencies and results compared and contrasted to the 
alternative random walk model. The long-horizon tests were significant (bearing 
a strong prediction power), unlike the short-term results. 
De Jong et al. (2010) studied the heterogeneity of agents’ expectations with 
different beliefs and levels of information. Their database consisted of seven 
monthly bilateral exchange rates for currencies of countries that became 
European Monetary System (EMS) members between March 1979 and 
December 1998. Unlike the other authors, De Jong et al. (2010) distinguished 
three types of investors: fundamentalists and two types of chartists (the Auto-
Regressive (AR) and the Moving Average (MA) types), with various forecasting 
rules being formulated for each type of trader. Similar to De Jong et al. (2010), 
the authors found that traders try to select the most profitable strategy for each 
period. 
From a different perspective, Rekik et al. (2014) proposed an agent-based model 
to explain price dynamics in financial markets. The authors argued that financial 
markets consist of agents with different expectations and who exhibit both rational 
and irrational behaviour simultaneously. The authors developed an artificial stock 
market and recorded more than 1,000 observations, to conclude that all factors 
(fundamentalist, anchoring heuristic, etc.) play a role in affecting price dynamics 
of assets. The authors examined both the degree of heterogeneity amongst 
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investors and its impact on broader pricing dynamics, to conclude that both 
fundamental investors and non-fundamental noise traders interact to affect 
financial markets at the macroeconomic level. It is this interaction which is the 
cause of asset price fluctuations. In other words, the authors provided evidence 
of the correlation between individual traders’ behaviour and financial market 
dynamics.  
Other empirical papers argue that heterogeneity in foreign exchange rates is 
directly driven by heterogeneity in trader expectations and forecasts, which arises 
from traders having incomplete or different information sources. Menkhoff et al. 
(2009) showed that exchange rate changes and inefficient pricing are able to 
explain the heterogeneity among forecasters. They use individual expectations 
from a market survey from the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). 
The survey provided detailed information on a census of 6-month forecasts 
sourced from a wide-range of financial market professionals. The sample 
contained expectations for the US-dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and JP-yen/euro 
exchange rates, with about 300 responses on average from December 1991 until 
August 2006. They used a C&F (chartist and fundamentalist) approach from a 
different perspective — by calculating dispersions i.e. their measure of 
heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations determined which factors affect the 
behaviour of chartists and fundamentalists. Exchange rate ‘misalignments’ and 
exchange rate changes helped to explain heterogeneity. 
Evans (2002) demonstrated that in the DEM/USD market, the high level of 
volatility is caused by strong market heterogeneity. Using a unique dataset of 
trading activity for the Deutsche mark/dollar (DM/$) in the spot FX market from 
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May 1, 1996 to August 31, 1996, Evans implied that traders' trading decisions are 
based on incomplete and heterogeneous information. All data was distinguished 
on common-knowledge (CK) news and non-common-knowledge (NCK) news. 
CK is public information that is interpreted homogeneously by everyone. NCK 
news is public and private data which creates no consensus among dealers as 
to its influence on underlying exchange rates. NCK news affects trading patterns 
and the whole distribution of transaction prices, while CK news affect only the 
latter. The author created a model to examine the origins of exchange rate 
dynamics using both types of information and a sampling component that 
presented the dispersion of an equilibrium transaction price distribution at each 
time point (i.e. the heterogeneity in trading decisions making process in markets 
that lack transparency). According to the results, between 17 and 80 percent of 
the variance in short-term price changes under normal market conditions was 
caused by this component. The influence of CK news reaches 15 to 40 percent 
for short-term price changes, and from 20 to 90 percent for long-term changes. 
Approximately 80 percent of the variance in permanent price shocks comes from 
NCK news. Specifically, information about Deutsche mark/dollar (DEM/USD) was 
observed from May 1 to August 31, 1996, provided by the Reuters D2000-1 
system using 79 full trading days, and containing 255,497 trades. 
Another set of studies examined how market stimulus plans, such as central bank 
interventions, impact on heterogeneity in foreign exchange markets. For 
instance, Beine (2003) measured volatility expectations and the effects of central 
bank (CBI) actions on exchange rates through the use of the Markov switching 
model. DEM/USD and the JP-YEN/USD markets were observed from 1985 to 
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1995 (Philadelphia Stock Exchange and Datastream). Evidence of heterogeneity 
was present because of different investor reactions to central bank interventions 
(some investors responded in a reactionary fashion, some ignored the event(s) 
and some took predictive trading decisions). The author also showed evidence 
of heterogeneity between the investigated currencies and the stress related to 
the role of policy credibility. 
Similarly, Beine et al. (2007) investigated whether there exists an influence of 
official foreign exchange interventions on forecast heterogeneity. Interventions 
from several central banks were observed (the Bank of Japan, the Federal 
Reserve, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bundesbank). They used 
monthly survey data forecasts from two periods: 1992-1994 and 1996-2001. 
Generally, official interventions drive forecast heterogeneity. Analysing the DEM-
EUR/USD market, the authors found that heterogeneity arises due to unexpected 
interventions (the difference between actual and expected interventions) while in 
the USD/JPY market, heterogeneity arises due to expected interventions as 
predicted by rumours during the four days before the actual intervention. 
The literature above presents significant evidence highlighting that heterogeneity 
in the long-run is driven by different expectations of macro and government 
factors. This long-run heterogeneity can be incorporated into foreign exchange 




2.1.6.2 Institutional Traders and Forecasters 
Many researchers have examined heterogeneity among large institutional traders 
or forecasters in the foreign exchange markets (Ito, 1990; Lyons, 1991, 1993; 
Frankel and Rose, 1994; Elliott and Ito, 1999; Evans, 2002; Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop. 2003; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2003; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006; 
Dreger and Stadtmann, 2008; Reitz and Taylor, 2008; Menkhoff et al., 2009; 
Goldbaum and Zwinkels, 2014). 
One of the most popular studies was conducted by Ito (1990), who collected data 
from the Japan Centre for International Finance (JCIF) of bi-weekly surveys and 
concluded that foreign exchange market participants are heterogeneous. Ito 
analysed the yen/dollar exchange rate expectations using the data of two years 
for 44 different institutions which include banks, brokers, securities, trading 
companies, export-oriented organisations, life insurance firms and import-
oriented industries. Ito (1990) showed that heterogeneity exists among market 
participants for different time horizons. In addition, Ito demonstrated that the 
reason for the existence of heterogeneity lies more in the biases from individual 
effects than idiosyncratic ratios of lagged variables. In other words, heterogeneity 
does not appear because of different investors’ reactions, but rather, it is a 
constant bias. Ito also suggested that heterogeneity may be attributed to the 
behaviour of market participants mostly due to traders’ slow and lagging learning 
process. The methodology was based on the assumption that exchange markets’ 
information is generally public and accessible. Similarly, other studies have 
shown the main cause of heterogeneity in the foreign exchange markets is due 
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to idiosyncratic interpretations of widely available information, thereby leading to 
significant differences in forecast accuracy.  
In their co-study regarding noise trading influence on exchange rates, Froot and 
Frankel (1989) showed that expected heterogeneity arises with sufficient 
numbers of unsophisticated traders providing significant noise trading. They used 
survey data information on exchange rate expectations, sourcing their data from 
three surveys: American Express Banking Corporation of London (1976 and 
1985), Economist's Financial Report of London (at regular six-week intervals 
since 1981) and the Money Market Services (MMS) of California (every two 
weeks beginning in November 1982 and every week beginning in October 1984). 
Their study focused on the question of whether the systematic portion of forward 
discount prediction errors could capture a time-varying risk premium and 
expectations. As for heterogeneity, they checked if there exists a single 
expectation, which is used by all agents. The results showed that different survey 
responders reported different forecasts, indicating the presence of heterogeneity 
in the investigated data. It was also determined that measurement error in the 
data was random. They found that investors would do better if they reduce their 
expectations of depreciation (fractional reduction). 
Macdonald and Marsh (1996) believed that heterogeneity is a crucial element in 
studying the behaviour of foreign exchange rates. They examined forecasts from 
corporate entities, professional agencies and institutions from G-7 countries to 
estimate the degree of heterogeneity (if any) present among them. Three-month 
and twelve-month forecasts for the three exchange rates were observed (from 
October 1989 to September 1992). Using two forecast datasets gave them the 
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ability to recognise variability in traders’ forecasting performance over the two 
periods. Using Ito’s (1990) simple and robust test for forecast differences 
detection, they found that both the three- and twelve-month forecasts have a 
significantly strong level of heterogeneity. In terms of forecasting prediction, 
forecasters are seemingly more accurate at relatively long-term horizons. This 
shows that traders behave very idiosyncratically when participating in foreign 
exchange markets. Macdonald and Marsh also analysed the quality of forecasts 
and concluded that good forecasters can sustain their accuracy only for a single 
currency pair. In addition, the authors find that short-term forecasters also tend 
to be good at forecasting long-term exchange rates. 
In a later study, Ito and Elliott (1999) examined traders’ behaviour in the yen/dollar 
market using micro survey data. They used exchange rate forecasts and 
calculated profits based on a positive trading rule. The authors used an updated 
version of the dataset used by Ito (1990), containing individual forecasts of 42 
companies with future spot yen/dollar rates for one, three, and six-month horizons 
from May 1985 to May 1996. During the 1985 to 1987 period huge differences in 
the forecasts were documented (from 15 to 30 yen per dollar for the one-month 
expectations and from 25 to 70 yen per dollar for the six-month expectations). 
Potential profits generated from decisions based on these forecasts are highly 
variable thus indicating significant risk in using such strategies. The authors 
concluded that this area could be further investigated since the difference 
between the profitability behaviour of the random walk model forecasts and the 
respondent forecasts suggest that there is potential in these models (i.e. not 
limited to static expectations with random noise). 
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Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2003) examined the expectation formation process of 
individual foreign exchange market participants. Data from 40 leading foreign 
exchange forecasters/dealers was used, in addition to forecasts from the 
Consensus Economics of London panel survey from January 1990 to December 
1994. The 3 and 12-month horizons were taken for the US dollar bilateral rates 
of the DM, yen and pound sterling, with Swamy and Fisher tests for the 
homogeneity of all individual coefficients. The authors estimated three basic 
expectation models: the extrapolative model (forecasters are chartists), the 
regressive framework (the exchange rate always returns to the equilibrium value, 
with independent movement), and the adaptive model (learning process where 
agents learn the ‘true’ level of the variable rather than its underlying process). 
Combining these models, the authors created a hybrid. The results showed that 
13 to 61 percent of individual coefficients differ significantly from the panel 
average (depending on the individual coefficient and the exchange rate) in the 
extrapolative model. The results also indicate approximately one-third of all 
traders — in the regressive framework — and significant (but weaker than in other 
models) level of heterogeneity in the adaptive model. The 12-month horizons 
were found to be more homogeneous in comparison to 3-months. As for the 
combined model, it also showed the lack of individual homogeneity. The authors 
concluded that the coexistence of various types of agents may be the cause of 
heterogeneity, and that heterogeneity in the observed financial markets is very 
significant. In a related study, Beine et al. (2007) estimated heterogeneity of 
trader expectations using a sample of 100 forecasters from 1992 to 1994 and 
another sample from 1996 to 2001, obtained from Consensus Forecasts 
(London) monthly surveys for the Japanese yen, the Deutsche Mark and the Euro 
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against the US dollar. The sample contains monthly surveys of analysts from 
banks and forecasting institutions of 1 to 24-month forecasts. Heterogeneity was 
found to be higher over a longer term horizon. Cross-section coefficients of 
variation were also used to measure individual forecast range. The lowest result 
was 2% in DEM-EUR market for three months forecasts, while the highest result 
was 10% (YEN, 12 months in 1998). Central bank interventions can be viewed 
as a possible means of generating different market opinions. For the DEM/USD 
and EUR/USD exchange rates, it was suggested that unexpected interventions 
raised information heterogeneity while interventions in the JPY/USD market 
produced mixed outcomes. 
Using a different approach, Menkhoff et al. (2009) classified subjects as either 
chartist or fundamentalist to explain heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations. 
The dataset used was obtained from the Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW) and the Deutsche Bundesbank, and contained 300 
professionals in three major exchange rates (US dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and 
JP-yen/euro) over 15 years from December 1991 to August 2006. The results 
showed that uncertainty among fundamentalists and a shift from dominating 
fundamentalists to the minor group of chartists has a positive correlation to 
heterogeneity. The main reasons for heterogeneous behaviour were exchange 
rate volatility, macroeconomic variables and (to a lesser degree) the risk premium 
influence. The risk captured by lagged exchange volatility explained 
heterogeneity, only and if there is no control for the three determinants: 1) 
uncertainty among fundamentalists, 2) a shift from dominating fundamentalists to 
the minor group of chartists and 3) whether these measures carry a risk premium. 
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Reitz et al. (2010) investigated heterogeneity in the Japanese currency market. 
Similar to Ito (1990), the authors examined the JPY/USD market, where they 
obtained their data from Consensus Economics Inc. The survey included monthly 
forecast spreads across a sample from October 1995 to December 2007, 
including 146 monthly forecasts from 31 individuals. They found a correlation 
between forecast dispersion and past exchange-rate volatility, such that 
heterogeneity increased with growing misalignments. The authors also found that 
heterogeneity expectations softened during periods of foreign exchange 
interventions by the Japanese Ministry of Finance. The study concluded that the 
magnitude of the interventions has a greater significance compared to the 
frequency of interventions, and that the former can greatly reduce heterogeneity 
in forecasts. 
Goldbaum and Zwinkels (2014) examined how expectations are formed by 
financial institutions operating in the foreign exchange market. They obtained 
forecast data from participating international financial institutions: a total of 146 
monthly observations, sourced from 31 companies, forecasting the Euro/Dollar 
and Yen/Dollar exchange rates over one, three, and twelve-month time horizons 
for the period of November 1995 to December 2004. A recursive and estimation 
algorithm was developed utilising the surveyed expectations. These responses 
were classified into two groups: the fundamentalists who were found to have 
mean-reverting expectations and the chartists who were found to have contrarian 
expectations. The switching model was very useful in explaining heterogeneity in 
the forecasts. Permitting panellists to switch between models improved the 
model’s accuracy predominantly over short forecast horizons. In addition, as the 
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forecast horizon increased, the fundamental model was found to be more 
popular. Finally, the results showed that the model of choice included a 
combination between period-specific and individual-specific determinants. 
Hsu et al. (2016) studied the heterogeneity of information, which are traders’ 
various responses to the same information (also called “trading due to the noise 
information”). Their study used data from the Taiwan Economic Journal database 
including daily closing prices, trading volume of each TSE stock, daily closing 
prices, number of the trading units and the trading volume of TSE Taiwan 
Capitalisation Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX) for the period of January 1995 to 
December 2008. The authors proposed a new theory regarding the heterogeneity 
of trading information and price-volume relationship. The empirical evidence 
demonstrates that stock price reversals often occur due to extremely large trading 
volumes; however, an abnormally large volume is not always the cause of price 
reversals. Their results strongly support the view that this is due to heterogeneity 
of trading information among traders during price reversals.  
The literature on institutional investors shows that there is significant 
heterogeneity among these entities. This may be due to institutional investors 
possessing unique private information, or proprietary forecasting models, which 
produce significantly different expectations. Nevertheless, these factors may not 
be common drivers of heterogeneity among retail traders since individual traders 
are less likely to possess superior information due to their limited resources to 
both gather and analyse complex sets of information. However, the 
abovementioned studies highlight that heterogeneity is not only present among 
35 
 
noise traders, but rather can be found at the institutional level, where resourceful 
entities can have different expectations of future market movements. 
2.1.6.3 Retail Traders 
Hayley and Marsh (2016) studied the quality of traders’ decisions in the retail FX 
market. The main aim was to determine if traders who are “learning by doing” 
(obtaining the experience by trading themselves) trade with better results over 
time. The authors used data from an anonymous online retail foreign exchange 
trading platform, including data such as number of trades, total value of trades, 
total value of positions that remain open after the 9pm reconciliation, capital 
injections and extractions, realised profit (loss), and personal information like the 
age and location (city and country). The scope of the data was from 4 January 
2010 to 29 June 2012. The study incorporated data from 95,617 unique traders 
and examined more than 4.8 million trader-day entries. Heterogeneity was 
measured as the investors’ performance, on a daily basis and compared to 
previous trading history. The authors concluded that certain types of traders 
always perform better than others, with one key finding being that older, more 
experienced traders responded differently to positive and/or negative market 
stimuli compared to younger traders. Therefore, there is some evidence 
supporting the existence of cross-sectional heterogeneity in retail FX markets, as 
per when using a variant of the Heckman selection model to estimate this 
phenomenon. The authors found no evidence that retail FX traders learn to trade 
more efficiently, although they did conclude that traders learn about their innate 
abilities (if they gain income from trading, they will continue investing and vice 
versa). They argued that foreign exchange traders with different level of abilities 
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invest differently, where beginner traders are more inclined to trade smaller 
amounts or less frequently compared to their more experienced counterparts, 
especially when the trading day was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the study 
focused more on the learning ability rather than on the heterogeneity itself, 
although it was examined as a part of traders’ learning behaviour. 
Similar evidence of heterogeneity has also been found by Abbey and Doukas 
(2015), using a sample of 428 foreign exchange traders from 2004 to 2009 and 
found that around 25% of traders exhibited skill and significantly outperformed a 
four-factor currency model, even inclusive of transaction costs. The authors also 
showed that traders in the heterogeneous population have a stronger tendency 
to quit. 
The literature presents evidence showing that individual retail FX traders exhibit 
heterogeneity in performance, and that such heterogeneity varies over the career 
of the trader. Hence, traders who have only just started their trading careers are 
likely to trade differently than those who have accumulated experience and 
learned to adapt to changing market conditions and varying market volatility. It 
follows that it is important to investigate heterogeneity among subgroups of 





2.2 Trading Skills  
2.2.1 Identifying Skilled Traders 
As mentioned previously, there is evidence of heterogeneity among retail foreign 
exchange traders that challenges classical finance theories. Given that there 
exists significant heterogeneity among retail FX traders, one would expect these 
traders to exhibit different levels of skill. According to Ramadorai (2006), good 
performing currency traders are those who pay attention to their returns from 
trading, while poor performers pay no attention to returns from trading and receive 
comparatively lower quality execution from financial dealers. The characteristics 
of traders in various asset classes linked with currency purchases can accurately 
identify the objectives of traders and determine heterogeneity among trader 
types. The author highlighted the importance of empirical analysis to investigate 
the variation of flows across currency traders as a determinant of trader 
performance and skill. 
Hayley and Marsh (2016) argued that foreign exchange market uncertainty is 
captured by large statistical variability in exchange rate fluctuations. Given this 
uncertainty, the authors did not find consistent evidence of positive performance 
among retail FX traders, which may be due to the fact that exchange rates 
frequently follow a drift-less random walk.  
In an earlier paper, Levich (1979) investigated the variability of unanticipated 
exchange rate changes over a five-year period, and found that floating exchange 
rates can have periods of both stable and turbulent trading activity. The study 
showed that firms and investors cannot take advantage of the currency markets 
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and earn abnormal returns, given the assumption that foreign exchange markets 
do not have frequent announcements of fundamental information regarding 
exchange rates. Moreover, Levich (1979) described how the costs associated 
with obtaining information can lead to uninformed trading and inefficient markets. 
As such, profits are correlated with the cost of information, which implies a greater 
likelihood of informed market participants earning higher profits compared to 
uninformed agents. If information is not easily and readily accessible then it can 
be characterised as having an advantageous edge, where excess returns are 
possible. The study concludes that in foreign exchange markets, where 
fundamental information is generally disclosed uniformly to the market, there 
should be no room for excess returns resulting from private information. This 
echoes the seminal work of Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1975) who argued that 
rational speculators will not trade unless they can expect to earn abnormal profits. 
Pojarliev and Levich (2010) argued that currency returns are unpredictable and 
uncorrelated to the general market. This implies that agents’ skills are crucial in 
foreign exchange markets, as well as the instruments used to estimate their 
performance. However, currency managers’ returns are in part due to skill, and 
in part due to varying exposure to risk factors. The study showed that 
heterogeneity arises due to differences in traders’ skill levels and that some 
managers exhibit better persistent performance stemming from diversification 
strategies. 
From a different perspective, Cornell (1979) discovered that inside information 
leads to abnormal profits and noted there is a significant difference between 
informed and uninformed traders in terms of average daily returns. This shows 
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the extent to which a trader’s performance can be influenced by a high level of 
information asymmetry. The author showed that in contrast to uninformed 
traders, informed traders accumulate wealth at a greater rate, which implies a 
growing fraction of the market. If differences in performance can be detected, 
rational investors should choose informed portfolio managers to manage their 
funds and in turn the informed portfolio managers should dominate the market. 
Rational condition implies there is no pattern to error terms. If such a pattern 
exists, uninformed investors can exploit it to improve their probability of success. 
The study concludes that uninformed traders believe that there are no mispriced 
securities.  
From an institutional benchmarking perspective, Amiri et al. (2010) and Melvin 
and Shad (2011) noted several “challenges” for evaluating currency investment 
manager performance, such as the lack of a currency market portfolio, which can 
be used as a benchmark, and the lack of “buy and hold” strategies in the FX 
market. Hence there is no standardised benchmark for evaluating traders’ 
performance with respect to currencies and the foreign exchange market.  
I will begin by discussing the empirical findings on ‘skill’ among retail foreign 
exchange traders. Given the scarce amount of literature previously published on 
retail FX traders, I will also discuss some of the most popular papers on 
institutional foreign exchange forecasters and on the evidence of ‘skill’ in other 
markets including futures and equities markets. 
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2.2.2 Skill Among Retail FX Traders 
Abbey and Doukas (2015) examined individual currency investor performance, 
drawdown, trading and timing abilities. Despite the fact that foreign exchange 
traders are considered to be extremely risky, they proved that individual traders 
(about 25%) are able to generate abnormal returns, with a positive relation 
between agents’ performance and trade activity being found as a result of the 
study. The primary dataset of their research was provided by an online advisory 
service Collective2.com for individual retail spot currency traders. Collective2 
(www.collective2.com) was founded in 2001 and is one of the most established 
platforms in the industry. The dataset consisted of 428 accounts, 9,282 registered 
account holders and 78,362 roundtrip transactions from March 2004 to 
September 2009. Investors were classified as intra-day traders (i.e. those who 
hold positions open for less than a day) and inter-day traders (i.e. those who keep 
positions open for more than one trading day). The following trader characteristics 
of agents were provided: names, account description, the number of contracts 
opened and closed, P/L, net profit ratio and for further analysis, the following 
variables were computed: trades per day, daily turnover, transaction costs per 
contract and the age of an account. To begin, the authors computed the raw daily 
return of each investor as a sum of all roundtrip transactions and the nominal 
dollar change in the value of open positions. Using closing spot currency prices 
for different currency pairs, they calculated the purchase and selling prices of 
contracts. Consequently, the authors went on to present gross and net returns 
per portfolio and individual contract (details provided in the methodology section). 
Also, the authors took into consideration traders’ risk-adjusted performance, 
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providing a passive benchmark model proxied by the Deutsche Bank Currency 
Return Index (DBCR), raw returns, and a modified version of alpha from the four-
factor currency model of Pojarliev and Levich (2012). The four possible factors 
presented by Pojarliev and Levich are: 
• Carry Strategy: buying in a low-interest rate currency and investing in a 
higher interest-rate currency. The risk associated with this strategy (which 
leads to greatest losses) is fully borne out if the low-interest rate currency 
depreciates by more than the applicable interest differential.  
• Trend Following Strategy: investing in currencies with upside 
momentum financed by borrowing currencies with downside momentum 
and vice versa. The risks associated with this strategy are sudden 
reversals of trends of patterns, excessive trading costs and so on. 
• Value Strategy: investing in an undervalued currency whilst borrowing in 
an overvalued currency. The risk associated with this strategy is that 
currencies may become more misaligned i.e. their rates reverting toward 
the equilibrium (Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)) value, or that the real 
exchange rate changes consistently with the new PPP exchange rate. 
• Volatility: this does not reflect the returns of a trading strategy, but does 
affect the change in foreign exchange volatility. Volatility risk entails 
opening simultaneous currency positions in spot FX, but also, in other 
derivatives such as options whose prices are sensitive to volatility.  
In the futures market, Hartzmark (1991) studied whether investors’ profits were 
the result of skill or pure luck. Hartzmark argued that the returns of futures traders 
are generated by a stochastic process. Consequently, the author presents the 
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“luck hypothesis”, which is based on the observed distribution of the forecasting 
abilities of traders; given the fact that superior and inferior traders regress toward 
the mean when comparing early and late period forecasting ability. All models 
proved that individual traders earn positive and significant gross and raw returns 
with passive benchmark models, showing that traders gain profits even after 
commissions (the four-factor model does not show this result). The best score for 
a gross daily raw return, according to the study, was 1.04% per day, and the worst 
was 0.25% per day. As for net profits, the highest one was 0.71%, and the lowest 
-0.57%, according to a net raw return model. The paper concluded that investors 
are able to generate profits in FX markets, but that transaction costs weigh 
heavily on their returns. It was also observed that intra-day traders are more 
successful than inter-day traders, according to all three performance measures. 
Another finding was that the higher the past returns, the more active trading 
activity tends to become. One of the possible reasons for significantly abnormal 
profits amongst individual traders is their proportionately higher propensity for 
risk-taking behaviour, expressed through their use of higher leverage ratios. In 
addition, these traders’ trading process resembled rather more a gambling 
approach than a trading strategy.  
In a more recent study, Hayley and Marsh (2016) estimated how traders’ 
performance is affected by investor participation in the FX market. They found a 
strong degree of heterogeneity in agents’ profitability levels. They used success 
ratio as one of the measures (having the limitation of the percentage of profitable 
days instead of closed trades). The data was provided by an anonymous online 
retail foreign exchange trading platform. The dataset begins on 4 January 2010 
43 
 
and ends on 29 June 2012. The data consisted of the complete trading history of 
a random sample of 95,617 unique traders, amounting to almost 4.8 million 
trader-day entries. Their results showed the average success ratio to be under 
50% with very high dispersion. Some traders were unsuccessful on every 
day they traded, while 10% of traders won three days out of five. The results 
showed that a high level of average career success in the past can help predict 
higher future returns. The same success ratio was applied to model the 
propensity of traders to cease trading altogether. The results showed an inverse 
correlation between career success and the desire to cease trading. 
The above evidence shows that very few traders possess genuine trading skill 
irrespective of the financial instrument being traded. Moreover, performance of 
traders is widely dispersed, meaning that there is no consistency across traders 
and that performance is distributed across a wide spectrum of outcomes. This 
implies that performance in general is highly random and unpredictable. 
2.2.3 Forecasting Power of Trading Strategies 
Rules-based strategies have been very popular in the FX market, and they have 
been shown to significantly outperform the S&P 500 index with a higher Sharpe 
ratio over all periods (Neely and Weller, 2013). Poti and Siddique (2013) model 
the admissible amount of predictability corresponding to a broad class of rational 
currency pricing models, and find that predictability itself is predictable. This 
challenges the efficient market hypothesis of Fama (1970) but is consistent with 
microstructure models of FX markets where individual retail traders seek to 
maximise returns relative to total risk rather than systematic risk alone. Given the 
44 
 
notion that traders aim to generate profits that compensate them for the total risk 
they are willing to take, many studies have investigated the profitability of trading 
strategies among FX traders. 
One of the early studies was conducted by Levich (1979) who measured investor 
returns from different forecasters to examine the accuracy of information when 
predicting future exchange rates. The author observed methods from nine 
leading foreign exchange advisory services, with Harris Bank providing the data 
for spot and forward exchange rates for the period January 1967 to February 
1979. After testing different forecasting methods and models, the author 
concluded that most advisory service forecasts are not as accurate as market 
forward rates. However, the fraction of good predictions was significantly higher 
than expected. Using the differences in expected forward rate movements, the 
author showed that traders might only be interested in the sign (whether it is a 
gain or a loss) of their profits rather than the magnitude. Relatedly, Goodman 
(1979) applied three measures for predicting a trend, point estimate accuracy, 
and speculative return on invested capital, in order to investigate the accuracy of 
trading strategies in terms of forecasting foreign exchange rate movements. The 
author used ten major forecasting services which included six economics-
oriented services and four technically-oriented services, and examined their 
predictive accuracy for six currencies (French Franc, Canadian Dollar, Japanese 
Yen, German Mark, Swiss Franc and British Pound) against the US dollar from 
January 1976 to June 1978. Traders who followed indicators at random were 
found to be less profitable compared to those that implemented buy and hold 
strategies (1.12% annually before transaction costs against 2.86% per annum 
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before transaction costs). Successful forecasting services are predominantly 
technical-analysis-oriented, and on average return 7.28% and 10.46% annually 
before transaction costs. Goodman concluded that forecasting abilities play a 
significant role in earning profits. 
Bilson (1981) examined whether there were any possibilities for speculative 
profits in FX markets by linking the volatility of exchange rates and the existence 
of opportunities. Using the five major currencies: the Canadian dollar, the Pound 
sterling, the Deutsche mark, the French franc and the Japanese yen from January 
17, 1975, to November 14, 1980, the author found a positive correlation between 
the volatility of exchange rates, and the level of speculative activity. Specifically, 
the more stable the market is, the less successful speculators are, which is a 
conclusion that is contrary to Telser’s (1959) findings. Later, Bilson (1987) 
calculated the investor returns of those who used a speculative strategy in the 
foreign exchange markets. The study investigated the efficiency of investors’ 
forecasting models compared to the random walk model, using the rate of return 
and the actual amount of profits. The data consisted of 666 observations taken 
on the Friday of every fourth week of the spot rate and the one-month forward 
rate, over the period from July 1974 to January 1980. The data consisted of low-
interest rate currencies such as the Swiss franc and high-interest rate currencies 
such as the Italian lira. In total, the data covered nine currencies (British pound, 
Canadian dollar, French franc, Belgian franc, Italian lira, Deutsche mark, Dutch 
guilder, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen). The author examined the speculative 
model’s performance within their portfolios, calculating the gross profits, the 
expected net dollar profit and the Return on Investment (ROI). The latter was 
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calculated with the assumption that speculators earn the Treasury Bill rate on the 
margin, so the net profit is the sum of the speculative activity gains and the 
interest on the margin minus applicable transactions costs. Ten percent over the 
four-week span was found to be the best ROI for the observed period, although 
the model is believed to be profitable only “on average”.  
Similarly, Schulmeister (1988) examined speculative profitability using data on 
the dollar and the Deutsche mark from March 1973 to March 1988. The author 
showed that technical trading rules increase returns without increasing risks. 
Further analysis examined the riskiness of technical analysis by testing the mean 
of the single rates of return against zero, and demonstrated that this type of 
trading is profitable during the entire period covered (from 1973 to 1986). Despite 
the fact that the number of losses exceeded the number of wins, the average 
duration of the profitable positions was longer than that of the unprofitable 
positions. This can be considered as evidence of Big Hit Ability (BHA), a term 
coined in a later study. 
Levich and Thomas (1993) also used the rate of return to estimate technical 
trading rules, potentially profitable for investors in the foreign exchange market. 
The authors used a dataset from I.P. Sharpe & Co., and the International 
Monetary Market of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, for five currencies (British 
pound, Canadian dollar, German mark, Japanese yen and Swiss franc), covering 
the period from January 1, 1976, to December 31, 1990, using 3,800 daily 
observations in total. The results showed that different currencies act differently, 
but from the 1970s to the 1980s the high level of profitability of simple technical 
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trading models was observable at numerous trading venues. Since the 1990’s 
(possibly due to central bank interventions) the rate of return has declined.  
The opportunities for profitable trading in European spot cross-rates were studied 
by Lee and Mathur (1996). The authors used six different currency pairs (JY/BP, 
DM/BP, JY/DM, SF/DM, SF/BP, and JY/SF) from data provided by the Knight 
Ridder Database, from May 23, 1988 to December 31, 1993. The author’s 
calculated daily returns on cross-rates trading and checked if the moving average 
trading rule is a profitable one. The results showed that only two of the six 
currencies (JY/DM and JY/SF cross-rates) delivered profits with the use of this 
strategy. Overall, the results suggest that it is not profitable to use the specified 
moving average trading rules in European cross-rates. 
Levich and Poti (2015) investigated the predictability and returns attractiveness 
of trading strategies in the FX market. Using currency returns from 1971 to 2006, 
the authors find evidence that predictability often exceeds an upper-bound “no 
good-deal” threshold. Moreover, strategies that aim to exploit daily excess-
predictability are very sensitive to transaction costs, while strategies that have a 
monthly time horizon remain attractive even after deducting trading costs. 
Trading costs and market volatility can be detrimental to performance and must 
be taken into account when calculating ex-post performance. For instance, 
Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) used data from spot trading in equities and 
currencies, between 2014 and 2015, in the seven largest asset trading centres, 
to measure investors’ return when implementing technical analysis. The authors 
determined that traders could be profitable despite paying transaction costs and 
that there is a positive relationship between these returns and level of currency 
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volatility. They also found that performance of technical models is not consistent 
over time.  
Similarly, in an attempt to account for volatility, Charlebois and Sapp (2007) used 
daily excess returns data and the Sharpe ratio, from January 1, 1988, to 
December 31, 1999, for the US dollar-Deutsche Mark spot exchange rate, to 
measure trading strategy profitability. They concluded that using at-the-money 
option strategies is more profitable than trading strategies based only on historical 
exchange rate data and that options appear to contain information about future 
spot exchange rate movements. Similar to Lee and Mathur (1996), they observed 
the moving average (MA) trading rule performance. As a result, the MA strategy 
generated returns (3.42% annually), proving that the foreign exchange market is 
not an efficient one. Similarly, Villanueva (2007) investigated whether currency 
excess returns can be used to predict the forward premium, using data from 
DataStream for the monthly spot rates DEM, JPY, and GBP over the period 
January 1981 to December 1998. Villanueva defined the success ratio as the 
fraction of correct predictions, and showed that standard mean square can be 
used for profit generation. 
In general, the results of the abovementioned papers show that technical trading 
strategies do generate positive returns. This implies an inefficient foreign 
exchange market which exhibits profitable anomalies that can be exploited by 
traders. While there may exist profitable market trends in the short-term as shown 
by ex-post analyses, it may require a truly skilled trader to be able to identify such 
opportunities as they are happening in real time.  
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2.2.4 Institutional Forecasters and Traders 
Marsh and Power (1996) calculated the performance of 22 forecasters to test if 
their strategies are profitable and accurate. The dataset used included industrial 
corporations, commercial and investment banks, Chambers of Commerce and 
forecasting agencies, from the Group of Seven nations (G7) (six countries 
overall). The authors compared the Deutschmark, Pound sterling and Japanese 
yen as traded currencies against the US dollar, for the period September 1989 to 
August 1992. Overall, their results showed that forecasting strategies are not 
profitable. Two portfolios were created to estimate investors’ performance, with 
an average expected profit target set for each forecaster at $100, and actual 
results tallied thereafter. Converting to the rate of return measure, only 7 of 22 
agents showed positive results, and only two demonstrated the significantly 
positive average profits, set at 10%. With regards to excess profits, only one 
forecaster had a return significantly greater than zero (5%). 
Melvin and Shad (2011) examined currency investment manager performance 
evaluation. Skill in timing and minimising drawdowns were the generic factors 
used to differentiate skilled investors. For empirical evidence, the study used the 
Deutsche Bank FXSelect platform and collected information about 42 managers’ 
activities from November 2004 to May 2009. To explain a manager’s return on a 
time-varied basis they used a moving window regression approach, where one 
of the factors is the expected return on a certain currency. The authors built an 
estimator with the use of a covariance matrix of returns with higher weighting 
allocated to currency pairs where the correlation of returns is high as well as to 
currencies with riskier returns.  
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Using a similar dataset, Pojarliev and Levich (2011) estimated currency investors’ 
performance to find out if their trading behaviour is similar with one another. They 
also used the database from Deutsche Bank FXSelect platform of hedge funds’ 
returns from April 6, 2005, until June 30, 2010. The authors measured the total 
return as a regression with such factors as a measure of active manager skill, a 
systematic risk premium in the market, the sensitivity of the manager’s returns to 
the factor and a random error term. The model showed between 50% and 75% 
variability in currency fund returns. It was also observed that strong and weak 
performers remain consistent over 2-3 year horizons. The authors also applied 
this model to currency volatility in relation to professional currency managers and 
found that currency volatility is a significant causal factor. 
In general, the literature on institutional forecasters and traders in the FX market 
shows that these entities exhibit heterogeneity in performance, and that 
persistence exists in both top and bottom performers. This may suggest that 
some institutional entities possess different private information and use different 
proprietary models which leads them to varying market expectations. 
2.2.5 Evidence on Futures Traders 
One prominent study in the futures markets was conducted by Hartzmark (1991), 
who investigated traders’ skills to predict price movements in futures markets, 
and argued that profitability is the result of luck. The author used data from July 
1977 to December 1981 from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) for the following markets: Chicago Board of Trade (oats, wheat, U.S. T-
bonds), Minneapolis Grain Exchange (wheat), Kansas City Board of Trade 
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(wheat), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (pork bellies, live cattle, feeder castle), 
and International Monetary Market (90-day T-Bills). The author categorised 
traders as “Pure hedgers” (commercial traders), “pure speculators” (non-
commercial), and those who report both kinds of positions. Only traders who 
made at least 25 transactions (purchases or sales) were included in the study. 
The author developed the Big Hit Ability (BHA) measure to examine traders’ 
ability to increase their position whenever the market moved favourably with a 
significant change. Hartzmark stated that trading in the futures market is 
statistically analogous to a coin toss where positive and negative outcomes are 
determined by luck. In other words, returns are generated by a stochastic 
process. The author showed that there is no significant relationship between 
dollar returns and forecasting coefficients. Moreover, the distribution of the BHA 
measure was found to be positively skewed: all seven observed markets were 
uniformly distributed for commercial traders and five out of seven markets were 
uniformly distributed for non-commercial traders. The only market where 
forecasting ability was significant and positive was the oat market where the 
results were dominated by traders with significantly large-volume positions. The 
author concluded that private information could be the reason for the high level 
of BHA. Moreover, while commercial investors showed better forecasting abilities 
compared to non-commercial investors, their returns still depended on luck. 
Similarly, Leuthold et al. (1994) also applied the BHA measure in the futures 
market to examine the frozen pork bellies traded on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange over a 9-year period (1982-1990). The sample contained 3,171 traders 
with over 450,000 daily trading observations. The authors used the rate of return 
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to calculate investors’ performance, and measured the BHA of the observed 
traders. The results showed that investors had a very strong ability to forecast 
and make a big hit (forty profitable agents compared to eighteen losers), and the 
forecast coefficients showed a significant relation to the profitability, especially for 
speculators and short hedgers.  
Egelkraut et al. (2007) also used the BHA measure of Hartzmark (1991) to 
investigate whether investors can predict price volatility changes in the corn 
options market. The authors used data provided by the Chicago Board of Trade 
on corn options settlement prices on contracts from 2 January 1987 to 31 
December 2001, and daily corn futures settlement prices from 17 February 1984 
to 22 November 2002. Their results showed that early-year options predict the 
direction and change of realised volatility, unlike the later-year options.  
The success ratio was used by Alquist and Kilian (2010) to measure the extent 
to which oil futures can estimate future market prices. The dataset contained daily 
prices of crude oil futures from NYMEX from March 1983 to February 2007. The 
authors defined the success ratio as the fraction of forecasts that correctly 
predicted turning points in the price of oil, based on the success ratio statistic of 
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992). Their results showed that the predictions were 
only correct at the 9-month and 12-month horizons. 
Fishe and Smith (2012) identified informed traders in futures markets using the 
success ratio and used data from the Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS), 
which is maintained by the CFTC and included the trades of 8,921 traders in 12 
commodity markets (corn, soybeans, wheat, copper, gold, silver, WTI crude oil, 
heating oil, natural gas, cotton, soybean oil and sugar futures contracts) from 
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January 2000 to May 2009. The authors used a binary measure of success and 
identified only a small percentage of traders as overnight informed or daily 
informed. Moreover, the authors found significant predictive power for various 
trader characteristics such as trading experience, position size, trading frequency 
and type of positions. 
The evidence in the futures market mainly suggests that it is not skill, but rather 
luck which results in some trader exhibiting positive excess performance. One 
may argue that the futures market is mainly commodity-based where there is little 
fundamental information about the underlying asset, which is mainly driven by 
forces of supply and demand. As such, private information to generate positive 
excess returns may not be available in the futures market, which implies that the 
performance of top traders in this market is not due to skill but rather to luck. 
2.2.6 Evidence on Stock Traders 
Following the earlier argument that there is not much opportunity to gather 
significant private information in the futures market, I review the evidence 
provided in the stock market, where it is possible to obtain fundamental 
information about the stock being traded through in-depth company research. In 
an early study, Ross (1975) defined winning traders as those who recorded a 
profit after deducting commissions over the entire life of the account. The author 
investigated two groups of investors of a large commodity trading house. After 
fees had been deducted from profits, the majority of both groups of traders 
incurred losses. Losses were the highest during the first two years, and there was 
no evidence of improved performance after accounting for trading experience. 
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Traders have the tendency to become addicted to speculation and deposit more 
funds even if they continue to lose. Ross concluded that many investors lack the 
background necessary to be successful and rely heavily on their brokers — which 
further highlights the importance of choosing a suitable broker. Hence, the 
research obtained from the broker adds value to the trader, rather than the trader 
adding value through skill. 
Nicolosi et al. (2009) examined traders’ ability to forecast both the direction and 
magnitude of future excess stock returns. The sample contained 78,000 
households from January 1991 to December 1996, including information about 
end-of-month portfolio positions, all trades (common stocks, options, and other 
securities) and investor characteristics files (age, income, etc.). The authors 
analysed retail investors’ stock trades and showed that individual investors learn 
from their trading experience. They defined forecasting ability to be the 
percentage of pervious trades that were profitable overall. Their results showed 
that stock selection ability significantly affects stock purchases, with the exception 
of short-term (5 trading days) forecasts. The evidence suggests that individual 
stock investors do learn and adjust their behaviour effectively, thus improving 
investment performance over time. 
Similarly, Griffin et al. (2012) investigated private information at the broker level. 
The data used consisted of brokerage houses trading NASDAQ-listed firms from 
January 2, 1997 to December 31, 2002, and included date, time, ticker symbol, 
trade size, the price of each transaction for each stock and market maker IDs 
from the settlement process. To identify successful brokers, the authors used the 
success ratio, defined as the percentage of imbalances in the right direction for 
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the identification of those clients. They found that some investors gain profits in 
the twenty-day period prior to earnings announcements. However, it was 
undetermined whether their trading decisions and performance were based on 
private or public information. They concluded there is no evidence to identify 
brokerage-level trading patterns of information leakage to favoured clients. 
The evidence from equity traders shows that information can give traders an 
advantage to generate excess positive returns. This is in contrast to the general 
findings in the futures markets where positive returns are attributed to luck rather 
than skill. This argument raises the question of whether positive performance in 
the FX market is due to luck since there is very infrequent fundamental news 
announcements by central banks and governments compared to earnings and 
company news announcements in the equities market. While the FX market is 
driven to a certain extent by macroeconomic factors such as interest rates and 
government policies, the overall price dynamics of this market have been 
characterised as a random walk (Hayley and Marsh 2016). Nevertheless, savvy 
traders may be able to gauge some of the fundamental directional movements of 
the market based on expectations of how governments and central banks will 
change their policies. Such qualitative data has become available and easily 
accessible in the form of surveys and polls from news agencies and even through 
social media. Hence, there should exist potential opportunities to generate 
positive excess returns from fundamental information in the FX market, and it is 
up to the individual trader to gather, analyse, and correctly interpret the news in 
order to make an informed trading decision. 
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2.2.7 A Note on Skill vs. Luck 
Distinguishing between skill or luck is one of the most debated topic in financial 
literature, especially regarding mutual fund and hedge fund managers. Such 
distinction is important from a forward-looking decision-making perspective 
because skill is generally permanent while luck is random by definition. An 
investor who was skilled during the last period will most likely be skilled in the 
future period, while an investor who was lucky last period is no more likely to be 
lucky again than any other investor in future periods. 
While arguing that the separation of skill and luck is an important task, actually 
doing so is a very challenging endeavour since skill and luck are not 
independently observable (Cornell, 2009). Nevertheless, skill has been strongly 
associated with performance, and the latter can be measured using a variety of 
techniques and metric. However, depending on the performance measure that is 
used, the conclusion about skill can vary significantly. The performance 
measures that will be used in this thesis will be discussed in greater detail in the 
methodology section, but I present two of them here in order to highlight the 
difficulty and subjectivity behind assessing an individual’s skill. 
Two of the measures that I will use are the success rate (SR) of a trader, which 
is simply the proportion of successful trades, and the return on investment (ROI), 
which captures the profit generated in relation to the balance of the trader. 
Suppose a trader executes nine profitable trades, each with a profit of one dollar, 
and one unprofitable trade with a loss of ten dollar. If we compute the SR of the 
trader we obtain a 90% rate, which signifies an ability to predict the direction of 
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future price movements. However, when we compute the ROI of the trader, we 
obtain a negative number which means that the trader in unable to add value in 
absolute terms to their initial wealth. As such, the SR suggests that the trader has 
skill while the ROI implies otherwise. Another argument is that the trader may 
indeed possess the skill to predict future price movements and add value in dollar 
terms when considering the first nine trades, but may lack the proper risk 
management skills to hedge against extreme adverse price swings. This shows 
that there are many different types of skills, each of which is valuable in regards 
to generating and preserving wealth. 
This discussion emphasises the point that there are many different types of skills 
and measuring them is a very difficult task. In this thesis, I specifically test for 
three performance-based skills which are 1) a trader’s ability to correctly predict 
future price changes, 2) a trader’s ability to add value in absolute terms to an 
initial investment, and 3) a trader’s ability to profitably adjust their position size 




2.3 Market Volatility  
2.3.1 Market Participation and Volatility 
The relationship between the level of trader participation and exchange rate 
volatility was examined by Hau (1998) using data on trading profits sourced from 
twenty large U.S. banks, and showed that higher trader participation increases 
exchange rate volatility (Ito et al., 1998). The author developed a dynamic model 
of endogenous traders subject to heterogeneous expectations and found that 
expectation errors create excessive market entry and excess volatility. 
Specifically, marginal trader entry in the market has two effects: 1) “it increases 
the capacity of the market to absorb exogenous supply risk” and 2) “it adds noise 
and endogenous trading risk”. In the case of a positive tax on margin traders, 
participation and volatility decreases alongside an increase in market efficiency. 
The model suggests additional market implications such as an explanation for 
exchange rate heteroscedasticity and a positive correlation between volatility and 
trading profits. High information content of the market price translates into 
negative information externality that dominates risk sharing benefits. 
Similarly, Bauwens et al. (2006) presented evidence that does not support the 
hypothesis that an increase in the number of traders reduces volatility. The 
authors investigated the relationship between volatility and other market 
determinants (central bank policy, the number of information events, etc.), using 
Norwegian weekly exchange rate volatility figures from 1993 to 2003. The authors 
used distribution hypothesis (MDH) to prove that investors may purchase 
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currencies even when volatility is elevated, which indicates their high-risk 
tolerance/appetite. 
The evidence presented above implies that volatility in popular markets, such as 
the EUR/USD, should be no different than the volatility in other exotic currency 
pairs. One reason for this may be due to FX markets being interrelated as 
contended by interest rate parity theory. It follows that an increase in volatility in 
one currency will spill over into other currencies since the flows in and out of one 
currency will be channelled into others. This implies that we can expect similar 
volatility-performance relationships across currencies that have similar 
characteristics, including liquidity and spreads to name a few. Nevertheless, 
liquidity is often sparse and spreads are wider in exotic pairs, which means that, 
while volatility may spill over into these exotic currencies, the magnitude and 
effect of the volatility may be more complex to estimate especially during times 
of market turbulence. 
2.3.2 Trader Expectations and Volatility 
Hau (1998) distinguished between financial institutions and traders. The author 
described financial institutions as rational venues that make critical decisions 
regarding which traders to hire to undertake trading activities on their behalf. On 
the one hand, traders’ profitability is influenced by past and current exchange 
rates — they have imperfect trading abilities due to temporary expectational 
errors related to the excess return, which can deviate from the optimal currency 
demand. On the other hand, financial institutions can make optimal hiring 
decisions based on rational expectations about the traders’ imperfect trading 
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abilities. The author found a positive relationship among trading profits and 
volatility for financial institutions, and a limited forecasting ability among traders. 
This means that if the expected profits are too low relative to the level of financial 
risk, financial institutions will not enter the market. After investigating expected 
excess returns, price volatility and investors’ demand, the author concluded that 
under high volatility, risk-averse agents naturally reduce their demand since it is 
more difficult to make predictions and remain profitable.  
Carlson and Osler (2000) investigated the microstructural connection between 
rational speculative activity and exchange rate volatility by distinguishing between 
two types of agents: 1) informed or rational speculators and 2) the current account 
traders who can be interpreted as importers and exporters of goods and services. 
In addition, the authors considered two types of market shocks: 1) those that do 
not affect speculators' preferred portfolio positions directly (like changes in 
liquidity demand), and 2) those that bring direct influence, such as changes in 
interest rates. Regarding the latter type of market shock, the authors showed that 
speculators do not play a stabilising role due to the fact that conditional variance 
amongst exchange rates monotonically increases with the amount of speculation 
activity. The authors also modelled the speculators’ constant absolute risk 
aversion utility function, which reflects their desire to take a bet each period for a 
certain amount of profits, and the welfare function, which reflects speculators’ 
expected utility, in order to identify the desired target portfolio. Risk premium of 
the speculators depends on risk aversion, the outstanding stock of foreign 
currency and the exchange rate's conditional variability. In summary, the 
exchange rate's variance causes speculators to adjust their bet coefficients.  
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Jeanne and Rose (2002) also investigated volatility in the foreign exchange 
market using monthly data obtained from the Financial Times Currency 
Forecaster for thirteen different (dollar) exchange rates from 1996 to 1999. They 
found that exchange rate volatility may include a non-fundamental component: 
noise trading that is based on whims, fads and non-fundamental influences 
(Jeanne and Rose 2002, p. 2). The authors further examined the reasons behind 
noise traders’ decisions to enter the currency markets, and argued that noise 
traders have two counteracting roles: 1) to create risk and 2) to share risk. The 
authors developed a conventional monetary model of the exchange rate with 
flexible prices to calculate the price of foreign exchange rates by assuming that 
investors are risk averse and that they will not enter into currency transactions if 
the exchange rate is stochastic. Investors were modelled to have the same 
endowments and tastes, but with different levels of trading ability. Some of them 
were able to form accurate expectations on risk and returns, while other had noisy 
expectations with associated entry costs. Traders decisions to enter the market, 
the portfolio allocation problem and the end-of-life wealth of each trader were 
modelled. Since noise traders have imperfect knowledge of the determinants of 
the exchange rates, their activities are expected to increase volatility. In addition, 
the authors found that exchange rate variance tends to raise the risk premium, 
and at the same time, increases the total number of investors demanding 
domestic currency, which lowers the risk premium (non-monotonic influence). As 
for the influence of volatility on traders, trade volume is higher with floating 
exchange rates. This means that agents tend to trade more following higher 
returns. Similarly, Shi and Xu (2009) expanded on the work of Jeanne and Rose 
(2002) by proposing a model incorporating noise traders with noisy expectations 
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and informed traders with rational expectations, where both categories of 
individuals must pay an entry cost to trade in the foreign exchange market. Noise 
traders may create big fluctuations and because of that, informed agents build 
their expectations about excess returns, considering the relative presence of 
noise traders in the market. As for investors’ behaviour, their decision to enter the 
market is based on the time of market shocks, the expected returns and the future 
exchange rate. 
In a more recent study, Skoupil (2015) examined the behaviour patterns of foreign 
exchange hedgers, whose aim is to minimise FX market risk. The author defined 
hedging activity as “managing market risk in a way that both the risk and the costs 
caused by the hedging are in approximate balance” (Skoupil 2015, p. 512). Since 
the level of volatility is a very deterministic feature in the foreign exchange market, 
hedgers have to pay strong attention to its ever-changing rate. Hedgers cannot 
be consistently profitable since they are not sufficiently informative, therefore they 
try to minimise their exposure (volatility of profit and loss) to FX market risk while 
maintaining the necessary part of the business activity in denominated foreign 
currencies. Using EUR/USD exchange rates from January 2010 to February 
2015, the author calculated 1) the sum of expected positive and negative cash 
flows in the foreign currency, 2) the value contracts that are already concluded at 
a fixed price and volume, and 3) contracts that are expected to happen based on 
the available information. The study concluded that if hedgers want to decrease 
the volatility of profit and loss, they need to decrease the level of exposure to 
foreign exchange rate volatility. 
63 
 
In a related study, Corte et al. (2016) examined the relationship between return 
and volatility predictions by creating a currency strategy to predict the currency 
volatility risk premium (VRP) for changes in spot exchange rates (i.e. the 
difference between expected future realised currency volatility and a model-free 
measure of implied volatility derived from currency options). The mechanics of 
the VRP strategy are the following: the strategy buys currency with a relatively 
cheap volatility insurance (highest volatility risk premium quintile) and sells 
currencies with expensive volatility insurance (lowest volatility risk premium 
quintile). This mechanism can be defined as the cost of insurance against 
volatility fluctuations in the underlying currency. The authors studied how the 
latter can affect currency returns predictions and thus investors decisions to form 
their portfolios. They concluded that there is a mutual relationship between 
volatility and traders’ behaviour. For example, as the well-informed and wealthy 
investors start trading, the fluctuations may become significant, which goes on to 
affect other agents forming or changing their expectations about future volatility 
and expected returns. Many market participants are found to increase their 
trading volume in response to abnormal profits. However, when volatility reaches 
a certain point, investors tend to reduce their purchases to avoid significant 
losses. Thus, the main findings are that: 1) there exists an intention to generate 
more profits while volatility is high, and 2) agents build and apply different 
expectation models to predict those fluctuations. 
All evidence presented in the literature supports a positive relation between 
market volatility and trader participation in the FX market. The reason is that 
heightened market volatility produces large price swings which traders deem 
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highly potentially profitable. Nevertheless, high volatility can also be detrimental 
to performance, especially for highly leveraged positions. As such, I expect that 
the higher the market volatility, the less the trader is able to gauge the direction 
of the market, and the less the individual is able to demonstrate their skill. In other 
words, heightened levels of volatility will negatively impact a trader’s skill and 
performance. 
2.3.3 Volume and Volatility 
Hagiwara and Herce (1999) examined how exchange rate volatility influences 
investors’ portfolio and trading volume. They used data from Harris Banks, in 
details a one-month Euro-currency rate for Canada, United Sates (US), United 
Kingdom (UK), France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, 
and Japan, having also the spot exchange rates for the Canadian dollar, Belgium 
franc, British pound, German mark, French franc, Italian lira, Dutch guilder, Swiss 
franc, and Japanese yen to test their models’ efficiency (971 observations from 1 
June 1973 to 3 January 1992, except for the EUR-YEN rate). The authors 
developed two models: 1) a model of portfolio choice, where the volatility of real 
exchange rate was used and 2) a model that highlighted the relationship between 
trading volume and volatility. The authors found that different patterns of the 
relationship between volume and price variability emerge depending on the 
distribution of endowments and when the distribution of these endowments is 
symmetric, the correlation between volatility and trading volume is positive, and 
vice versa for asymmetric endowments.  
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The relation among volatility, trading volume and spreads was also studied by 
Galati (2000), who found that volatility and bid-ask spreads are positively 
correlated. Trading volume is found to have a positive correlation to volatility, but 
only during periods of stable volatility, while a negative correlation is found when 
volatility increases sharply. The author used data from the Central Bank Survey 
of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity and the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange related to the Mexican peso, the Colombian peso, the Indian rupee, 
the Brazilian real, the Indonesian rupiah, the Israeli shekel and the South African 
rand-dollar exchange rates from January 1998 to June 1999. Firstly, the author 
measured the volatility and trading volume behaviour during normal trading 
periods, as well as the correlation for all the currencies used. In summary, traders 
tend to be more risk-aggressive when the market endures heavy fluctuations; 
however, when volatility becomes too strong, they tend to reduce trading volume 
due to trading limits reaching their pre-determined risk tolerance limits. 
Bjonnes et al. (2002) studied the impact of volume on volatility in the FX market 
and found a positive correlation with volatility and trading volume in the Swedish 
krona (SEK) market (SEK/EUR exchange rate movements from January 1, 1993 
to December 31, 2001). The sample used was primarily dominated by 
commercial banks. The authors connected heterogeneity in expectations found 
among institutional investors and the level of volatility in the FX market. This 
showed that trading volume is concentrated around the largest banks during 
periods of high volatility. 
In an earlier study, Tse and Tsui (1997) investigated the relationship between 
heterogeneous expectations and volatility in the Malaysian and Singaporean 
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foreign exchange markets. Using 4,067 daily closing spot exchange rates of the 
Malaysian ringgit-US dollar and Singapore dollar-US dollar from 3 January 1978 
to 29 June 1994, the authors showed that persistence in volatility is mainly due 
to heterogeneous expectations. Moreover, in reaction to exchange shocks, 
trading occurs to resolve heterogeneous assumptions. Also, the asymmetric 
effects of foreign exchange shocks on future volatility may be due to the 
unbalanced reaction of expectations to such shocks (heterogeneous 
expectations hypothesis). 
Aggarwal and Mougoue (2011) also studied the relationship between volatility 
and trading volumes by analysing historical prices for the British pound, the 
Canadian dollar, the Japanese yen and futures contracts from the Futures 
Industry Institute (December 1, 1978 - August 21, 2009 for the Canadian Dollar, 
November 1, 1977 - August 21, 2009 for the British Pound, and November 21, 
1978 to August 21, 2009 for the Japanese Yen). The authors tested for linear and 
non-linear time trends in trading volume and found that there is a correlation 
between trading volume and linear/quadratic time trends. Moreover, the authors 
used the generalised method of moments (GMM) approach to investigate the 
relationship between return volatility and trading volume. The results showed that 
there are significant lead-lag relations between trading volumes and return 
volatility, which means market fluctuations have a strong influence on investors’ 
decisions to purchase currencies.  
In general, the literature shows that heightened market volatility is partly driven 
by heterogenous expectations. Moreover, when volatility is high, volume tend to 
decrease as traders reach their position limit and risk appetite. This suggests that 
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traders change their behaviour depending on the current market conditions. In 
other words, traders alter their trading decisions by changing their position size 
in response to changing market conditions. 
2.3.4 News and Volatility 
Hua and Gau (2006) studied the intraday Taiwan dollar/U.S. dollar (NTD/USD) 
exchange rate patterns by applying a GARCH model to identify the cyclic 
seasonality in the intraday volatility of the NTD/USD exchange rate. The 
Bloomberg Professional Service was used to obtain public news announcements 
in Taiwan and the U.S. at 15-minute intervals from January 4, 2001 to December 
31, 2001. The Taipei Foreign Exchange Brokerage Inc. was used to obtain data 
for the NTD/USD spot exchange rates and trading volumes at 15-minute 
intervals. The results showed a significant relationship among volatility, news and 
traders adjusting their inventory positions. Specifically, as Taiwan’s news was 
made public at the opening of the market, traders adjusted their inventory 
positions due to the risk created from US dollar depreciation, which caused a 
higher level of volatility in its own right within the NTD/USD exchange rate, and 
consequently led to further central bank interventions. 
Goddard et al. (2015) investigated the relationship between FX market volatility 
and investors’ active attention, measured by a Google search volume index (SVI). 
The authors used weekly data from January 2004 to September 2011 for seven 
currency pairs: GBP/USD, USD/JPY, EUR/USD, USD/AUD, EUR/JPY, 
EUR/GBP, and GBP/JPY, accounting for more than 69% of the total turnover in 
FX markets in 2004, and found a positive and significant relation between SVI 
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and risk aversion (the difference between option implied volatility and realised 
volatility). Moreover, the authors showed that changes in SVI are positively 
correlated with the changes in trading volume. Investor attention is strongly 
associated with changes in trading volume among the largest traders in the FX 
market (banks) and there was a significant connection between attention and 
volatility. Investor attention is found to contain predictive information regarding 
the volatility of future currency returns, even after controlling for news supply and 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Hence, investor attention is also associated with 
time-varying risk aversion measured by the variance risk premium.  
Marshall et al. (2012) examined the impact of news announcements on foreign 
exchange implied volatility (IV) using data on daily IV of 1-month at-the-money 
options on four major FX pairs (USD/EUR, USD/GBP, USD/CHF and USD/JPY) 
obtained from Olsen and Associates. The authors showed that for US scheduled 
macroeconomic news announcements, the FX IV tends to drop on the day of the 
announcement, but there were no significant changes found in FX IV levels pre- 
and post-announcements. Moreover, larger announcement surprises can in 
some cases influence FX IV differently compared to smaller surprises, and the 
magnitude of the impact of positive news is generally not different to that of 
negative news. Regarding the three other types of announcements: 1) minutes 
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 2) official US interest rate 
changes and 3) Bank of Japan (BOJ) interventions, the only impact on the FX IV 
was found for BOJ interventions indicating that these interventions result in 
upward revisions in expected future market volatility. 
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Similarly, Evans and Speight (2010) examined the relation between 
macroeconomic announcements and intraday euro exchange rate volatility. They 
used inter-bank bid-ask quotes for Euro-Dollar (EUR-USD), Euro-Sterling (EUR-
GBP) and Euro-Yen (EUR-JPY) spot exchange rates provided by Olsen Data 
from January 2002 to July 2003. The authors found that macroeconomic news 
announcements from the US cause the majority of statistically significant 
changes in volatility, with US monetary policy events and real activity 
announcements causing the largest volatility changes across the three exchange 
rates. 
As mentioned earlier, fundamental news announcements in the FX market are 
followed by many traders and have the potential to significantly impact exchange 
rates. Those who are able to use fundamental data and form correct predictions 
prior to announcements on a consistent basis are likely to possess genuine 
trading skill. 
2.3.5 Impact of Volatility on Trader Performance 
Olson (2004) and Qi and Wu (2006) found evidence of declining trading profits 
over time. The authors argued that moving average trading rules do not generate 
large abnormal returns as they did previously in the 1990s. They explained this 
phenomenon through the notion that the foreign exchange market is becoming 
more efficient, meaning fluctuations are caused by fundamental information, 
rather than the activities of noise traders. 
Cornell and Dietrich (1978), Dooley and Shafer (1984), Lee and Mathur (1996) 
and Neely and Weller (1999) proposed that technical trading rules are more 
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profitable for currencies experiencing relatively higher volatility. Specifically, 
Cornell and Dietrich (1978) examined whether the foreign exchange market is 
efficient. The authors used the same data as Dooley and Shafer (1984) from the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank as well as the Standard and Poor's 500 index, 
and they applied different trading rules: the filter rule (Alexander, 1961), moving 
average rule and Praetz (1976) tests. The results showed that from the 
investigated currencies, the franc mark and guilder showed the highest returns 
with the largest variance in daily rates of return, thereby indicating the existence 
of a positive correlation between volatility and traders’ performance. Dooley and 
Shafer (1984) also found that exchange rate patterns reflected relative returns 
from different currencies using daily foreign exchange rate series. The authors 
stated that potential windfall wins and losses can exist only as a result of high 
volatility. 
Bilson (1980) investigated whether there were any opportunities for abnormal 
profits for speculative traders participating in the FX market. Using the 
movements of five major currency pairs from January 17, 1975 to November 14, 
1980, Bilson found a positive correlation between exchange rate volatility and the 
level of speculative trading gains, which suggests that as markets become more 
stable, speculators become less profitable. This finding opposed earlier evidence 
presented by Telser (1959). 
Lee and Mathur (1996) tested the moving average (MA) trading rule for six 
European spot cross-rates using daily closing spot or cash prices on European 
cross-rates from May 23, 1988 to December 31, 1993, supplied by the Knight- 
Ridder Database. They found that the Japanese yen/Deutsche mark and the 
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Swiss franc/Deutsche mark had significantly positive returns parallel to high 
volatility rates.  
Kho (1996) analysed the role of time-varying risk premia and volatility in 
explaining technical trading rule benefits. The author used moving average 
crossover rules to examine the British pound (BP), Japanese yen (JY), Deutsche 
mark (DM), and Swiss franc (SF) futures contracts patterns from the International 
Monetary Market (IMM) division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for the 
period from January 1980 to December 1991. The study concluded that 10% of 
generated profits could be explained by volatility in the observed time-period. 
Bollerslev and Melvin (1994) studied the relationship between the magnitude of 
foreign exchange market spreads and underlying exchange rate volatility, using 
more than 300,000 continuously recorded Deutsche mark/dollar quotes from April 
1989 to June 1989. The empirical results indicated a strong positive correlation 
between volatility and market spreads. 
Neely and Weller (1999) found that the reduction in volatility may reduce trading 
profitability. Using half-hourly bid and ask quotes for spot foreign exchange rates 
during 1996, obtained from the HFDF96 dataset provided by Olsen and 
Associates, the authors found that low volatility coupled with the effect of 
transaction costs leads to economically insignificant excess returns; and since 
the Dutch guilder had the lowest variability against the German mark, it was the 
only observed currency that did not generate significant profits. Contrary results 
were found with the Italian lira, which had the highest variability of all currencies 
during the examined period.  
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Pojarliev and Levich (2011) criticised the carry trading strategy, showing that 
between April 2005 and March 2008, carry trading showed an essentially zero 
return and was negatively correlated with volatility. The authors used a four-factor 
model to analyse the profitability of 107 currency managers who are part of the 
Deutsche Bank (DB) FXSelect platform. The results showed that different types 
of investors generate different returns due to volatility. For instance, so-called 
“dead” managers (those who exited the platform due to poor performance) 
generated lower profits when fluctuations increased. This illustrates the impact of 
volatility on a trader’s life span in retail foreign exchange markets. In general, 2 
out of 15 managers were able to benefit from falling volatility, and 2 investors 
made profits from rising volatility.  
Abbey and Doukas (2015) researched individual currency traders’ activities. The 
dataset comprised account data from an online advisory service obtained from 
Collective2.com including individual retail spot currency traders. They used a 
modified four-factor model, originally developed by Pojarliev and Levich (2010) 
to calculate the daily returns of an equally weighted portfolio where volatility was 
a chosen factor, because carry traders trade on currency volatility alongside carry 
trading, momentum-following and value factors. 
The literature shows that volatility can create profitable trading opportunities; 
however, heightened volatility can have a detrimental effect on a trader’s wealth 




2.4 The Effect of Behavioural Biases on Performance and Skill 
In this section, I review the literature related to five popular behavioural biases 
that help shape traders’ behaviour, and consequently, affect their performance. 
In what follows, I discuss five of the most popular behavioural factors that have 
been reviewed in previous literature. 
2.4.1 Herd Initiations 
In the literature, ‘herding behaviour’ or simply, herd behaviour, is defined as the 
tendency for individuals to ignore private information in favour of majority-held 
popular opinion (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; 
Banerjee, 1992; Avery and Zemsky, 1998). Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) 
characterised herding behaviour into two types: intentional (true) herding and 
unintentional (spurious) herding. Intentional herding occurs when individuals 
willingly decide to ignore their private information and follow the popular opinion 
of other market participants because they expect that others possess superior 
private information. Unintentional herding arises due to individuals trading on 
common information or using the same models to forecast and trade. While 
unintentional herding is a logical outcome of an efficient market because 
information is quickly acted upon by individuals and absorbed into market prices 
(Sias et al., 2001), intentional herding can increase market volatility and 
destabilise markets as trades become highly correlated (Scharfstein and Stein 
1990, Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003, and Hwang and Salmon 2004). Distinguishing 
between these two types of herding is very difficult, since it is conditional upon 
identifying the intent of the trader. 
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Intentional herding can be further divided into rational and irrational. Rational 
herding occurs when traders decide to imitate the trades of another individual 
deemed to possess superior market information and who typically has a proven 
track record of success. On the other hand, irrational herding behaviour occurs 
when individuals decide to ignore their own private information in favour of simply 
following the majority in order to avoid the regret associated with underperforming 
their peers (Devenow and Welsch 1996, Nofsinger and Sias 1999, Sias et al., 
2001). 
2.4.1.1 Drivers of Herding Behaviour 
Many studies have investigated the drivers behind herding behaviour. I 
summarise the most common drivers below: 
2.4.1.1.1 Preservation of Reputation and Compensation 
Researchers including Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Trueman (1994), Zwiebel 
(1995), Prendergast and Stole (1996), Graham (1999) Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999), Holmes et al. (2013), and Jiao and Ye (2014) have argued and found 
evidence showing that fund managers, as noted above, herd in order to preserve 
their reputation and avoid the regret associated with underperforming their peers. 
As such, fund managers are likely to ignore their own private information and 
follow the herd in order to avoid potentially underperforming the benchmark, 
especially since their compensation is directly related to their performance 
relative to a benchmark. Consequently, higher herding levels are typically 
observed among more experienced fund managers. Herding behaviour to 
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preserve reputation also extends to the opinions of investment analysts and 
newsletters (Hong et al., 2000).  
2.4.1.1.2 Information Availability 
The availability of information related to the asset being traded is a significant 
driver of herding behaviour. Studies including Lakonishok et al. (1992), Lin et al. 
(2007), Choi and Sias (2009), and Venezia et al. (2011) have presented 
significant evidence of higher herding levels in small-cap stocks relative to big-
cap stocks. The authors determined that the reason behind higher herding in 
small-cap stocks is due to the limited, or lower amount, of information available 
to investors regarding these stocks. Hence, when market information is scarce, 
investors look at each other’s activities as a source of valuable information in 
order to gauge the direction of the market. Similar evidence was reported by 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), who found that when information asymmetry 
increases, market liquidity declines, and herding behaviour increases. 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) identified this phenomenon as herding due to 
information cascades. Information cascades can easily change the course of 
herding behaviour, and investors choose either to invest in the cascade or stay 
out of it. For example, Ederington and Lee (1993), Bollerslev et al. (2000), 
Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) and Galariotis et al. (2015) found that in the US, 
herding increases when price-sensitive macroeconomic news is published. 
Chang et al. (2000) found similar evidence in the South Korean and Taiwanese 
markets, respectively. 
Park and Sabourian (2011) developed a standard sequential security trading 
model and argued that individuals herd only in cases where their information is 
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sufficiently dispersed, such that, they consider extreme outcomes more likely 
than moderate ones. Similarly, traders follow a contrarian strategy only if their 
information drives them to focus on middle values. In general, both herding and 
contrarianism produce excess price volatility and lower liquidity.  
2.4.1.1.3 Market Conditions 
Researchers have investigated herding behaviour in relation to different market 
states; however, the arguments in the literature are mixed.  
Chiang and Zheng (2010), Klein (2013), Messis and Zapranis (2014), Mobarek 
et al. (2014), and Ramli et al. (2016) found that herding behaviour increases 
during times of crises and market instability. The reason is that when markets are 
highly volatile and unstable, individuals panic and look at what others are doing 
in the hope of obtaining potentially valuable information about the direction of the 
market. Thus, individuals have lower confidence in their own private information 
during times of crises and choose to simply follow the herd. Similarly, during 
market bubbles, investors ignore analyses of the market and decide to “ride the 
wave” as others are doing in the hope of profiting from the market momentum.  
Empirical evidence has been found in several markets including the Chinese (Hu, 
1999; Mei et al., 2004; Demirer and Kutan, 2006; Tan et al., 2008; Chiang et al., 
2010), Taiwanese (Demirer et al., 2010), US and UK (Galarioti et al., 2015), Arab 
Gulf (Balcilar et al., 2013), South Korean and Japanese (Chang et al., 2000), 
Hong Kong (Zhou and Lai, 2009), Poland, (Goodfellow et al., 2009), Greece and 
other South European markets (Caporale et al., 2008; Economou et al., 2011).  
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Moreover, herding can arise simply due to diversification, from one asset class 
into another, or between countries. Ramli et al. (2016) examined herding 
behaviour in the Indonesian market during the financial crisis of 2008 and found 
that foreign investors in the Indonesian market — specifically those from the U.S 
or Europe, who wanted to benefit from the low correlation between their home 
portfolio and the Indonesian market, were likely to herd with domestic investors 
due to their lack of knowledge of the new market.  
On the other hand, some studies have shown that while herding is high during 
market crises, this behaviour is caused mostly due to the selling desire of 
investors who wish to limit their losses (Boortz et al., 2013). In other words, the 
dominant selling behaviour is not due to investors looking at each other’s actions, 
but rather in view of their own preference to limit their loss. Supporting evidence 
is provided by Kremer and Nautz (2013) who found that sell-herding arises when 
there is a reversal in asset returns. 
2.4.1.1.4 Feedback Trading 
A similar driver affecting herding behaviour is feedback trading. Positive feedback 
trading is a strategy where traders buy assets that have recently risen in value 
and sell assets that have fallen in value, while negative feedback trading is a 
contrarian strategy where traders buy assets that have recently decreased in 
value and vice versa. Lakonishok et al. (1992) argued that institutional investors 
herd unintentionally in cases where their trading decisions are based on common 
fundamental information. In addition, herding among institutional investors can 
also arise when these institutions decide to trade against irrational behaviour in 
the market, thus following a negative feedback trading strategy. Hence, following 
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a similar trading strategy can exhibit herding behaviour when examining a specific 
group of investors. Herding which arises from feedback trading, while 
unintentional, can destabilise financial markets since decisions are not based on 
fundamentals, but rather on the momentum of the market (De Long et al., 1990b). 
2.4.1.2 Empirical Evidence on Herding Behaviour 
2.4.1.2.1 Herding in Equity Markets 
Estimating herding behaviour means examining an individual’s tendency to buy 
or sell an asset at the same time as other participants, relative to what would be 
expected if these individuals traded independently (Lakonishok et al.,1992). 
Many studies including Sias et al. (2001), Barber et al. (2009) and Chiang and 
Zheng (2010) distinguished between a static (cross-sectional) and a dynamic 
(time-series) herding estimation, where the former measures herding that is 
happening within a specific period while the latter measures herding across 
different trading periods. 
Christie and Huang (1995) developed two cross-sectional methods to detect and 
estimate herding behaviour in periods of huge upward or downward trends in 
stock markets. The first is called the cross-sectional standard deviation (CSSD) 
and the second is called the cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD), where 
the CSAD is not affected by outliers. When investors herd, the dispersion around 
the market consensus is expected to be low. The results for both daily and 
monthly returns are not consistent with the existence of herding behaviour during 
times of large price swings. This means that during severely declining markets, 
in which herding behaviour is expected to be very high, the magnitude of the 
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increase in dispersion of actual returns, is reflected by the increase in dispersion 
of predicted returns, which are estimated using rational asset pricing models.  
Chang et al. (2000) proposed another variation of the CSAD using the entire 
distribution of financial market returns. The correlation between the observed 
stock return of the firm and the CSAD was used to detect herding behaviour. The 
authors found no evidence of herding in the US and Hong Kong markets, partial 
evidence of herding in the Japanese market, and significant evidence in the South 
Korean and Taiwanese markets. 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) proposed an alternative method for estimating 
herding based on the cross-sectional dispersion of the factor sensitivity of assets 
within the market. It enables the detection of herding within a particular sector or 
towards a certain trading style. By doing so, one can distinguish true herding 
behaviour from expected movements in asset returns that are driven by 
fundamentals. Using data on both U.S and South Korean stock markets, the 
authors found that herding is significant, once general market conditions and 
macro factors have been taken into account. 
Demirer et al. (2010) use firm-level data in the Taiwanese stock market, to find 
that the linear model based on CSSD shows no significant evidence of herding 
among Taiwanese investors. Nevertheless, the non-linear model proposed by 
Chang et al. (2000) and the state space models developed by Hwang and Salmon 
(2004) show significant and consistent evidence of herding behaviour in all 
sectors. Moreover, the authors found that herding is more pronounced during 
downward moving markets. 
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Jiao and Ye (2014) and Andreu et al. (2015) analysed herding behaviour in the 
style exposures of mutual funds and concluded that mutual funds usually follow 
hedge funds, and the level of herding increases with performance. The authors 
also found that hedge funds almost never follow mutual funds. In an earlier study, 
Kaminsky et al. (2004) found that mutual funds exhibit herding behaviour in Latin 
America, where the main source of herding was the news from other emerging 
markets.  
Galariotis et al. (2015) used macroeconomic variables to explain the herding 
behaviour in leading US and UK stocks. The authors showed that US investors 
are more likely to herd when important macro news is released and that there 
was a herd spill-over effect from the US to the UK during previous financial crises. 
Moreover, they found that US investors herd based on both fundamental and 
non-fundamental information during different crises, while UK investors only herd 
due to fundamentals, or during the first ‘Dotcom’ bubble crisis. These findings 
indicate that the factors driving herd behaviour are both period and country 
specific. 
2.4.1.2.2 Herding in the FX market 
Carpenter and Wang (2007) investigated the effect of private information on 
herding behaviour. Using the herding measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. 
(1992), the authors found a significant impact from herding on prices in the 
USD/AUD market, and concluded that herding generates greater effects on 
market prices, especially when behaviour is initiated by financial institutions.  
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Yip (2008) examined whether herding may cause heightened volatility in the 
foreign exchange market. The author investigated exchange rate systems and 
policies in Asia — specifically, China’s exchange rate system reform initiated on 
21 July 2005 and found that speculators herded due to excited expectations of 
revaluations, which drove the Chinese currency beyond its equilibrium level and 
thus creating a financial crisis.  
Belke and Setzer (2004) investigated the influence of herding behaviour on 
currency crises. Similar to Banerjee (1992), the authors found significant herding 
due to informational cascades, which resulted in prices moving away from 
fundamentals and leading to increased volatility.  
Kaltwasser (2008) examined herding behaviour in the foreign exchange market. 
Using a simple heterogeneous agent model of the exchange rate, the author 
estimated the dynamics of the socioeconomic configuration, optimistic and 
pessimistic excess demands and showed that investors are susceptible to 
changing their mind about the fundamental value of a particular asset purely as 
a result of contagion. This implies that investors tend to herd. 
2.4.1.2.3 Investigating Herd Initiation 
The literature on herding behaviour provides significant evidence showing that 
investment decisions among groups of investors can be highly correlated. 
However, very few papers investigate the problem of separating between the true 
decision leaders and those who simply mimic the actions of these leaders. 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) noted the importance of paying attention to early 
herding decisions. The authors proposed a fashion leader model, in which the 
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source of herding behaviour comes from the most experienced investor, acting 
first and attracting others to imitate him. However, the main drawback of this 
model is that the level of knowledge of the leader must be known with certainty. 
Boortz et al. (2013) found that information asymmetry is a key driver of herd 
behaviour, and private information is a significant advantage in financial markets. 
This means that those who hold more relevant data are “eligible” to become herd 
leaders.  
Identifying and separating the herd initiators from the followers is a difficult yet 
very important task since it allows us to determine who has the ability to influence 
others to follow suit, and whether these herd initiators possess superior trading 
skills which can benefit their followers as a waterfall effect. 
2.4.2 Disposition Effect 
2.4.2.1 Understanding the Disposition Effect 
“The disposition effect is defined as the tendency to sell winning investments 
early and hold on to losing investments” (Weber and Camerer, 1998). The 
authors estimated the difference in propensity to close a position, conditional on 
the investment being a gain versus a loss. The disposition effect, like herding 
behaviour, can potentially affect market prices, moving them away from their 
fundamental values (Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Frazzini, 2006; Shumway and Wu, 
2006; Birru, 2015). The reason given is that selling assets that have increased in 
value to realise gains will gradually increase the price of the asset, whilst holding 
on to losing assets will push down the price of the asset further. Odean (1998) 
argued that the disposition effect results in traders withholding information from 
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the market, which consequently shifts asset prices away from their true values. 
Evidence supporting this argument is provided by Statman et al. (2006) who 
found that the disposition effect influences market-wide trading activity, subject 
to a bull or bear market. Moreover, Hartzmark (2014) found that traders’ tendency 
to sell extremely profitable securities and to hold on to particularly loss-making 
securities within their portfolios, can lead to strong price effects. 
The most popular theoretical framework, used in previous literature to explain the 
disposition effect, is the prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). The idea behind this theory is that when an individual has a choice 
between two or more outcomes, their behaviour will follow an “S”-shaped value 
function, where “the function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the 
domain of losses” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), indicating that losses 
outweigh the gains. 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) were among the first researchers to identify and 
define the disposition effect as the traders’ tendency to close winning trades and 
hold on to losing trades. To measure the disposition effect, the authors (Shefrin 
and Statman, 1984) applied a behavioural model, which includes five factors: 
1. Prospect theory: As mentioned earlier, the disposition effect may appear 
when investors face the choice between realising a small loss immediately, 
or waiting to see if the position will turn into a gain, or result in a more 
significant loss. Prospect theory implies that traders will choose the second 
option and hold on to a losing investment in the hope that the investment 
will turn into a gain in the future. 
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2. Mental accounting: This factor was discussed by Thaler (1980) and is 
related to the concept of tax swapping, such that investors use the 
difference between long-term and short-term tax rates when deciding 
when to realise gains versus losses. The reason is that realising a gain 
would result in a definite tax payment, while realising a loss would give the 
investor a tax credit or “rebate”. 
3. Regret aversion: This factor arises when the traders’ regret for making a 
wrong decision prevents them from closing the losing position. Two 
emotions are in play in such a scenario that affect the investor’s behaviour: 
regret and pride. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Thaler (1980) argued 
that the first emotion overcomes the latter leading to individuals becoming 
passive and withhold decision-making when their investment losses value. 
Similarly, Shefrin and Statman (1985) illustrated that when investors 
realise that they sold a particular asset too early and the price continues 
to rise, they feel a sense of regret. 
4. Self-control: This factor initially studied by Glick (1957) refers to the 
conflict between traders’ rational thinking and their emotional drives. 
Emotions can influence investors to hold on to losers and sell winners 
without any rational reasons behind this decision. Self-control may be 
dominant to the point that some traders will make up rules, such as 
accepting the loss only if the price declines by more than ten percent (stop-
loss orders) (Kleinfield, 2004). 
5. Transaction costs: According to the strategy of Constantinides (1983, 




The behavioural model of Shefrin and Statman (1985) examined the nature of 
investors’ time differences in realising losses relative to gains. The authors used 
two datasets, the first is provided by Schlarbaum et al. (1978a) and is made up 
of panel information about individual stock trades by selected investors between 
1964 and 1970. The second dataset was obtained from the Investment Company 
Institute. The Investment Company Institute publishes an annual Statistical 
Workbook that contains data on monthly purchases and redemptions of mutual 
fund shares from January 1961 to December 1981. The authors found significant 
evidence that tax concerns alone cannot explain gain and loss realisations, and 
that the disposition effect is widely evident in real world scenarios. 
Odean (1998) proposed one of the most popular measures of the disposition 
effect, which accounts for both potential and actual gains and losses. By dividing 
the actual gain (loss) by the sum of both actual and potential gains (losses), one 
obtains the proportion of gains realised PGR (proportion of losses realised PLR) 
and can measure one’s propensity to realise a gain or a loss given the opportunity 
to do so. The difference between the PGR and PLR is an estimate of an 
individual’s disposition effect. Odean (1998) examined the trading records of 
around 10,000 investors from January 1987 to December 1993 and found that 
investors often prefer to sell winners rather than losers — this is not a rational 
trading strategy from a tax, transaction cost, or portfolio rebalancing perspective. 
This finding is similar to that reported earlier by Case and Shiller (1988). Odean 
(1998) explained his findings using 1) prospect theory and 2) that traders may 
hold losers because they believe these securities will generate more profits than 
the current winners.  
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Weber and Camerer (1998) suggested an alternative measure of the disposition 
effect, which is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the number of 
trades with realised gains and the number of trades with realised losses to the 
sum of these two parameters. They applied this method in an experiment where 
individuals buy and sell different shares, and where investors are allowed to sell 
or to hold both winners and losers. The results showed that when traders 
experienced losses, they were willing to hold these losing assets because the 
pain of a further loss is less than the pleasure of recovering the purchase price. 
Weber and Camerer (1998) explained their findings using a specific reference 
point — the difference between the purchase price (or the last period price) and 
the current price. When this difference reaches a certain value, the trader will sell 
the stock. According to Weber and Camerer (1998), traders prefer to sell more 
when the current price is above the purchasing price.  
Shapira and Venezia (2001) analysed the disposition effect among a large 
number of professional (2,688) and independent (1,642) investors at a major 
Israeli brokerage house during 1994. The authors used the method developed by 
Schlarbaum et al. (1978a, b) and found that both professional as well as 
independent investors exhibit the disposition effect; however, this effect is more 
pronounced among independent investors. Moreover, the authors found that 
professionally managed accounts experience more frequent trading compared to 
independent accounts, which may explain the higher disposition effect among 
independent investors who prefer to hold losing investments rather than close 
their position. Their findings suggest that investors who follow a strict investment 
mandate are less likely to succumb to the disposition effect. Similarly, Locke and 
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Mann (2005) investigated whether “discipline” — adhering to a predetermined 
exit strategy measured by the speed of trading or by the avoidance of holding 
onto large losing positions — can be used to soften the disposition effect among 
retail investors. Using data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) on 334 
traders during 1995, the authors found that measures of relative discipline based 
on the first 6 months are associated with a trader’s success in the following 6 
months. Moreover, traders who offset losses more quickly are more likely to be 
successful in the future; however, speed in realising gains is also a useful 
predictor of future success. The authors also found that traders who are more 
likely to hold on to large losses are less likely to be successful in the future. This 
evidence is consistent with the disposition effect. Similar evidence was also 
presented by Griffin et al. (2007) regarding institutional investors; however, the 
disposition effect is less pronounced relative to individual investors. Similarly, 
Aspara and Hoffmann (2015) investigated whether eradicating feelings of 
personal responsibility can decrease an individual’s tendency to exhibit the 
disposition effect. Specifically, the authors conducted three experiments that 
show the disposition effect can be reversed, when: 1) “prior investment gains are 
attributed to external factors while prior losses are associated with an individual’s 
own faults”, 2) “individuals invest other investors’ money”, and 3) when individuals 
have a “socially driven investment goal other than simply generating a financial 
gain”. 
Other studies have investigated whether experience, as proxied by the number 
of trades executed, reduces the disposition effect. For instance, Shumway and 
Wu (2006) examined whether the disposition effect drives stock price momentum 
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using a dataset of 13,460 Chinese investors and firms from a large Shanghai-
based brokerage firm. The authors found that a significant proportion of Chinese 
investors exhibit this behavioural bias. Investors with a higher disposition effect 
trade less frequently and in smaller volumes. Moreover, while past returns are 
not a good predictor of future returns for stocks traded on the Shanghai stock 
exchange, sorting stocks by net unrealised gain or loss of those investors with a 
high disposition effect results in a significant winner-loser spread of 7% per year. 
This suggests that the disposition effect has an impact on stock momentum. 
Moreover, Leal et al. (2010) examined the disposition effect of 1,496 individual 
investors in the Portuguese stock market and found noteworthy evidence of its 
influence, on the basis of trade frequency, volume, and value traded. The 
disposition effect was also present at the end of the fiscal year, despite of the 
fiscal effect, where investors realise losses in order to reduce their tax exposure. 
The authors also divided the data into bull and bear periods, and found that the 
disposition effect is more prominent in bull markets. The authors also defined 
sophisticated investors, as those who trade more frequently, with a larger number 
of transactions, and a larger total portfolio value. The authors also found an 
inverse correlation between investor sophistication and investor propensity to 
exhibit the disposition effect. Furthermore, Dhar and Zhu (2006) analysed the 
trading records of more than 50,000 individual traders at a major discount 
brokerage and found that wealthier individuals and those employed in a 
professional occupation exhibit a lower disposition effect. Moreover, trading 
frequency was also shown to reduce the disposition effect, suggesting that 
traders learn from their past trades to avoid this bias. Da Costa et al. (2013) 
examined whether trading experience erodes the disposition effect in a computer-
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simulated stock market. The authors categorised individuals as experienced 
investors or inexperienced investors (undergraduate students). In addition, they 
simulated random computer-generated trade decisions as a control group. The 
authors found that both human groups exhibited the disposition effect, and that 
this bias is less prominent among experienced investors. These findings confirm 
earlier results by Shapira and Venezia (2001) that investor experience erodes the 
disposition effect. Since the automated trades did not exhibit the disposition 
effect, Da Costa et al. (2013) argued that this bias is caused by cognitive illusions. 
Several studies have investigated how news impacts the disposition effect. For 
instance, Frazzini (2006) examined whether the disposition effect induces an 
underreaction to news, which may lead to return predictability. Using a dataset 
on 29,812 mutual fund holdings from January 1980 to December 2002 obtained 
from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT database, the author found that post-
announcement price drift is most significant when capital gains and news are 
positively correlated. In addition, the magnitude of the change depends on the 
capital gain or loss experienced by the investor on the date of the event. 
Moreover, Li et al. (2014) used a multi-agent model to examine the disposition 
effect in the Chinese market. The authors found that negative news creates 
fluctuations in prices that are larger than those produced by good news. The 
authors’ model categorised traders as either chartists, fundamentalists, or 
inactive traders. Results showed that chartists are more prone to the disposition 
effect; in addition, this type of trader is a key source of asymmetric volatility in the 
Chinese stock market. Focusing on information asymmetry, Dorn and Strobl 
(2009) used a dataset of transactions of 30,000 investors at a German brokerage 
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from 1995 to 2000 to investigate the impact of information asymmetry on the 
disposition effect. The authors found that the disposition effect among uninformed 
investors weakens after events that decrease information asymmetry. Moreover, 
the disposition effect among these uninformed investors becomes weaker in 
persistent winners and losers. Frydman and Rangel (2014) conducted a trading 
laboratory experiment to examine the possibility of reducing the disposition effect 
exhibited by individuals by making information about a stock’s purchase price and 
capital gains (or losses) less salient. The authors compared two conditions: 1) a 
high-saliency condition where the purchase price of the stock is often displayed 
by the trading software, and 2) a low-saliency case where the price is not 
displayed at all. Their study shows that traders exhibit a disposition effect in the 
high-saliency scenario and that this effect is 25% smaller in the low-saliency case 
— indicating that it is possible to reduce the disposition effect by decreasing the 
saliency with which a stock’s purchase price is displayed to the investor. 
Brown et al. (2006) examined daily investor holdings from the Australian Stock 
Exchange from 1995 to 2000 and discovered significant evidence of the 
disposition effect. Nevertheless, traders executing larger investments are less 
affected by the disposition effect. This suggests that the disposition effect erodes 
altogether approximately 200 days after the purchase of the asset. Moreover, the 
house money effect tempers the disposition effect, and shareholder loyalty 
schemes also partially offset their relative preference for selling winning stocks. 
Richards et al. (2011) examined 7,828 UK active individual traders with around 
395,998 trades from July 2006 to December 2009. Using the empirical methods 
of Odean (1998) and Feng and Seasholes (2005), the author found that stop 
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losses, age and sophistication may reduce the influence of the disposition effect. 
Similarly, Bellofatto et al. (2014) analysed 51,098 retail investors from 1999 to 
2012 and used the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) tests to 
determine the level of investor sophistication. They found that stop-loss orders, 
investment advice and financial sophistication reduce the disposition effect. 
Singal and Xu (2011) examined how the disposition effect can create stock 
mispricing; they used a dataset of 2,363 actively managed US equity mutual 
funds from 1980 to 2007, obtained from the CRSP database. The authors used 
the measure proposed by Odean (1998), utilising 3-factor and 4-factor regression 
models, and found that around 30% of all funds exhibit the disposition effect and 
as well tend to underperform funds that do not exhibit the disposition effect by 
around 4% to 6% per annum. Additionally, disposition-prone funds attract much 
smaller fund flows, suggesting that investors are knowledgeable and tend to steer 
away from disposition-prone funds. As such, funds that exhibit the disposition 
effect have a higher rate of failure. 
Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) investigated how investor beliefs and 
preferences influence trading patterns in relation to past returns. Using a dataset 
of 77,037 unique accounts from January 1990 to December 1996, the authors 
argued that the probability of selling as a function of profit is V-shaped, meaning 
that investors are more likely to sell extreme losers in short holding periods. 
Moreover, they found little evidence of an upward jump in selling at zero profit. 
Their findings show that there is no clear relation between realisation preference 
and trading patterns. Importantly, the authors concluded that the preference for 
selling winning stocks in preference to losing alternative stocks does not directly 
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affect the disposition effect; however, trading based on belief revisions is a more 
likely explanatory factor. An (2016) expanded on the work of Ben-David and 
Hirshleifer (2012) using data from the CRSP database, from January 1970 to 
December 2011, and argued that the disposition effect lowers current prices, 
affects equilibrium price dynamics, and cannot be fully explained by return 
predictors such as high volatility, momentum or reversals. Specifically, the 
authors found that the disposition effect is not a source of momentum, which is in 
contrast to the findings of Shumway and Wu (2006). 
Rau (2015) investigates the disposition effect within two-person teams in 
comparison to individual traders. The author concludes that individuals investing 
jointly exhibit a larger disposition effect compared to individuals, since investor 
teams rarely realise losses and mostly choose to sell winners. This suggests that 
decision-dependent emotions may explain these differences in disposition 
between teams and individuals — such that, teams expressing high levels of 
regret, exhibit higher levels of disposition compared to individual investors. 
More recently, several studies have investigated the relation between 
demographics and the disposition effect. Frino et al. (2015) studied the 
prevalence of the disposition effect among 46,289 individual traders in the 
Australian stock market, focusing on the effect of demographics and Chinese 
ethnicity on trading behaviour. The authors found evidence of the disposition 
effect across different categories of investors with the largest bias among 
investors of Chinese background, women, and older investors. Furthermore, 
other trading characteristics such as high trading frequency, round-size trading 
heuristics, and the level of portfolio diversification, were found to be accurate 
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forecasters of the disposition effect. Moreover, Tekçe et al. (2016) examined the 
disposition effect between 162,460 investors with around 64 million transactions 
during 2011 in the Turkish stock market. The authors found that age and portfolio 
values are positively related to the disposition effect, and females also tend to 
exhibit this bias more than males. Only 17% of investors did not show any 
significant evidence of the disposition effect. 
2.4.2.2 Disposition Effect in the Forex Market 
Very few studies investigate the disposition effect in the FX market. For example, 
O’Connell and Teo (2009) use a proprietary dataset consisting of a large group-
set of institutional currency traders, in order to examine the effects of gains and 
losses on risk-taking behaviour. The authors found that institutional investors, 
unlike individual investors, are not as prone to the disposition bias. The reason is 
that institutions aggressively mitigate risk following a loss and slightly increase 
risk-taking behaviour after a gain. This asymmetry is more prominent at the end 
of the calendar year and especially among older and more experienced funds. 
Moreover, performance dependence is consistent with dynamic loss aversion 
(Barberis et al., 2001), as well as with overconfidence. 
In a study on individual forex traders from October 2003 to May 2004, obtained 
from Oanda FXTrade, Nolte (2012) used a panel survival technique to examine 
the impact of limit orders, trading success, trade size, and experience on the 
disposition effect. The main findings show that the disposition effect is nonlinear, 
such that small profits and losses have an inverted disposition effect, while larger 
gains and losses exhibit the usual positive disposition effect. Moreover, the 
inverted part of the disposition effect is mainly driven by the cautious behaviour 
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of investors closing their positions with limit orders, including stop-loss and take-
profit orders. The positive disposition effect is greatly intensified for investors who 
quickly and actively close their positions with market orders. In addition, the study 
finds that unsuccessful traders show a strong inverse disposition and that higher 
volume-trading traders are less prone to this bias. 
Nolte and Voev (2011) created a model with a time-varying latent factor and 
examined investors’ decisions to enter and exit a position in order to estimate the 
strength of various effects and the differences in trading behaviour across various 
types of traders. They found that the disposition effect decreases with investor 
size, in tandem with larger agents being more prone to the disposition effect at 
the portfolio level, but not with respect to profit or loss on single positions. 
2.4.3 Sensation-Seeking 
Zuckerman (1979, 1994) defines ‘sensation-seeking’ as a “trait for seeking 
varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences and a 
willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such 
experiences”. In financial markets, market sensation-seekers exhibit a pattern, 
such that they are not afraid of taking high levels of risk in order to achieve higher 
returns. Markowitz (1952b) argued that traders may choose to open many loss-
making trades, in exchange for a small chance of a large gain. This type of 
behaviour can become addictive; hence sensation-seeking is often described as 
reckless trading behaviour.  
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) stated that sensation-seeking could be detected 
when stock markets offer thrilling ‘events’ for individuals. Nevertheless, sensation 
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seekers are not pure risk takers, because unlike risk takers, sensation seekers 
agree to tolerate risk only in relation to its potential for novel and different 
experiences (Sunder et al., 2017). Nevertheless, Steenbarger (2007) argued that 
sensation-seeking leads to poor trading outcomes. In addition, Steenbarger 
argued this human bias is nearly impossible to control because such irrational 
behaviour in financial markets is inevitable (De Brabander et al., 1995; De Man, 
2014). 
According to Zuckerman et al. (1990) and Wong and Carducci (1991), there are 
two types of sensation seekers: 1) the low sensation seekers are people who 
show this bias in emotionally over-arousing situations in order to calm 
themselves, and they typically have low-risk tolerance, and 2) high sensation 
seekers, who look for thrilling situations regardless of the risk associated with the 
event. As such, sensation-seeking is negatively related to risk appraisal and 
positively associated with risky behaviour (Horvath and Zuckerman, 1993). 
Horvath and Zuckerman (1993) suggested that individuals who score high on 
sensation-seeking tests are more likely to engage in risk-taking behaviour in 
financial activities.  
Rogers et al. (2013) studied risk-taking behaviour among investors by using 
measures including impulsivity, sensation-seeking, psychopathic personality 
traits and real life financial outcomes. Using a sample of 157 males and 179 
females aged between 18 and 71, the authors concluded that sensation-seeking 
had a very large and significant influence on instrumental risk-taking among the 
38 factors that were considered.  
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Studies such as De Brabander et al. (1995) and Statman (2014) separated 
sensation-seekers into two categories: knowledgeable sensation-seekers who 
are able to monitor and control their overconfidence, and less informed ones who 
are “blinded” by the cognitive error of overconfidence.  
2.4.3.1 Drivers of Sensation-Seeking 
2.4.3.1.1 Demographics 
Sensation-seeking varies significantly among different demographics. 
Zuckerman (1971, 2005) stated that sensation-seeking declines in-line with a 
person’s age, and typically peaks at adolescence. Similarly, Reyna and Rivers 
(2008) argued that sensation-seeking and sensitivity to rewards grow from mid-
childhood at roughly the age of 10 and peak in mid-adolescence between roughly 
the ages of 13 to 16. As such, sensation-seeking is expected to be higher among 
younger traders compared to older traders. Further studies, including Zuckerman 
et al. (1979), Ball et al. (1984) and Potenza et al. (2001), found that males tend 
to be greater sensation seekers than females, partly due to inherent physical 
traits. 
Sjöberg and Engelberg (2009) examined the level of sensation-seeking among 
students using a questionnaire to measure emotional intelligence, attitude to 
economic risks and savings, general values, gender, age and experience in the 
finance industry. The authors found that students specialising in finance tend to 
have the highest level of risk tolerance. 
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2.4.3.1.2 Resource Availability and Status 
Bradrania et al. (2016) and Sunder, et al. (2017) found that CEOs trade more 
aggressively, a behaviour driven mainly by the amount of resources available to 
them, coupled with their professional status and capacity to make executive 
decisions.  
Specifically, Sunder et al. (2017) found that CEOs who engage in daring activities 
such as flying a private jet tend to spend resources on innovation more 
successfully. Using data on 103 pilots and 1,130 non-pilot directors from the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), ExecuComp database and CEOs’ 
biographies from 1993 to 2003, the authors found that pilot CEOs had more 
patents and citations, which is evidence of the positive correlation between the 
level of an individual’s sensation-seeking and firm innovation outcome. 
Specifically, the number of patents that companies with pilot CEOs have is 70% 
more than companies with a non-pilot CEO, and the number of citations is 100% 
more. As for the board structure, the degree of sensation-seeking rises when the 
board is relatively small, when power is concentrated with the CEO through 
chairmanship of the board, and with a large number of insider directors.  
Sunder et al. (2017) concluded that with a board structure where advising and 
supporting the CEO’s sensation-seeking is greater than monitoring his behaviour, 
the effectiveness of the company’s innovation activities is improved. Thus, risky 
innovative activities bring more exciting experiences with the result that CEOs will 




2.4.3.1.3 Entertainment  
Mayall (2010) argued that traders do not always act rationally, and are often 
motivated by emotional sensations just as much as by financial imperatives. 
Hoffmann (2011) conducted a survey on Dutch investors and found their primary 
motivation for trading is its function as an enjoyable pastime activity, and not 
necessarily for the sake of increasing wealth. This echoes the work of Dhar and 
Goetzmann (2006) who found that investors buy stocks as a hobby and because 
it is something they enjoy doing. Similarly, Feingold et al. (1996) found that 
individuals engage in sensation-seeking activities to reduce negative feelings. 
For instance, Zuckerman et al. (1990) identified that susceptibility to boredom is 
a main driver of sensation-seeking. Willman et al. (2006) also concluded that 
excessive trading may emerge from boredom.  
Dorn and Sengmuelle (2009) also examined entertainment attributes in trading 
activities using a sample of 1,000 investors at a German brokerage from January 
1995 to May 2000. The authors found that entertainment factors are significant 
explanatory variables in a cross-sectional regression of portfolio turnover, where 
sensation seekers are believed to be younger, less educated, and less wealthy 
individuals. 
Bauer et al. (2009) examined 26,266 option traders and 41,880 equity traders 
from January 2000 to March 2006, and showed that entertainment is key for 
sensation seekers in the options market in the Netherlands. Around 55.7% of 
options traders and 43.6% of equity traders stated that investing is just a hobby 
for them. The authors argued that gambling and sensation-seeking are important 
determinants of options trading. 
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2.4.3.2 Sensation-Seeking and Overconfidence 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) stated that the main difference between 
overconfidence and sensation-seeking is that sensation seekers are people who 
“live for the moment”, while overconfident individuals are those who have 
unrealistic and highly optimistic beliefs about their skills. Using information about 
Finnish investors’ driving records, tax filings and mandatory psychological profiles 
from January 1995 to November 2002, the authors found that sensation seekers 
trade more frequently and tend to perform poorly due to transaction costs. De 
Man (2014) proposed the use of double-crossover moving averages and 
contrarian Bollinger Bands as strategies for overconfident sensation seekers. 
2.4.3.3 Risk-Taking in Gambling 
In a recent study, Markiewicz and Weber (2013) conducted an experiment which 
included the trading records of 3,870 traders in addition to survey questions, and 
found that a domain-specific variant of risk-taking propensity — namely risk-
taking in gambling as contrasted with risk-taking in investing — can predict the 
volume of an investors’ trades. The authors found that investors’ gambling risk-
taking propensity, as measured by the Weber et al. (2002) Domain-Specific-Risk-
Taking (DOSPERT) gambling subscale, increases the trading frequency of trades 
made, which consequently increases transaction costs; furthermore, this frequent 
trading behaviour is driven by sensation-seeking. Similarly, Hsieh (2013) 
examined individual and institutional investors in the Taiwan stock market and 
found that individual investor activity is driven by sensation-seeking, especially 
where given individuals perceive the stock market as a lottery game.  
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Grall-Bronnec et al. (2017) examined the similarities between trading and 
gambling using the data of 8 excessive traders, picked from a group of 221 
outpatients seeking treatment for gambling addiction. The authors found several 
similarities between excessive trading and gambling in relation to diagnosis, 
trajectory and comorbidities. Like many sufferers of gambling, excessive traders 
also experienced several small early profits, chased their losses, and ended up 
losing control over their invested capital. Their findings support the notion of 
addictive-trading behaviour being a component of gambling disorders; however, 
they distinguished investing from gambling and excessive trading. 
The literature presented shows that sensation-seeking leads to riskier trading 
strategies and the likelihood of incurring large losses. My research has revealed 
no studies that investigate sensation-seeking in the FX market. Hence, I measure 
this behavioural bias using a trader’s margin utilisation, which serves as a proxy 
for risk preference. I discuss this indicator in more detail in the methodology 
section. 
2.4.4 Inconsistent Behaviour 
Inconsistent behaviour refers to the notion of an investor’s decision-making in 
trading varying transitorily, outside the boundaries of their typical behaviour. This 
aspect is worthy of more detailed investigation, in order to better understand why 
traders deviate from their statistically mean-average behaviour. 
2.4.4.1 Risk Appetite 
Similar to sensation-seeking, inconsistent behaviour is partly driven by an 
investor’s attraction to gambling. While this phenomenon might be expected 
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among individual traders, it has also been documented among institutional 
market participants such as Lehman Brothers, Long Term Capital Management, 
IndyMac and Bear Stearns (Jadlow and Mowen, 2010). According to Golec and 
Tamarking (1998, p. 221) “the possibility of a large win is what lures them 
[inconsistent behaviour traders]”. The authors’ findings show that some tranches 
of institutional traders have a tendency to bet with a high degree of risk tolerance, 
therefore, inconsistent behaviour is closely related to investor risk preferences.  
For instance, Barseghyan et al. (2011) showed that risk preferences are very 
unstable across highly related decision contexts between different types of 
insurance (home, auto, etc.). Moreover, risk preference can be influenced by 
information (Easley et al., 1996; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000; Peress, 2010; 
Easley et al., 2014), trading strategies (Boswijk et al., 2007; Goldbaum and 
Zwinkels, 2014), skills and knowledge (Park and Sabourian, 2011; Lin and Lin, 
2014; Banerjee and Green, 2015), types of markets (Michaely and Vila, 1996; 
Heath et al., 1999; Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Barberis and Xiong, 2009), 
among many other factors. Researchers have also examined risk appetite in 
financial markets.  
Miccolis and Quinn (1996) defined risk appetite as the aggregate level, and the 
type of risk an entity is willing to bear within its risk capacity to achieve its strategic 
objectives and business plan. Sweeney et al. (2015) argued that risk appetite 
cycles are correlated with global growth cycles, which reach their peaks during 
times of crisis. Trader behaviour becomes largely driven by psychological fears 
and deviates from a trader’s regular/typical behaviour. 
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Illing and Aaron (2005) distinguished between actual and theoretical indexes of 
risk appetite. The former are based on statistical methods of different market 
estimation such as the Merrill Lynch Financial Stress Index (ML), the JPMorgan 
Liquidity, Credit, and Volatility Index (LCVI), the UBS Investor Sentiment Index 
(UBS), and the Westpac Risk Appetite Index (WP). By looking at all these indices 
together one can obtain an index quantifying overall risk appetite. Many 
researchers have also developed risk appetite indices. For instance, Kumar and 
Persaud (2002) developed a Global Risk-Appetite Index (GRAI) where they 
ranked assets by their riskiness and excess returns, and examined the relation 
between these two features. A positive relation indicates an increasing risk 
appetite and vice versa. Furthermore, Tarashev et al. (2003) developed the Risk-
Appetite Index by estimating the statistical distribution of future asset returns 
using the historical patterns of asset prices, and by applying a Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) model. Subsequently, 
using option prices with different exercise prices, the authors calculated the 
implied volatility, where the Risk-Appetite Index is the ratio of the left tails of the 
distributions of the asset return to the option price volatility. Gai and Vause (2004) 
expanded upon Risk-Appetite Index of Tarashev et al. (2003) by using the ratio 
of the full distributions instead of the ratio of the left tails. Wilmot et al. (2004) 
developed the Credit Suisse First Boston Risk-Appetite Index (CSFB), which is 
similar to the GRAI. The authors compared excess returns across assets with 
past price volatility by applying a cross-sectional linear regression and observing 
an upward-sloping correlation, thereby indicating a higher level of risk appetite. 
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Misina (2003) proposed that: 1) “changes in investors’ risk appetite will have 
monotonic effects on assets in different risk classes, where the impact on returns 
will depend on the riskiness of a particular asset”, and 2) “a change in the 
riskiness of an asset will not have monotonic effects on excess returns across 
different asset classes”. It follows that random changes in risk preference is a key 
attribute of inconsistent traders. In a follow up study, Misina (2005) investigated 
changes in risk appetite by creating an index that calculates changes in traders’ 
risk preferences based on popular trader opinion. The author identified three 
factors of risk appetite: 1) agent’s risk aversion, 2) demand for risky securities, 
and 3) the quantity of risky assets demanded. Consequently, one can explain 
observed changes in an investor’s portfolio based on changes in that investor’s 
risk appetite. 
2.4.4.2 Noise Trading and Inconsistent Behaviour 
Inconsistent behaviour is closely related to noise trading (De Long et al., 1990a); 
however, noise trading is a wider phenomenon that includes traders who deviate 
from fundamentals. As such, noise traders act differently when compared to 
rational investors, and their collective actions have the potential of moving asset 
prices from their fundamental values. Hence, noise trading can greatly increase 
the volatility of an asset even when there is no change in the fundamental risk of 
that firm. Figlewski (1979) noted that noise traders create hazards for rational 
ones, because they can destabilise financial markets long enough to create 
different anomalies (bubbles, crashes, …). One reason why traders may choose 
to ignore fundamentals is because there may be an opportunity to earn excess 
returns due to short-term fluctuations in the price of an asset. Moreover, markets 
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take time to consume all fundamental information, thus investors may be able to 
identify market anomalies, such as the high dollar of the mid 1980s and the 
extraordinary price/earnings ratios on Japanese stocks in 1987-1989.  
It may seem logical that young and inexperienced traders would exhibit 
inconsistent behaviour more often than experienced ones, since they are less 
informed about their abilities and more prone to succumb to behavioural biases. 
Nevertheless, Hayley and Marsh (2016) examined the performance of around 
100,000 retail foreign exchange traders over two and a half years and found that 
retail traders act in a similar way to each other and their behaviour can be 
modelled and predicted. 
2.4.4.3 Individual Trader Heuristic Decisions 
Individual traders have neither the capacity, nor the time to analyse many assets 
in a short period of time; as such, they often rely on certain heuristics to simplify 
their decision-making process. Quoting Kahneman and Tversky (1974), “people 
replace the laws of chance by heuristics, which sometimes yield reasonable 
estimates and quite often do not” (p.32). According to Shah and Oppenheimer 
(2008), heuristics either (i) examine fewer cues, (ii) simplify their weighting, (iii) 
reduce the effort of reclaiming cue values, (iv) examine fewer alternatives, or (v) 
integrate fewer amounts of datasets. Similarly, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 
(2011) defined this phenomenon as “a strategy that ignores part of the 
information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or 
accurately than more complex methods”. The authors detected a trade-off 
between accuracy and time, or effort, when making a decision. This dilemma has 
been explained by Savage’s (1972) “small world” and “large world” assumptions. 
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Small world is a “perfect” world where all relevant alternatives, their 
consequences and probabilities are known. However, small world scenarios are 
rare in modern financial markets (Simon, 1979). Large worlds, on the other hand, 
are scenarios where (i) private information is present, (ii) costs (time, money, etc.) 
need to be paid for getting relevant data, and (iii) the future is uncertain. ‘Large 
world’ market conditions are more synonymous with actual market action, which 
it makes it very important to distinguish between large world and small world 
dynamics, since rational models do not work in imperfect financial markets. In 
large world situations, agents tend to base their decisions on heuristics, where 
less information and effort can yield more accurate results than applying a 
complex model.  
Hertwig and Gigerenzer (2011) argued that inconsistencies in observed 
behaviour have often been perceived as conflicting with average stable 
behaviour. Nevertheless, the authors showed that the issue is not solely based 
on the inconsistent behaviour itself, but on the assumed existence of preferences. 
Using a theoretical framework, the authors explained behaviour as a function of 
heuristics’ interactions with the environment, rather than identifying different 
behavioural inconsistencies, and were able to accurately predict when 
behavioural inconsistencies are likely to occur. 
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) investigated heuristics as efficient cognitive 
processes that ignore some of the available information. Since using heuristics 
saves effort, the traditional argument has been that decisions based on heuristics 
have greater errors compared to “rational” decisions that are based on statistics 
and models. Nevertheless, for many decisions the assumptions of rational 
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models may not be met. As such, the authors tested formal models of heuristic 
inference and found that 1) individuals often base their decisions on simple 
heuristics in an adaptive way, and 2) ignoring part of the information can lead to 
more accurate decisions compared to weighing up and integrating all available 
information.  
Several types of heuristics have been identified in the literature. I summarise 
some of the most popular below: 
● Representativeness heuristic: This is explained as an individual’s 
tendency to evaluate the probability of an uncertain event by the extent to 
which it is 1) similar in its fundamental characteristics to the parent 
population, and 2) reflects salient features of the process by which is it 
generated. For example, if a person assigns a high probability to the event 
that a data sample is generated by a random walk process, the underlying 
sample should be considered representative of such a process. 
● Recognition heuristic: This occurs when an individual has to infer, which 
of two or more decisions will produce a better outcome. The recognition 
heuristic occurs when the individual recognises only one of these 
alternatives and not the other, and infers that it is the better decision. 
● Fluency heuristic: This occurs when traders recognise all available 
alternatives, but choose the one they recognise to be the fastest. Making 
decisions based on this heuristic results in inconsistent behaviour since 
individuals are not making their decisions based on a rational evaluation 
of all options, but rather, simply choose the first option they recognise, 
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which may be very different from their average/typical decision type 
(Johnson and Raab, 2003). 
● One-clever-cue heuristics: This heuristic occurs when an individual 
gives attention to one advantage of a certain decision and ignores all the 
other cues or disadvantages. This heuristic can differ among individuals 
since it is based on the way cues are perceived and assessed. 
● Trade-off heuristics: This heuristic happens when individuals weigh 
information and cues in order to determine the optimal option among the 
alternatives. Within financial markets, DeMiguel et al. (2009) compared 
decisions made using this heuristic to 14 optimisation models, including 
Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio framework (among others), using 10 
years of stock market data. The authors concluded that none of the 
complex optimisation models can reach the same positive result (returns, 
turnover, the Sharpe ratio) as the trade-off heuristic process. 
 
In general, the literature implies that the more unpredictable the information 
environment, the more superior heuristic models become, relative to rational 
models. 
Measuring inconsistent behaviour is a complex task. Given the studies presented 
above, I use a measure of risk appetite as a proxy for inconsistent behaviour, 
specifically, a trader’s actual margin utilisation at the moment of placing the order. 
If this measure is not significantly different from zero, it is assumed the trader 
does not exhibit inconsistent behaviour. On the contrary, if the measure is 




2.4.5 Information Advantage 
Traditional financial theory postulates that all market participants have access to 
the same publicly disclosed information, which is already reflected in asset prices. 
Aldea and Marin (2007) defined such a situation as perfect symmetric 
information, where market participants receive the same information 
simultaneously. Moreover, investors are assumed to be rational and unemotional 
when allocating their capital to different investments. Nevertheless, many studies 
have shown that homogeneity among market participants does not hold in reality 
(Lyons, 1991, 1995; Frankel and Rose, 1995; Elliot and Ito, 1999; Frechette and 
Weaver, 2001; Evans, 2002), and investors exhibit many behavioural biases that 
drive them to deviate away from a common well-diversified market portfolio and 
trade irrationally for various reasons (Locke and Mann, 2005). 
One reason why traders may choose to make decisions that are different from 
the predominant market consensus is because they may possess private 
information deemed to be valuable (Easley et al., 1996; Bikhchandani and 
Sharma, 2000; Easley et al., 2014). Thus, a heterogeneous expectations theory, 
which opposes traditional financial frameworks, embraces the notion that 
investors may possess different sets of information, and that these information 
differentials may result in superior returns in some cases and irrational behaviour 
in others. Consequently, private information in the hands of individual investors 




2.4.5.1 Information Asymmetry 
Hayek (1945) stated: “the utilisation of knowledge is not given to anyone in its 
totality”. Many studies have investigated information asymmetry in different 
situations. For instance, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) observed information 
asymmetry by analysing the influence of geographic proximity in the portfolio 
choices of US mutual funds. Krinsky and Lee (1996) and Cong et al. (2010) found 
a significant relation between information asymmetry and earnings 
announcements. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) found that herding behaviour 
may appear — because investors know that private information exists and seek 
to follow those who possess it. Therefore, herding arises due to informational 
cascades.  
Boortz et al. (2013) created a model of herding behaviour based on information 
risk — “the probability of trading with a counterpart who holds private information 
about the asset” — and proposed that information asymmetry is a key 
determinant of herding behaviour. The authors analysed around 2.6 billion trades 
from the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and found that 
aggregate herding intensity increases with information risk. Similar results were 
also reported by Ramli et al. (2016) after investigating herding behaviour on the 
Indonesian stock exchange. The authors argued that information asymmetry 
leads to different stock price expectations, dividends and performance growth. 
Information asymmetry also appears to increase risk premiums and the volatility 
of stock prices and their returns, making uninformed traders highly prone to herd 
behaviour (Wang, 2000).  
110 
 
Chauhan et al. (2016) argued that information sharing may be distorted due to 
the needs of data owners, while Huddart and Ke (2007) found two factors that 
drive the information advantage: the uncertainty of company value and the 
precision of an agent’s private information. They also showed that information 
asymmetry is positively correlated with the uncertainty of company value. 
Information asymmetry can arise from two sources or activities: 1) insider 
information, which may lead to illegal activities if traded upon, and 2) private 
information, generated by an individual’s own research efforts or paying for 
privately collected data or research reports. I discuss these two sources of 
information asymmetry below. 
2.4.5.1.1 Insider Information 
One situation that leads to information asymmetry among market participants is 
insider information. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) defines insider 
information as information that is (i) not generally available, (ii) relates, directly or 
indirectly, to certain securities, and (iii) has the ability to have a significant effect 
on asset prices. As such, some investors may possess superior insider 
information through 1) “the membership of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of an issuer of certain securities”, 2) “holding of capital of an 
issuer of certain securities”, or 3) “connections via their employment, profession 
or concurrent duties. Institutional investors typically have access to such insider 
information and are usually required to disclose their holdings of companies in 
which they have a vested interest or have a business relation”. Retail investors 
are less likely to possess insider information, especially in the foreign exchange 
market where the majority of fundamental information is disclosed directly by 
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centralised federal agencies, such as central banks, at very infrequent time 
intervals. Hence, I do not expand on this topic further. 
2.4.5.1.2 Private Information and Research 
Obtaining private information and subsequently conducting private research 
requires individuals to expend their available time and resources. The advantage 
of conducting these activities to obtain private information is that the individual 
becomes more informed than the counterparty, leading to information asymmetry 
and a potential for excess returns. It follows that investors can be divided into two 
categories: informed and uninformed. The former are active investors who 
possess sufficient resources and apply additional effort to obtain valuable private 
information, while the latter do not — which typically leads to emotionally-driven 
trading decisions.  
Abdioglu et al. (2015) defined the relationship between informed and uninformed 
investors as a situation where knowledge about a company’s returns is unequally 
distributed among its investors. The authors also indicated that in today’s financial 
markets, information asymmetry is considered to be inevitable, and that this 
phenomenon leads not only to changes in financial markets, but also to deviations 
in the behaviour of other market agents (Healy et al., 1999).  
2.4.5.2 Studies on Private Information 
Akerlof (1970) research was one of the first to investigate information asymmetry 
in financial markets. Using the car market as an example, the author illustrated 
that the seller is typically more informed about the asset being sold, and “knows 
which cars are good and which are bad” or “lemons”. Buyers on the other hand 
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are not as familiar with these new assets and do not have access to private 
information about the quality of the cars being sold. Consequently, due to this 
information asymmetry, good cars may be driven out of the market by the bad 
“lemons”.  
Similarly, Spence (1973) examined information asymmetry in recruitment, 
arguing that since the employer does not know the exact level of an individual’s 
skills, the hiring process involves information asymmetry and may result in 
uninformed decisions on behalf of the hiring manager. In a related study, 
Figlewski (1979) investigated "subjective information" or "expert opinion" using 
data provided by professional analysts, brokers and banks. The author examined 
market efficiency with respect to this type of information, and found that subjective 
information brings uncertainty to decision-making processes since every source 
offers a different forecast. Costs associated with obtaining private information are 
the reason for information imperfection and should be taken into account as they 
have great influence (Stigler, 1967).  
As a remedy to the issue of information asymmetry, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
developed a model that is based on the assumption of informationally inefficient 
markets, including a risk-free asset with a stable return, and risky securities that 
offer stochastic returns. The authors stated that there are two types of traders: 1) 
informed traders who have access to information that allows them to identify and 
understand asset risks, and 2) uninformed traders who do not have the same 
privileges. There is a cost in terms of time and resources to be paid, should a 
trader choose to become more informed. The authors argued that prices reflect 
the information only partially, and that the aggregate level of market awareness 
113 
 
depends on the number of informed agents, which can vary widely. Hence, the 
whole financial market system can be described as follows: as informed agents 
generate gains based on superior private information, the greater the demand for 
private data among uninformed agents, and subsequently the less profitable this 
data tends to become as more individuals act upon it. Moreover, as the cost of 
obtaining private information increases, uninformed traders become willing to pay 
this cost. Furthermore, the expected effectiveness of uninformed individuals 
depends on the magnitude of noise trading. The authors concluded that there is 
a fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread 
information and the incentives of market participants to acquire information.  
Stiglitz (2000) stated that the process of obtaining data can be costly, and showed 
how information asymmetry affects economies. The author described information 
as a commodity, where any piece of information is different from another, and its 
value cannot be fully estimated until the data provider shares it; however, when 
the information is shared the price is immediately adjusted to reflect that event. 
In general, the author concluded that economies (including financial markets) 
with imperfect information have very significant differences with the economies 
where information is symmetric and perfect. 
Baik et al. (2010) investigated the role of information in relation to the 
geographical proximity of an institution’s activities. Specifically, the authors 
studied the relationship between institutional investors’ informational advantages 
and stock returns, where geographic proximity was used as a measure of data 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed agents. The authors stated 
intention was to examine and compare whether local or non-local investors traded 
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better. Local (in-state) investors are those who trade the securities of the country 
they live in, while non-local (out-of-state) investors are those who trade in foreign 
markets and assets. The study made use of multiple datasets such as the 
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings from January 1995 to June 2007 
including 171,989 firm-quarters, stock returns from the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), analyst forecasts from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate 
System (IBES), and financial data from Compustat (a financial database). Baik et 
al. (2010) used cross-sectional regressions of fractional local (non-local) 
institutional ownership on companies’ characteristics, including: market-to-book, 
the log of market capitalisation, return volatility, turnover, S&P500 inclusion, stock 
price, cumulative market-adjusted return for the penultimate six months, 
cumulative market-adjusted return for the preceding six months, dividend yield 
and age. Their results showed that the highest quintile of local agents gain more 
profits, compared to the highest quintile of non-local agents.  
As for information asymmetry, the in-state institutional investors are more 
informed than their out-of-state counterparts, and their trading activity is a strong 
predictor of future returns. Furthermore, data imperfection was found to be 
positively correlated with local ownership, such that organisations with a high 
level of data imperfection performed better, compared to those with low levels. 
Examples of such organisations include small or start-up companies, firms with 
high levels of volatility, and R&D (research and development) intensive 
companies. The findings of this study provide a good example of how costs may 
influence access to information, since obtaining information by local investors is 
significantly easier compared to non-local investors. 
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From a different perspective, Easley et al. (2014) studied private information 
content amongst hedge funds, using a model similar to Grossman and Stiglitz’s 
(1980), where despite having all private information “investors do not have a clear 
idea of what strategies are used by other traders”. Hedge funds also have access 
to private investment opportunities, such as direct investments in companies and 
options trading — financial products that mutual funds may be legally restricted 
from investing in. This gives hedge funds an advantage and the opportunity to 
provide effective risk-aversion investment strategies in equity markets. In the 
authors’ model two assets are traded: a risk-free asset and a risky-equity asset. 
At the beginning of the trading session agents have one stock — they can choose 
to be “transparent traders” (mutual funds) or “opaque traders” (hedge funds), but 
to be the latter a cost must be paid, which represents the cost that hedge fund 
must pay to develop complex trading strategies. Opaque traders have a different 
information set and more investment opportunity diversity, such as foreign 
currencies, venture capital, commodities, options or precious metals.  
Easley et al. (2014) also distinguished between different types of information that 
can lead to ambiguity: 1) exogenous data which includes forecasts about price 
dynamics, earnings reports, and other fundamental signals, and 2) endogenous 
information, which is related to uncertainty about the trading strategies of other 
investors. The authors simulated a decrease in the degree of ambiguity around 
hedge fund strategies and an increase in the cost of operating them — to find 
that the premium paid for equities increases, subsequently decreasing total 
welfare and the number of hedge funds in operation. They also estimated the 
demand, future wealth and expected effectiveness of these traders and found 
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that hedge funds appear to behave in a less risk-averse manner compared to 
mutual funds. As costs increase, and as ambiguity increases, a smaller number 
of traders tend to become opaque. 
Evidence of information asymmetry in Chinese stock markets was found by 
Doukas and Wang (2013), where they examined whether differences exist in data 
availability between local A-share and foreign B-share markets. A-shares can be 
held and traded only by Chinese domestic traders, while B-shares can be 
purchased by foreign traders. In contrast to the study performed by Baik et al. 
(2010), the authors found that out-of-state investors possess more value-
relevant, firm-specific information, compared to local investors, despite factors 
such as different accounting standards, language barriers and weak access to 
local information. The latter factors are also the reason behind higher premiums 
in the B-share market (Chakravarty et al., 1998; Chan et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
the authors found that Chinese investors are not as informative as they can be, 
and the reasons behind this are local market problems such as ineffective legal 
enforcement, limited trader protection and imperfect accounting-auditing 
systems. Such issues create a tendency to trade not on the actual information, 
but on rumours. As a result, Chinese stocks are more correlated with overall 
market movements, than with firm-specific information (Morck et al., 2000; Chan 
and Hameed, 2006). Foreign investors, on the other hand, cover their high costs 
of obtaining information by the profits generated through their skills and 
professionalism. Moreover, the stricter rules that apply to companies that want to 
list their shares in the B-shares market, such as the preparation of financial 
statements according to both Chinese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
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(GAAP) and the International Accounting Standards (IAS), ensure that investors 
obtain high-quality information about companies. As such, the B-share market 
has a higher level of investor protection and information transparency. Moreover, 
the authors established that B-shares discounts are the result of a downward 
price correction towards the fundamental value, once more firm-specific 
information is capitalised on by sophisticated foreign B-share investors. 
Furthermore, Doukas and Wang (2013) used vector autoregression (VAR) to 
examine the lead-lag relationship between the two investigated markets. Using 
data from October 1997 to September 2007, obtained from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR), the results showed that 
the B-share market leads the A-share market, and that the degree of information 
asymmetry decreases when regulatory reforms and market liberalisations 
occurred. 
Another study by Sankaraguruswamy et al. (2013) investigated the frequency of 
news releases as an information asymmetry proxy. Specifically, the authors used 
the probability of information-based trading (Easley et al., 1996), the decomposed 
bid-ask spread (Huang and Stoll, 1997), and the permanent price impact of trades 
(Hasbrouck, 1991) as measures of information asymmetry, and found that 
information asymmetry tends to increase before and after events such as 
earnings or dividend announcements. Using data on 1,031 stocks traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange during 2004 and news announcement information 
from the website “www.MarketWatch.com”, the study showed that there is a 
negative correlation between the frequency of public news releases and 
information asymmetry. The more frequent the stream of public information 
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announcements, the higher the trading intensity of uninformed investors. In 
addition, market regulators were identified as a key component affecting this 
frequency. As a conclusion, the study showed that uninformed investors do not 
react to information as fast as informed investors, which affects price dynamics 
in the wider markets.  
Other researchers such as Ravi and Hong (2014) examined the nonlinear 
relationship between firm-to-investor and investor-to-investor information 
asymmetry using a sample of over 1,000 stocks traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange from January 1993 to December 2008. The authors found that when 
firm-to-investor information asymmetry increases, investor-to-investor 
information asymmetry tends to increase in parallel — but only up to a certain 
point after which it steadily decreases. Data imperfection reaches its peak 
between two extreme situations: the first extreme situation is when the company 
is completely transparent, such that inter-investor information asymmetry is zero, 
and the second situation is the exact opposite. The authors stated that since firms 
are opaque, it follows that inter-investor information asymmetry is also zero. The 
reason behind this is that in both situations investors either know everything or 
know nothing about the company. Hence, an increase in the level of transparency 
of a company does not always lead to an advantage for uninformed traders since 
inter-investor information asymmetry may still increase, resulting in liquidity 
reduction and an increasing cost-burden on capital growth. 
Abdioglu et al. (2015) studied how information asymmetry affects foreign 
institutional investors’ desire to invest in US equities. They aimed to explain why 
out-of-state traders take a big interest in US assets, despite the Sarbanes-Oxley 
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Act in 2002, which introduced significant compliance costs and had the potential 
to reduce US firms’ performance. One of the reasons is firm-level disclosure and 
information transparency that reduces information imperfection. Using 
information on three indices, 18 different foreign countries, and 2,752 unique 
firms from the Thomson Reuters 13F database over the period 1999-2012, the 
authors studied how increasing firm-level disclosure influences the decision-
making process of passive investors such as banks and insurance companies, 
and active investors including public pension funds, investment companies and 
independent investment advisors. Passive investors do not usually spend money 
on acquiring private information because of prohibitively high costs, as such they 
rarely put pressure on the managers of their investee companies to disclose more 
information. Passive investors on the other hand are more willing to obtain private 
data. The authors found that, in general, foreign institutional investors prefer large 
companies with high turnover, low ownership concentration, relatively safe 
institutional environments (i.e. strong accounting standards and legal 
frameworks), and the avoidance of markets with government expropriation risk. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act came into force in order to improve the institutional 
environment by increasing the amount of disclosure, which resulted in a decline 
in costs related to obtaining information. As for active traders, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act decreased their competitive edge since the disclosure of company 
information has been made a legal requirement under this act. 
Another study was conducted by Tourani-Rad et al. (2016), who investigated 
foreign IPOs of Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange to 
find if the choice of listing location influences the information environment for 
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foreign IPO companies, compared to those who list their stocks for the first time 
solely in their home market. Using intraday tick data from 1996 to 2012, the 
authors examined the asymmetric information component of the bid-ask spread 
and concluded that foreign IPO firms have the same degree of data imperfection 
as Hong Kong IPO firms. However, on Chinese exchange markets IPOs have 
higher levels of priced information asymmetry compared to foreign IPOs. 
Chauhan et al. (2016) examined the impact of information advantage on stock 
prices in the Indian stock market and found that the information content of insider 
trading follows an inverted U-shaped function in relation to controlling ownership. 
The reason for information asymmetry is due to poor investor protection, resulting 
in a higher level of uncertainty regarding a firm’s value. The study distinguished 
between two sources of inside information: 1) founders and families hold most of 
the corporate ownership structure in emerging markets, which allows them to use 
private information to obtain an advantage against minorities and other traders, 
thus increasing the degree of information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders, and 2) performance of regulations, where stricter regulations lower 
insiders’ willingness to use private information to make abnormal profits. Due to 
less stringent enforcement of regulations, data imperfection estimates are high in 
India. To measure information asymmetry within institutional ownership the 
authors used price responses to earnings announcements, product market 
competition, the percentage of independent directors and price ‘informativeness’ 
(awareness) as model parameters. Moreover, they employed the database 
maintained by the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) from January 
2007 to October 2012. The results showed that: price informativeness reduces 
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insider information content, traders who possess negative private information 
start selling immediately, and that insider trading becomes less frequent, but 
more informed. 
Akbas et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between information asymmetry 
and the level of board member influence upon the company. In every company, 
corporate managers are required to keep information private and confidential; 
however, interacting with many people may lead to information leakage to 
sophisticated traders, who may then gain a competitive edge in trading. 
Corporate directors are insiders who have privileged information about their 
organisations, while sophisticated traders do not have direct access to such 
information, but can get it through exchanges with corporate directors. The more 
frequent these communications and exchanges, the higher the probability of 
inadvertent information leakage. The same applies to the number of people who 
possess private data (Steele, 1989). The authors argued that companies with a 
higher degree of director connectivity are easier to analyse for upcoming earnings 
surprises. The data used in the study was composed from different sources 
including information about connections of corporate directors and executives 
from the BoardEx for the period January 2002 to December 2011, proxies from 
Ivy OptionMetrics, data about institutional ownership and insider trading data 
from Thomson Financial, and analyst forecasts included in the I/B/E/S database. 
Using the monthly level of short interest, weekly order imbalances of institutional 
traders, and the ratio of monthly option volume to stock volume as measures for 
informed trading, the authors developed a novel identification strategy which 
studies the information flows between corporate directors and sophisticated 
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traders. The study found highly significant relationships between all measures of 
informed trading and future stock returns for firms with more connected boards.  
2.4.5.3 Relation Between Noise Trading and Private Information 
De Long et al. (1990a) investigated noise trading and argued that noise has a 
great impact on financial markets since rational investors have a limited 
willingness to take positions against noise traders. According to Black (1986), 
noise trading occurs because of irrational trading behaviour amongst uninformed 
investors. This is in opposition to what classical theorists such as Friedman 
(1953) and Fama (1965) propose, where rational thinking agents always defeat 
noise traders thus returning the price to its fundamental value. The reasons why 
noise prevails in the market is because aversion to fundamental risk can hold 
arbitrageurs back even when they have infinite time horizons (Shiller et al., 1984; 
Campbell and Kyle, 1993), and according to Figlewski (1979) a long-time period 
is needed for noise traders to run out of money. Noise trading is unpredictable 
and creates risk even when there is no excess fundamental risk in the financial 
market.  
With respect to information asymmetry, there are two main issues. First, noise 
traders do not have the ability to obtain private information, especially in the 
foreign exchange market. Second, noise traders believe they have special 
information about the future price of the risky security a result of “pseudo signals” 
produced from technical analysis, economic consultants or stockbrokers. 
Generally, noise trading often drives certain anomalies in financial markets such 
as volatility clustering, mean reversion in asset prices, bubbles and crises. 
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In general, the literature on information advantage illustrates the inevitability of 
information asymmetry. In this research, I concentrate on retail traders in the 
foreign exchange market. As such, I argue that the Forex market has limited 
potential for insider information to be effective in generating excessive returns, 
with every participant being able to get all relevant publicly-disclosed data. 
However, some individual traders may still be able to obtain private information 
on order flow, which this information can be used to gauge the direction of the 




2.5 Research Questions 
In general, this thesis investigates the performance and behaviour of retail FX 
traders, which is an area that has not been intensely explored by academics due 
to limited access to high quality, detailed data. Hence, I employ a detailed 
transaction level dataset on retail FX traders, which allows me to control for trade-
specific characteristics and provide refined insight — compared to the existing 
literature — about heterogeneity in performance and expectations among retail 
FX traders in the EUR/USD market to shed light on the characteristics and 
dynamics of foreign exchange markets. I also examine what proportion of traders 
possess skills, which further highlights that there may be significant variation in 
performance and expectations among traders at any given moment. Such an 
analysis emphasises the importance of understanding that the FX market is not 
homogenous and that heterogeneity should be acknowledged as a constant and 
natural phenomenon. Additionally, I study how external factors, such as 
heightened market volatility, and endogenous behavioural biases affect trader 
skills. This allows us to understand the micro dynamics of the FX market and 
provide insight into how market factors as well as trader behaviour affect an 
individual’s trading skills. Furthermore, this is the first study to my knowledge to 
examine the effect of multiple behavioural biases, simultaneously, on trader skills. 
Very few researchers have investigated heterogeneity among retail FX traders, 
and those who did (Abbey and Doukas, 2015; Haley and Marsh, 2016) had data 
limitations which prevented them from controlling for trade characteristics when 
testing for heterogeneity in performance, and from investigating heterogeneity in 
expectations. Hence, the research questions I aim to investigate are: 1) how do 
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trade-specific characteristics affect heterogeneity in performance among retail FX 
traders, and 2) do retail FX traders exhibit heterogeneity in expectations, such 
that their forecasts vary significantly from the market average? I make use of 
transaction level data on retail FX traders, which allows me to delve deeper into 
micro dynamics of this market and shed light on how individual traders make 
decisions, that on average, diverge significantly away from the market 
consensus. Such an analysis illustrates that heterogeneity in financial markets is 
a natural and persistent phenomenon, which should not be overlooked or simply 
labelled as noise. 
The analysis on heterogeneity among retail FX traders raises another research 
question. Given that traders have different views about the market at any point in 
time, and thus trade differently, this implies that some traders perform well while 
others perform poorly. Some papers have investigated this topic in the context of 
retail FX, such as Abbey and Doukas (2015) who apply a factor model to assess 
whether traders exhibit outperformance. Their analysis essentially examines only 
one of the three skills which I investigate in my thesis, which is the ability to add 
value in absolute terms to an investment. My research contributes to the literature 
on trading skills by answering the following: 1) do individual traders have the 
ability to correctly predict future price movements, and 2) do they have the ability 
to adjust their position in a profitable manner based on their expectation of the 
change in market prices? To do so, I adopt an alternative approach to capture 
the different skills of a trader using three metrics: 1) success rate, 2) return on 
investment, and 3) big hit ability. This analysis allows us to estimate what 
proportion of traders in the retail FX market truly possess genuine trading skills. 
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While a trader’s skills may be endogenously determined by one’s innate 
characteristics, external market factors, such as volatility, may play a critical role 
in shaping the outcome of these skills. The literature shows that there is a 
negative relation between volatility and performance, where higher volatility 
negatively impacts the performance of investors. As such, I investigate how 
heightened market volatility affects the three trading skills mentioned above. 
Specifically, does heightened market volatility have a negative impact on a 
trader’s skills? The high level of uncertainty in the market should cloud the 
judgement even of the most skilled traders, such that the high volatility will have 
a detrimental impact on a trader’s ability to correctly predict price movements and 
as well as generate a positive return. 
The evidence presented in the literature and in this thesis shows that market 
dynamics can be greatly affected by the skills of the individual traders. Moreover, 
a trader’s skills are determined by one’s personal biases, which affect the 
person’s decision-making process. This leads me to investigate the following 
research question, which is a topic that has not been researched previously: how 
do behavioural biases affect the skills of retail FX traders? Specifically, I examine 
five behavioural proxies which are: 1) herd initiations, 2) disposition effect, 3) 
sensation seeking, 4) inconsistent behaviour, and 5) information advantage. In 
general, a skilled trader is expected to, 1) initiate the herd and is deemed as a 
leader by others, 2) exhibit the disposition effect by realising small yet consistent 
profits, 3) be a sensation seeker and use leverage to exploit even the slight price 
movement, 4) exhibit inconsistent behaviour to adjust to the dynamic market 
conditions, and 5) have an information advantage, which may be in the form of 
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private analyses of the market. This analysis highlights the importance of 




Section 3. Hypotheses, Data and Analytics 
3.1 Hypotheses Section 
There has been limited research that investigates the characteristics and skills of 
individual retail FX traders, and examines how external as well as endogenous 
factors impact trader skills. 
Based on literature review and the research gaps presented above I propose the 
following hypotheses in order to shed light on 1) the degree of heterogeneity 
found in retail FX markets, 2) the variation in the skills exhibited by the different 
traders, 3) how market uncertainty impacts a trader’s skills, and 4) how an 
individual’s endogenous biases affect their abilities. 
3.1.1 Hypothesis 1: Measuring heterogeneity among traders  
The research question I aim to investigate is whether there is heterogeneity in 
performance and expectations among retail traders in the EUR/USD foreign 
exchange market? I develop the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.A: 
• H0: There is no significant heterogeneity in performance among retail 
traders in the EUR/USD foreign exchange market. 
• H1: There is significant heterogeneity in performance among retail traders 
in the EUR/USD foreign exchange market. 
Given the methodological and data limitations of previous studies discussed in 
the literature (Abbey and Doukas, 2015; Hayley and Marsh, 2016), I use a 
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detailed transaction level dataset, which allows me to apply a more refined 
methodology to control for trading characteristics that may impact variations in 
performance among traders, including trade duration, limit orders, trade direction, 
volume, and trading frequency. I expect to find evidence of and persistence in 
heterogeneity among retail FX trader, which implies that heterogeneity is not a 
momentary lack of consensus among market participants, but is rather a constant 
characteristic that defines the microstructure of the market. 
Hypothesis 1.B: 
• H0: There is no significant heterogeneity in expectations among retail 
traders in the EUR/USD foreign exchange market. 
• H1: There is significant heterogeneity in expectations among retail traders 
in the EUR/USD foreign exchange market. 
I draw on the literature on heterogeneity in expectations (Ito 1990) at the 
institutional level and argue that retail traders in the FX market also exhibit 
heterogeneity in expectations such that their forecasts of the EUR/USD spot rate 
are significantly different compared to the average market consensus. 
3.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Identifying genuine trading skills 
The second research question I aim to investigate is whether some retail FX 
traders possess genuine trading skills, such that they are able to consistently 
predict future price movements (i.e. more than half of a trader’s positions 
generated a profit), add value in absolute terms (i.e. the sum of all profits and 
losses is positive) and adjust the size of their position based on their confidence 
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in their forecast (i.e. increase their position when they expect the change in future 
prices to be large, and vice versa)? 
Hypothesis 2.A: 
• H0: There is no significant evidence that retail FX traders consistently 
predict future price movements (Success Rate ≤ 50%). 
• H1: There is significant evidence that retail FX traders consistently predict 
future price movements (Success Rate > 50%). 
Given the evidence in the literature that retail FX traders have the ability to 
correctly predict future price changes in the short-term (which may be due to the 
use of momentum strategies) I expect that a large number of traders in my sample 
will exhibit a Success Rate greater than 50%. Given that some traders will exhibit 
the ability to successfully predict future price movements, this further contributes 
to the literature on heterogeneity by showing that there is significant variation in 
traders’ ability to predict movements in market prices. 
Hypothesis 2.B: 
• H0: There is no significant evidence that retail FX traders add value in 
absolute terms (ROI ≤ 0%). 
• H1: There is significant evidence that retail FX traders add value in 
absolute terms (ROI > 0%). 
While retail FX traders may have the ability to correctly predict future price 
changes in the short-term more than half of the time, fewer traders possess the 
ability to add value in absolute terms to their initial investment. This may be due 
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to the elevated levels of volatility in the FX market, coupled with the traders’ use 
of high leverage levels which can result in large losses if the market turns against 
them. As such I expect that the majority of traders will have a negative ROI which 
indicates that these traders lose money over time. As such, the variation in the 
use of leverage and the timing of trades among traders is expected to result in a 
heterogenous distribution of returns. This would support the argument that there 
is significant heterogeneity in the ability of traders to add value to an investment. 
Hypothesis 2.C: 
• H0: There is no significant evidence that retail FX traders adjust the size 
of their position based on their confidence in their forecast (BHA ≤ 0%). 
• H1: There is significant evidence that retail FX traders adjust the size of 
their position based on their confidence in their forecast (BHA > 0%). 
I expect that few retail FX traders will adjust their positions based on their 
confidence in their forecasts as it is highly unlikely that these traders will possess 
superior fundamental information on foreign exchange rates which will drive them 
to adjust the size of their positions accordingly. Given that some traders are 
expected to change their exposure over time depending on their confidence in 
their decisions, this implies that heterogeneity is a dynamic and persistent 
characteristic of the market. 
3.1.3 Hypothesis 3: The impact of volatility on trading skills 
The third research question I aim to investigate is how heightened market 





• H0: There is no significant evidence that volatility impacts the ability of 
retail FX traders to correctly predict future price movements. 
• H1: There is significant evidence that volatility impacts the ability of retail 
FX traders to correctly predict future price movements. 
I expect that high market uncertainty will have a negative impact on a trader’s 
ability to predict future price movements, as market information becomes less 
accurate, more volatility and traders rely more on sentiment rather than economic 
analysis. 
Hypothesis 3.B: 
• H0: There is no significant evidence that volatility impacts the ability of 
traders to add value in an investment in absolute terms. 
• H1: There is significant evidence that volatility impacts the ability of traders 
to add value in an investment in absolute terms. 
I expect that elevated market uncertainty will have a negative impact on a trader’s 
skills. This is because the high level of uncertainty will cloud the judgement of 
traders. In addition, when traders base their simulations on historical low volatility 
data, and are then faced with a high volatility market situation, this renders their 
analysis inaccurate. Hence, when volatility is high, price fluctuations can be very 
significant such as that they result in significant losses to traders, which can be 
hard to recover. Given the above argument, I expect that elevated levels of 
market volatility will be detrimental to an individual’s skills. 
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3.1.4 Hypothesis 4: The impact of behavioural biases on trading skills 
The fourth research question I aim to investigate is how trader behaviour impacts 
the skills of retail FX traders; specifically, how behavioural biases affect 1) the 
performance, 2) the ability to add value in absolute terms and 3) the ability to 
adjust the size of the position. 
I examine five behavioural indicators to capture behavioural features such as 
herd initiations, disposition effect, sensation seeking, inconsistent behaviour and 
information advantage.  
Hypothesis 4:  
• H0: There is no significant evidence that behavioural biases affect the 
skills of retail FX trading population. 
• H1: There is significant evidence that behavioural biases affect the skills 
of retail FX trading population. 
I expect that skilled traders 1) are herd initiators, 2) exhibit the disposition effect 
whereby they are more likely to realise profits compared to losses, 3) are 
sensation seekers, 4) exhibit inconsistent behaviour and 5) do not have an 
information advantage since they are trading in the foreign exchange market 
where it is unlikely that they possess superior fundamental information about 




3.2 Data and Methodology 
3.2.1 Retail Trading Operations 
Foreign exchange trading traditionally refers to over-the-counter (OTC) SPOT 
(the single payment option trading) currency contracts in the interbank market. 
SPOT automatically converts the option to cash when the option is successful, 
giving a pay-out. The SPOT option contract is not cancellable by selling. The 
standard settlement time frame is usually two business days (T+2), with some 
exceptions settling on different dates such as USD/CAD (T+1). 
Although this OTC product is popular in the interbank market, it became 
increasingly popular following its simplification in the retail domain. FX trading in 
the retail domain is performed through trading a rolling spot FX product, a product 
that is more appealing to the retail community rather than the SPOT currency 
contracts in the interbank market. The contract has the same underlying asset of 
the two-day forward, but with no physical cash settlement date. The settlement 
cash amount at the end of each day acts as a rollover (simultaneous operation of 
buying one value date in exchange for selling another value date) resetting the 
delivery to the next trading day. The difference in prices between the two value 
dates results in creating a fee (usually a small amount) and this amount is defined 
as a rollover fee (or a swap fee). 
Essentially, retail FX traders engage in trading by speculating on currency 
fluctuations without the need to worry about any physical delivery of their position. 
In reality, a CFD (contract for difference) is marked to market in real time and is 
settled at the end of each trading day. Thus, any potential gains or losses are 
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realised at the end of each trading day, and the trader’s position is rolled over to 
the next trading day if it has not been closed by the trader. 
National Futures Association (NFA), the self-regulatory organisation for the U.S. 
futures industry was one of the first that attempted to standardise rolling spot FX 
trading and its market makers. Retail foreign exchange dealers (RFEDs) are 
defined as “individuals or organisations which act, or offer to act, as a 
counterparty to an off-exchange foreign currency transaction with a person who 
is not an eligible contract participant”. The transaction is either: 
• A futures contract, an option on a futures contract or option contractor. 
• Offered or entered into, on a leveraged or margined basis, or financed by 
the offerer, counterparty or person acting in concert with the offerer or 
counterparty on a similar basis” (National Futures Association 2010). 
Following the NFA official description of the RFED operations, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) (Financial Services Authority 2011), now the FCA 
(Financial Conduct Authority) also commented on its functions and described 
them as “not to be limited to the intermediation function but also serving as an 
agent and/or deal as a principal” making the RFED essentially a broker-dealer. 
Broker-dealers play a vital role in the financial markets by providing access to any 
category of market participants such as investors, speculators, hedgers and 
arbitrageurs. 
Specifically, RFEDs act as market makers by offering both bid and ask prices to 
their customers (the traders). This is done by injecting vital liquidity and serving 
as a counterparty to any of their trades. The traders are eligible to place trades, 
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and the market maker holds an obligation to fill the order at either the market or 
the requested price. 
Traditionally, after a dealer receives an order it can reduce his inventory in two 
ways: 
• by matching the customer order with another customer from his order 
book. The dealer has no control of the entry of trades since customers 
always instigate customer trades. This, though, does not limit the dealer’s 
control since it has the ability to attract customers by offering 
advantageous rates (price shading); or 
• by passing the customer order to the interdealer network (acting as a 
broker only) from dealer to dealer, with the deal exiting the interdealer 
network only when it is offset by one or more customer orders. 
The above is not the usual case for the RFED. Due to the nature of their product 
offering (high leverage financial instruments) they prefer to take a certain 
inventory themselves, but also stand ready to buy or sell in the interbank market 
if they are required to minimise their inventory risk. They do this by standing as 
the sole counterparty to its customers by providing liquidity and facilitating the 
creation of orderly markets. 
On the other hand, banks do not enjoy holding inventory for more than a trading 
day. However, individual banks do not represent the market as a whole — since 
if every dealer in the market place targeted zero inventory then the sum of all 
signed order flow would be zero, which is usually not the case. 
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Regarding trading operations on the Anonymous broker, a trader begins by 
opening an account with the broker. To do so, the trader needs to provide 
personal identification information, which is verified by Anonymous and kept 
private. After the account is approved, the trader is able to deposit funds into their 
account in order to trade. Typically, the trader would transfer funds from his 
personal banking account to that of the broker, who in turn credits the trader’s 
brokerage account with an identical amount in the base currency chosen by the 
trader. Once the funds are available in the trader’s account, they are able to open 
positions using contracts for difference (CFDs) where they can have either long 
or short positions to a certain currency pair. All products available to the trader 
are displayed on the trading platform with all relevant real-time information, 
including the bid and ask quotes, the swap rate, minimum lot size, among other 
characteristics of the contract. The trader is then able to go long or short the 
currency pair either by a simple click of a button which is available on the chart 
of that currency pair, or by executing an algorithm, which will execute trades 
automatically when certain criteria are met. Similarly, the trader is able to close 
an open position either manually by a click of a button, or by specifying certain 
criteria in the algorithm, which would in turn automatically close out the position. 
Some of these criteria include, take-profit which would be executed once a certain 
amount of unrealised profit has been accumulated, and a stop-loss which is a 
predetermined level that limits a trader’s loss should the price move adversely to 
the position direction. A trader is able to withdraw the funds in his account at any 
time (subject to paying all unrealised losses and due fees) to his bank account. 
Given this empirical setting, several parameters are recorded by the broker, 
which are used in my analysis. 
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3.2.2 Data. Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset I use is obtained from a foreign exchange broker, which I call 
Anonymous, and contains 4,119,479 transactions in the EUR/USD currency pair 
executed by 21,300 retail FX traders from February 2011 to October 2013. The 
database is filtered to exclude any dummy accounts and as a result all trading is 
based on real money. The platform is active only from Sunday through Friday 
21:00 GMT on Sunday till 21:00 GMT on Friday. Mark-to-market reconciliations 
of open trading positions take place at 21:00 GMT each day. For each trade, the 
platform records the value of the trade in U.S. dollars, the position direction, the 
time-stamp, and the type of the order, whether it is a market or limit order. Around 
68.32% of positions are personally closed by the traders while 13.36% and 
18.32% of positions are closed due to stop-loss and take-profit orders, 
respectively. In addition, I calculate several trader characteristics, which are 
presented in Table 1.1. The average trader balance is USD 1,806 with the largest 
account balance equalling USD 361,306. This shows that the Anonymous trading 
platform attracts small retail as well as larger traders. On average, around 46% 
of a trader’s positions on Anonymous are long, which shows that traders engage 
in both long and short positions in order to exploit price movements in both 
directions. With respect to the average trade duration, I find that the mean across 
all traders is around 1 day. This indicates that traders on Anonymous are day 
traders who tend to close their positions at the end of each trading day in order 
to avoid exposure to overnight market volatility. I find that the average volume 
traded is around USD 20,933, with the largest position size equalling USD 
7,611,111. Moreover, I find that the mean trade frequency over the life of a trader 
is 193 trades. Finally, the average account life of a trader is 243 days. This 
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suggests that many individuals cease their trading activities on this platform after 
243 days either voluntarily by withdrawing their capital from their account, or 
involuntarily as a result of losing all their capital due to trading. 
The independent variables that are used in my analyses include the following: 
• Career Success: the average success rate of a trader over a specified 
period of time; 
• Career ROI: the average return on investment of a trader over a specified 
period of time; 
• Duration: the average duration of a trade for each trader; 
• SL: the proportion of trades of a trader that are triggered by a stop loss 
order; 
• TP: the proportion of trades of a trader that are triggered by a take profit 
order; 
• Long: the percentage of trades of a trader that are long positions; 
• Volume: the average position size of a trader measured in USD; and 
• TradeFrequency: the number of trades executed by a trader. 
Table 1.2 presents the correlation matrix of all the above-mentioned variables. 
We notice that the correlation between Career SR and Career ROI is not very 
high at around 12%. This underscores my earlier argument that each of these 
performance measures captures a different skill of the trader, and are thus 
generally independent of one another. Career SR has a relatively higher 
correlation with the other independent variables compared to Career ROI. Hence, 
all my models that make use of ROI have generally low explanatory power as will 
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be shown in the results section. Looking at some of the other large correlations, 
I find that the SL and Career SR variables are negatively correlated (-0.34), which 
is intuitive since the higher the proportion of stop loss orders executed, the more 
losing trades a trader incurs, and the lower their success rate. Similarly, the TP 
and Career SR variables are positively correlated (0.31) meaning that the higher 
the proportion of take profit trades executed, the higher the number of profitable 
trades a trader realises, and the higher the success rate. 
3.2.3 Methodology 
3.2.3.1 Performance Measures 
I begin by introducing three performance measures, which are used throughout 
this thesis. 
3.2.3.1.1 Success Ratio (SR) 
The Success Ratio (SR) or “win ratio” is the percentage of winning trades relative 
to all executed trades, and is used to measure the trader’s ability to consistently 
predict future price changes. Many papers have adopted the SR as a simple 
method to investigate investors’ ability to forecast short-term and longer-term 
excess returns (Hartzmark, 1991; Nicolosi et al., 2009; Villanueva, 2007; Alquist 







 , (1.1) 
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where 𝑆𝑅𝑖 is the proportion of trades of trader i that were profitable, 𝑍𝑗 takes the 
value of one if trade j was successful and zero otherwise, and n is the total 
number of trades executed by the trader. 
Hayley and March (2016) suggested their variation of this measure. Instead of 
trades they take a number of successful days and divide it by the number of total 
trading days. Nevertheless, this variation was used due to the authors’ lack of 
access to transaction level data. The obvious drawback of this measure is that it 
does not consider the actual size of the win. For instance, a trader can lose many 
times or days, but the profitable ones can cover all these small losses. In order 
to provide a better picture of the performance of FX traders, I also use two 
alternative performance measures: the return on investment (ROI) and the big hit 
ability (BHA). 
3.2.3.1.2 Return on Investment (ROI) 
ROI is a very popular instrument for estimating both individuals’ and funds’ 
performance. Menezes et al. (2015) mentioned the importance of this ratio and 
defined it as the profit of an investment divided by the cost of the investment. The 
ROI ratio shows the per-period profitability of the individuals, and how their capital 
was invested during the observed time. I can write the ROI for each trader i during 





 , (1.2) 
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where Net Profiti,t represents the realised and unrealised profit of trader i on day 
t, and Balancei,t represents the balance of the trader up to day t, and includes Net 
Deposits and Net Profits prior to day t. 
The reason why I include both realised and unrealised profits is because 
unrealised profits can be very significant and ignoring this component would give 
an unrealistic view of a trader’s performance during a given trading period. 
A positive ROI indicates that the trader has the ability to add value to an initial 
amount of investment, whereas a negative ROI means that the trader is actually 
decreasing his initial wealth. 
3.2.3.1.3 Big Hit Ability (BHA) 
This measure allows us to estimate a traders’ skill in adjusting the size of their 
position contingent on their confidence in their expectations about market prices 
future movements. BHA was originally proposed by Michael L. Hartzmark (1991). 
Hartzmark (1991) defines BHA as taking “his [trader’s] largest position (make his 
larges bets) when the highest returns are expected”. Leuthold et al. (1994, p. 460) 
wrote that BHA is “being on the "right" side of the market when large price 
changes occur”. 
Hartzmark (1991) firstly assumed that the magnitude of the price change has a 
strong relation with to the probability of the right prediction. Thus, even a small 
amount of correct expectations can be very profitable, if a trader guessed the 
direction of a large price movement. Basically, this method of trading assumes a 
lot of small losses and few very big wins, that keep investor’s level of profitability 
high. As for the method of estimating BHA, the author suggests a simple 
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regression proposed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Cumby and Modest 
(1987) to test the forecasting ability and investment performance of investors. 
The magnitude of the price change 𝑅(𝑡) linearly depends on the net position held 
by the trader 𝐿𝑆(𝑡). The formula can be expressed as follows: 
 R(t) = a′ + B′LS(t) + e(t) . (1.3) 
where 𝑒(𝑡) is a normally distributed error term. 𝐿𝑆(𝑡) > 0, if the agent is net long, 
and vice versa. A 𝐵′ ≥ 0 implies “superior” predicting ability (i.e. positive BHA), 
while a 𝐵′ < 0 implies that the trader is an “inferior forecaster”.  
BHA is a very important measure since it clearly indicates whether the trader can 
“read” the market and thus decide the right time for buying or selling the asset. 
This ability is crucial for retail traders who cannot afford to lose a lot of money, or 
who usually do not have access to private information, etc.  
3.2.3.2 Testing for Heterogeneity among Retail FX Traders 
3.2.3.2.1 Heterogeneity in Performance 
In order to test for heterogeneity in performance among foreign exchange traders, 
I start by using the method proposed by Hayley and Marsh (2016), which is based 
on empirical evidence showing that some traders exhibit significant trading skill, 
thus outperforming a four-factor currency model (Abbey and Doukas, 2015).  
I test for cross-sectional heterogeneity in performance by regressing the jth trade 
success rate, which takes the value of 1 if the trade was successful and 0 
otherwise, on the career success rate (i.e. the average success rate) over all 
previous trades. If performance is constant over the trading career of a trader, or 
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if differences in success are only temporary, then the coefficient of the career 
success rate will be statistically insignificant. It follows that there exists significant 
heterogeneity in performance if the coefficient is statistically significant and 
positive. I control for trading characteristics such as trade duration, limit orders, 
position direction, volume, as well as trading frequency. The model can be 
expressed as: 
𝑆𝑅𝑖,j,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑅𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐿𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,j,𝑡
+ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,j,𝑡  + 𝑒(𝑡) , 
(2) 
where 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the average career success rate over all trades of trader i, 
excluding the jth trade. Hence, the control variables are the averages for each 
trader up to, but not including trade j, and include Duration, the average duration 
of a trade for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered 
by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long 
positions, Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number 
of trades executed by a trader. I run a series of logistic regressions on the full 
sample of traders as well as on subsamples chosen according to the number of 
trades executed. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while 
Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on 
subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which 
is a proxy for the career stage of the trader. These subsamples are as follows: 
first (N<=10), early (10<N<=25), middle (25<N<=50), and late (N>50) trades. 
Moreover, I repeat all the above-mentioned models; however, using the ROI 




𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,j,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐿𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,j,𝑡
+ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,j,𝑡  + 𝑒(𝑡) , 
 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,j,𝑡 is the trade-level return on investment for each trader, and 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,j,𝑡 is the average career return on investment over all previous trades 
of trader i, excluding the jth trade. Note that I report the intercept for Model (2a), 
which does not include trader fixed effects; however, I there is no intercept for the 
other model variations that include trader fixed effects. The reason is that 
including an intercept would result in perfect correlation with the trader fixed 
effects, meaning that the model cannot be estimated. 
In order to compare my results to those presented by Hayley and Marsh (2016), 
who only have access to data that is aggregated on a daily basis, I repeat the 
above analyses on daily aggregated data of the success rate. For instance, if a 
trader executes a total of three trades in a given day, where two of these trades 
result in a gain and the other in a loss, then the trader’s success rate on that day 
is 2/3. I fit a linear model on the calculated success rate percentages; moreover, 
I dichotomise the daily success rate percentage, such that the daily dummy 
success rate equals 1 if the percentage success rate is greater than 50% and 0 
otherwise. This allows me to run a model comparable to that done by Hayley and 
Marsh (2016). Model (2) can be rewritten for daily aggregated data as: 
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑒(𝑡) , 
 
where 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the trader’s daily success rate (which is the percentage success 
rate for the linear model and a binary success rate for the logistic model as 
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mentioned earlier), and 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the average career success rate over all 
previous trading days of trader i, excluding the tth day. Similarly, all other control 
variables are computed up to, and excluding the trades on day t. 
I repeat the daily-aggregated model using the 𝑅𝑂𝐼 measure, such that: 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑒(𝑡) , 
 
Where 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the return on investment for each trader on day t, and 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the average career return on investment for each trader up to, 
but not including day t. 
3.2.3.2.2 Heterogeneity in Expectations 
The access to transaction level data allows me to apply the simple yet robust 
method proposed by Ito (1990) to test for heterogeneity of trader expectations. 
This technique requires the estimation of individual trader effects, which the 
author argues arise from constant individual bias and not due to the use of 
different models. To explain this method, consider that there are j traders in the 
sample, and that each trader’s forecast at time t can be decomposed into a 
common structural part based on publicly available information, 𝑓(𝐼𝑡), and an 
individual trader effect, denoted by gj. It follows that a trader’s forecast at a given 
time frame t can be formally expressed as: 
 𝑆𝑗,𝑡




𝑒  is the forecast or expectation of trader j at time t of the spot exchange 
rate, and 𝑢𝑗,𝑡 is a random error term. Similarly, the cross-sectional average 
expectation at time t across all traders can be written as: 
 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡
𝑒 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑡) +  𝑔𝐴𝑉𝐺 + 𝑢𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡 , (2.2) 
where 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡
𝑒  is the average expectation across all traders at time t, 𝑔𝐴𝑉𝐺 is the 
average individual effect, and 𝑢𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡 is the mean of the error terms. If I assume 
that the common information 𝑓(𝐼𝑡) is accessible by all traders and comprises of 
a constant term, then normalising such that 𝑔𝐴𝑉𝐺 = 0, and subtracting equation 
(2.2) from (2.1) would result in: 
 𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑒 − 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡
𝑒 = 𝑔𝑗 + (𝑢𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑢𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡) , (2.3) 
The coefficient estimates of the individual trader effects, 𝑔𝑗 can be obtained by 
regressing the difference between a trader’s expectation and the average 
expectation of the spot exchange rate at time t, given by 𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑒 − 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡
𝑒  on a constant 
term over the sample period. A statistically significant 𝑔𝑗 means that a trader’s 
expectation or forecast is biased compared to the average expectation. 
Note that in equation (2.3), it was not necessary to define the underlying structure 
of the common information set, 𝑓(𝐼𝑡) as long as this information is assumed to be 
publicly disclosed and available to all traders. The composite error term in 
equation (2.3) has a mean of zero and no autocorrelation if 𝑢𝑗,𝑡 is cross-sectionally 
and serially uncorrelated, and the information set, 𝑓(𝐼𝑡) is the same to all traders. 
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Ito (1990) argues that if the individual trader expectations of future spot exchange 
rates extends to idiosyncratic coefficient terms on the information set 𝑓(𝐼𝑡), then 
equation (2.3) needs to be modified as follows: 
 𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑒 − 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡
𝑒 = 𝑔𝑗 + (𝛽𝑗 −  𝛽𝐴𝑉𝐺)(𝑓(𝐼𝑡)) + (𝑢𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑢𝐴𝑉𝐺,𝑡) . (2.4) 
 
Equation (2.4) allows us to test for individual trader effects, 𝑔𝑗 as well as 
idiosyncratic effects, (𝛽𝑗 −  𝛽𝐴𝑉𝐺). In this study, I include a two-period lag of the 
information coefficient in order to examine the impact of idiosyncratic effects on 
heterogeneity of expectations. 
3.2.3.3 Testing the Impact of Market Volatility on Trader Skill 
In this section, I investigate the impact of market volatility as an external factor on 
trader skill.  
To do so, I estimate a series of models similar to Model (2) where I regress the 
jth trade success binary variable or ROI on the market volatility in the EUR/USD 
currency pair in the current period as well as in the previous 10 trading days3. If 
traders can profitably exploit and extract information from market uncertainty, 
then the volatility variables would exhibit a positive coefficient. On the other hand, 
if volatility proves to be detrimental to a trader’s skills, then the volatility 
coefficients will be negative. As such, the general models I estimate are: 
                                            
3 I do not estimate the impact of volatility on BHA since the latter cannot be computed on a daily 
or weekly basis due to lack of variation in the volume traded by traders. 
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 𝑆𝑅𝑖,j,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑅𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐿𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,j,𝑡




 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,j,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐿𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,j,𝑡
+ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,j,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,j,𝑡  + 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−𝑞  
+ 𝑒(𝑡), 
(3.2) 
where 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,j,𝑡 are the career success rate and return on 
investment over all previous trading days of trader i up to but not including trade 
j, respectively. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but 
not including trade j, and include Duration, the average duration of a trade for 
each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses 
and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, 
Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades 
executed by a trader. As for market volatility, I use different proxies as follows: 
• Model (3.1.a) and Model (3.2.a): 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−𝑞 is the daily standard 
deviation of spot price changes on day t-q where q = [0, 1, …, 10]; 
• Model (3.1.b) and Model (3.2.b): 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−𝑞 is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for each day t-q, where q = [0, 1, …, 10], if the standard deviation 
of spot prices on day t-q is greater than the 70th percentile of standard 
deviations over the previous 30 trading days; 
• Model (3.1.c) and Model (3.2.c): 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−𝑞 is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for each day t-q, where q = [0, 1, …, 10], if the standard deviation 
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of spot prices on day t-q is greater than the 80th percentile of standard 
deviations over the previous 30 trading days; 
• Model (3.1.d) and Model (3.2.d): 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−𝑞 is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for each day t-q, where q = [0, 1, …, 10], if the standard deviation 
of spot prices on day t-q is greater than the 90th percentile of standard 
deviations over the previous 30 trading days. 
All models include time and trader fixed effects. 
As a robustness check for Model (3.1) and its variations, I aggregate the success 
rate of traders on a daily basis to examine the tth trading day aggregate success 
rate on market volatility. The general model I estimate is written as: 
 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−𝑞  
+ 𝑒(𝑡) . 
(3.3) 
3.2.3.4 Quantifying Behavioural Biases  
In this analysis, I examine the impact of behavioural biases on trader skill. I use 
three performance measures, which are the Success Ratio (SR), Return on 
Investment (ROI), and Big Hit Ability (BHA) as defined earlier, and five 
behavioural indicators: herd initiations (HERD), disposition effect (DISP), 
sensation seeking (MU), inconsistent behaviour (INCON), and information 
advantage (INFO). For each of the performance measures, I run a linear model, 
given by Model (4.1), which uses the continuous value of the performance 
measure, and a logistic model, Model (4.2), which uses the dichotomised version 
of the performance measures. The dichotomised SR variable takes the value of 
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1 if SR is greater than 50% and 0 otherwise. The dichotomised ROI variable takes 
the value of 1 if ROI > 0% and 0 otherwise. Finally, the dichotomised BHA takes 
the value of 1 if BHA > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
3.2.3.4.1 Herd Initiations 
Herding behaviour is popular in financial markets (Cont and Bouchaud 2000, p. 
174). It is common that individual investors join/follow the herd when they are 
concerned how others evaluate and make sound decisions i.e. stock market 
bubbles. The dynamics of herding behaviour can be explained as follows: 
individuals start forming a crowd, individuals then observe other individual actions 
and derive information from them, ignoring their own information and following 
the actions of others.  
This condition does not test the traditional herding effect (previously performed 
with price dispersions) per se but the individuals who are capable of initiating a 
herd. In trading, this translates to an investor who has the ability to influence the 
investment decisions of others. Ideally, a herd leader typically exhibits the 
following characteristics: 1) has access to a significant number of market 
participants through trading platforms, 2) can initiate herding (stampede) 
behaviour by prompting others to follow suit, and 3) can consistently lead the herd 
such that this individual is recognised as the group leader. 
This study investigates here who is able to initiate a herd and specifically, which 
traders are capable of not pulling, but initiating a herd. These will presumably be 
leaders who will initiate a group of people and be followed or observed by traders 
probably from their network. These traders who are capable of initiating a herd 
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are also deemed risky, as in ‘more dangerous’ for the dealer and always 
influential.  
In order to measure the tendency of an individual to become a leader (herd 
initiator) I calculate the correlation coefficients 𝑟𝑖 between the Net Open Positions 
of each trader i at time t denoted by 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑖 and the dealer’s 𝑁𝑂𝑃t−Δ
𝐷  at time t − Δ, 
where Δ is a time lag [Δ = 5, 10, 15, 30 and 60 minutes]. I only calculate 
correlations between each trader’s positions and the dealer’s NOP at these five 
time lags due to the significant computational power required for these 
calculations. Moreover, I chose these time lags because they are the typical data 
frequencies that are available to traders on the MT4 platform.  






 with a critical value of N-2 degree of freedom. A correlation between a 
trader NOP and the dealer NOP will imply that a herding effect exists.  
A strong positive correlation would indicate that the trader is leading the herd, 
since the dealer’s lagged NOP (which represents the predominant opinion of 
traders on the platform) is moving in the same direction as the trader’s position. 
On the other hand, a negative correlation implies anti-herding behaviour since 
the trader is trading in the opposite direction of the majority. 
I test the significance of the correlations between each trader’s positions and the 
dealer’s NOP at the above-mentioned time lags and find that the 15-minute time 
lag correlation is the most significant correlation. Hence, I focus my analysis on 
this time lag.  
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3.2.3.4.2 Disposition Effect 
The second behavioural bias I examine is the disposition effect which is defined 
as the tendency of a trader to realise profits prematurely while holding on to 
losses for too long. In other words, this means that traders close winning positions 
as a sure gain while keep losses open in hope that they will turn into a gain.  
I use Odean’s measure to estimate an individual’s disposition effect (Odean 
1998), which considers the actual, and potential trades of trader i during 1 day 
trading timeframe. The proportion of gains realised (PGR𝑖) and proportion of 
losses realised (PLR𝑖) are defined as: 
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where 𝑁𝑔𝑟
𝑖  (𝑁𝑙𝑟
𝑖 ) is the number of trades by trader i with a realised gain (loss), and 
𝑁𝑔𝑝
𝑖  (𝑁𝑙𝑝
𝑖 ) is the number of potential trades for trader i with a gain (loss). 
The disposition effect (DE) of a trader (Odean 1998, p. 1781) i is then calculated 
as 
𝐷𝐸𝑖 =  𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖 − 𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖 (2) , 
where −1 ≤ 𝐷𝐸𝑖 ≤ 1. A positive  𝐷𝐸𝑖 indicates that a smaller proportion of losing 
traders are closed compared to the proportion of winning positions closed, in 
which case trader i exhibits the disposition effect. 








where the standard error 𝑆𝐸𝑖 is: 











A disadvantage of the equation (2) is that 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖  and 𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖 measures may be 
sensitive to trading frequency (Odean 1998). As such, I used two alternative 
measures of the disposition effect as robustness checks which are not sensitive 
to volume size and trading frequency. 
The first measure was proposed by Weber and Camerer (1998) and considers 
the difference between the number of trades with realised gains by trader i and 
the number of trades with realised losses relative to the number of all trades, this 
can be expressed as: 








where −1 ≤ 𝐷𝐸𝑖 ≤ 1 
If the number of trades with realised gains matches the number of trades with 
realised losses, then there is no disposition effect.  
The second measure was proposed by Dhar and Zhu (2006) and is expressed 
as: 













I find that all three indicators are highly correlated and do not change the results 
of my analysis as such I focus my analysis on the results using Odean’s measure. 
3.2.3.4.3 Sensation Seeking 
The third behavioural bias I examine is sensation seeking which is a trader’s 
tendency to look for experiences that are novel, complex and challenging by way 
of taking social and financial risks to achieve these experiences. In financial 
trading sensation seeking occurs when a trader uses varied strategies and high 
leverage ratios in order to achieve significant positive returns, where by the trader 
feels an addiction and a thrill when participating in the market.  
It follows that sensation seekers are described as people who are more willing to 
use leverage (in this case margin), thus exhibiting reckless behaviour. In many 
instances people start by demonstrating reckless behaviour which then 
transforms into sensation seeking.  
From a psychophysiological perspective, the central nervous system is affected 
by the individual differences in the cortical arousal thresholds, the levels of 
enzymes and neurotransmitters (Hogan, 1997). Evidence can also be traced in 
the genetic origins of dopamine receptor levels linked to the venturesome 
personality (Cloninger et al. 1996; Farde et al. 1997). 
Margin utilisation is a dimensionless variable that shows the relation between the 
margin required to maintain the position and the available collateral at a given 
point in time. Margin utilisation serves as an efficient benchmark for the 
identification of trader risk preference within the broker-dealer book. Margin 








(𝑖))⁄  . 
where 𝑀𝑈𝑡
(𝑖)
 represents margin utilisation of the ith trader at time 𝑡; 𝑃(𝑖) represents 
the trading position notional value calculated in standardised units; 𝐵(𝑖) is the 
collateral of the ith trader and 𝑃𝐿𝑡
(𝑖)
 is the floating profit or loss of the ith trader at 
time 𝑡.  
As stated before, the margin utilisation serves as a proxy for sensation seeking.  
I also use the squared margin utilisation (MU2) in order to capture any potential 
non-linear relation between margin utilisation and skills, since high margin 
utilisation can lead to not only high returns but significant losses as well. 
3.2.3.4.4 Inconsistent Behaviour 
The fourth behavioural bias I examine is inconsistent behaviour which is an 
attribute of an individual who chooses to act in such a way that cannot be justified 
or explained by their normal (average) behaviour. In other words, inconsistent 
traders are individuals who switch or change their activity momentarily or all the 
time, resulting in actions different from their average behaviour. 
To capture the inconsistent behaviour, I draw on the field of gambling sciences. 
Since bettors crave a skewness in outcomes over mean returns (Golec and 
Tamarkin, 1998, Cowley 2013) by escalating bets it provides them with the 
opportunity for big wins. Golec and Tamarking (1998, p. 221) described the 
cogent state as the attractiveness of the possibility of a large win. To win big, 
bettors should be allowed to bet big. This bet differential (the difference between 
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maximum and minimum bets) is the benchmark that casinos use to limit their risk 
exposures in this discrete game. 
In my study, I argue that traders exhibit consistent behaviour when their risk 
appetite does not vary significantly around their mean risk tolerance. Conversely, 
inconsistent behaviour arises when the trader adopts a varying risk exposure. As 
such in order to measure inconsistent behaviour one should examine the margin 
utilisation over time whereby this risk proxy is expected to vary significantly with 
each trade, thus signifying inconsistent behaviour. 
To measure inconsistent behaviour, I use the standard deviation of margin 
utilisation 𝜎𝑖
𝑀𝑈 for the ith trader, where a value that is close to zero implies that 
trading behaviour is consistent. On the other hand, a significant non-zero value 
means that the trader exhibits inconsistent behaviour. 
3.2.3.4.5 Information Advantage 
The final behavioural bias that I used in this research is information advantage 
which represent an individual that “does not play by the rules”. In game theory 
(Milchtaich 2014, p. 1) all trading terms and conditions can be considered as rules 
in a trading game. If there is an incentive to bend the rules in this game, then the 
rules will be bend. In this sense, rules act not just as a constraint, rather as a 
resource of gain and in certain situations where instructions are not clear they are 
subject to interpretation. 
Taking into account that there exists a trade-off between the advantage of having 
more information and the cost of obtaining it a trader will optimise this function in 
order to achieve superior returns. This information is used to a trader’s advantage 
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by identifying and measuring overpriced opportunities by keeping a risk-averse 
behaviour. 
In the foreign exchange market, insider information is assumed to have minor 
impact since it is unlikely that retail traders will poses private superior 
fundamental information. Hence, prices (exchange rates) should reflect all 
available information (news, public releases, etc.), where every market 
participant has access to the same set of information at all times. 
From an interdealer broker4 perspective, interdealer brokers operate within tight 
margins, and they profit mostly from the spread as a source of constant gain. 
Taking any inventory risk means that an interdealer broker should be able to 
offset the order in the interdealer market covering at least his costs (the spread). 
Therefore, traders who exhibit short-term momentum when they trade cause 
interdealer brokers to immediately offset the order in the interdealer market 
without giving them any opportunity to hold inventory. 
This short-term momentum i.e. the time between placing the order with the broker 
and how fast the market reacts to the trade and capturing the spread cost, is the 
proxy that captures information advantage.  
This phenomenon has also been investigated at the institutional level, whereby 
short-term momentum in extreme levels becomes momentum ignition, which is a 
strategy that triggers a number of positions and creates price movements (Tse et 
al. 2012, p. 6). 
                                            
4 An interdealer broker (IDB) is a financial intermediary that matches transactions between broker-
dealers and other financial institutions. 
159 
 
To measure the information advantage of a trader I calculate the average time  
it takes to cover the spread cost after placing an order. For each position opened 
there is a time t and an opening price p(t), where the time n is calculated for each 
trade as: 
{
𝑝(𝑡1 + Δ1) − 𝑝(𝑡1) = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 × 𝑡𝑟a𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 
⋯
⋯
𝑝(𝑡𝑛 + Δ𝑛) − 𝑝(𝑡𝑛) = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 × 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑛
 
The set of equations above defines the time to profit n for each ith trade. The 







3.3 Results and Discussions 
3.3.1 Testing for Heterogeneity 
3.3.1.1 Heterogeneity in Trader Performance 
3.3.1.1.1 Transaction Level Analysis 
I begin by running Model 2 and its variations on the transaction data, and present 
the results in Table 2.1.1.1. The results of Model (2a) on the full sample of traders 
show that the career success rate of an individual is positively related to the jth 
trade success rate. This is indicated by the statistically significant coefficient of 
3.3892. This implies that traders exhibit an autoregressive pattern in their 
performance, which can be interpreted as evidence of temporal heterogeneity, 
since each trader’s performance is changing throughout their career. 
The average trade duration of a trader is positively related to the jth trade success 
rate as indicated by the significant coefficient of 2.5e-7. While this number may 
seem small, recall that Duration is measured in seconds. Hence, the longer the 
mean duration of trades, the higher the likelihood of having a positive success 
rate on a future trade. The reason is that trades are initially opened in a net loss 
to the trader due to the bid-ask spread, hence, it may take some time before the 
price moves in favour of the trader in order to cover the bid-ask spread and 
generate a profit. 
With respect to limit orders, I find that the SL parameter has a negative coefficient 
of -0.3964, which suggests that traders are placing stop loss levels that are very 
close to the market price. Hence, any slight change in the price would trigger the 
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stop loss order. Consequently, these traders may be placing suboptimal stop loss 
levels as part of their trading strategy, which increases the likelihood of a zero-
success rate on a future trade due to a stop loss being triggered prematurely. 
Similarly, for the take profit variable, TP, I find a negative coefficient of -0.02 
meaning that (compared to a market order) the take profit limit set by the trader 
is suboptimal.  
I find a coefficient of -0.3628 for the Long variable, which indicates that traders 
who predominantly rely on long positions tend to have less successful trades as 
they are less likely to take advantage of downward movements in prices. 
Moreover, this may suggest that these traders have strict trading strategies that 
limit excessive short positions, which are deemed to be riskier in general. 
Regarding Volume, I find a significant coefficient of -0.0309 meaning that traders 
with larger positions historically tend to be unsuccessful in future trades, which 
may be a sign of overconfidence. Hence, as traders are more confident in their 
decisions and invest larger amounts, they may underestimate risk, resulting in 
losses on future trades. 
Finally, the transaction level details allow me to investigate “experience” in trading 
using TradeFrequency i.e. number of traders executed by a trader. In this way, 
trading experience is not a reflection of the real age of a person but the actual 
experience a trader has. I report a significant but very small coefficient of 1.0e-5 
for the TradeFrequency variable, which suggests that gaining experience by 
executing more trades does not improve a trader’s success rate. This result is 
similar to the finding of Haley and Marsh (2016) who show that traders do not 
learn to trade better over time. Considering an alternative interpretation of 
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TradeFrequency as a proxy for overconfidence, the coefficient implies that 
overconfidence only marginally improves a trader’s success rate.  
Model (2a) does not include year and month and trader fixed effects, and has an 
R2 of 7.75%. In order to account for time and trader fixed effects, I repeat the 
same analysis on the full sample; however, I include year and month fixed effects. 
The results of Model (2b) are largely the same at those of Model (2a). Most 
importantly, the Career SR coefficient is 3.3848, which is very similar to what I 
obtained in Model (2a). This further supports the evidence of significant 
heterogeneity in performance among retail FX traders. I obtain similar results for 
all the other control variables, thus I avoid repeating the discussion. The R2 of 
Model (2b) is equal to 7.78%. 
Next, I divide the data into the different phases of a trader’s careers: first (N<=10), 
early (10<N<=25), middle (25<N<=50), and late (N>50) trades. I repeat the 
analysis in order to examine the impact of career success on future trading as a 
trader matures and progresses through his trading career. The results are 
reported in Table 2.1.1.1 under Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f), respectively, for 
each subsample. 
I find that the coefficient for Career SR is statistically significant and positive 
across all models, and it increases as a trader gains more experience through 
trading. Specifically, the coefficients for Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are 
1.0889, 2.7852, 3.4236, and 4.6991, respectively, which indicates that the 
estimated coefficient increases as a trader progresses through his trading career, 
since the average career success rate is estimated more accurately as the 
number of transaction observations increases. This means that heterogeneity in 
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performance among traders persists and increases as traders progress in their 
trading career. My results are similar to the evidence presented by Hayley and 
Marsh (2016), who showed that there exists significant persistence in 
heterogeneity in performance among retail FX traders. 
Regarding Duration, I find a positive coefficient across all models, since it may 
take prices sometimes to move favourably before covering the spread and turning 
a profit. 
With respect to limit orders, I report a negative coefficient for the SL variable 
across all models, which is similar to the result on the full sample. As for the TP 
variable, I find that it is initially positive in the early career of the trader and then 
decreases until it becomes negative as the trader matures, as shown by the 
coefficients of 0.2614, 0.1979, 0.12332, and -0.0596 for models (2c), (2d), (2e), 
and (2f), respectively. This means that at the start of their career, traders who use 
take profit orders tend to perform better than those who use market orders, which 
may be an indication of quick irrational decisions by traders who place market 
orders. As traders progress through their career, they become better at placing 
market orders as indicated by the negative coefficient of -0.0596 for model (2f). 
This may be an indication that traders better analyse the market and place market 
orders in a more efficient manner. 
Regarding the Long parameter, I report coefficients of around -0.1781, 0.04117, 
0.07611, and -0.0884 for models (2c,), (2d), (2e), and (2f), respectively. This 
shows that the Long parameter alternates between negative and positive 
coefficients. Such a pattern can be explained by the notion that the FX market is 
typically characterised as a random walk with no drift over the long-term, where 
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it is difficult to forecast the direction of the price of exchange rate in a consistent 
manner. Hence, it is expected that traders are not able to capture the direction of 
FX price movements in a consistent manner over their trading career as FX prices 
move in a random fashion (Pukthuanthong-Le and Thomas, 2008).  
Nevertheless, this ability disappears as traders become very mature. I find a 
negative coefficient for the Volume variable for Models (2d), (2e) and (2f), which 
means that traders who trade larger positions tend to be less successful in future 
trades. This may be interpreted as sign of overconfidence, whereby traders 
record losses on large positions, which they were expecting would return a 
significant profit. 
Finally, for TradeFrequency, I report a significantly negative coefficient of -0.0311 
for Model (2c), and a small yet positive coefficient of 1.0e-5 for Model (2f). This 
means that traders are less successful in the first trades they execute (i.e. just 
starting out their trading career). Moreover, executing more trades does not have 
a significant impact on traders’ success rate meaning that retail traders do not 
improve their performance by simply executing more trades. This is similar to our 
earlier finding and the evidence presented in the literature. Considering an 
alternative interpretation of TradeFrequency as a proxy for overconfidence, the 
results show that at the start of their career, traders are less confident about their 
skills and tend to underperform relative to the end of their trading career, where 
they have gathered enough real experience and are more confident about taking 
risks and holding on to open losing positions until they turn into a profit. While in 
the literature on equities, overconfidence often results in overshooting forecasts 
due to interpolating recent trends too far into the future, in the context of FX 
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trading, overconfidence can be interpreted as a trader’s ability to be comfortable 
with high levels of risk and not panicking and closing positions prematurely at a 
loss. 
I repeat all the above models with 𝑅𝑂𝐼 as the dependent variable, and replacing 
the independent variable 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑅 with 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼, in order to investigate 
heterogeneity in performance based on traders’ ability to add value in absolute 
terms. The results are presented in Table 2.1.1.2. In general, the models have 
weak explanatory power. Starting with Model (2a), which does not include time 
and trader fixed effects, I find no significant relation between 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼 and 𝑅𝑂𝐼. 
This means that a trader’s previous return on investment is not related to future 
returns, indicating that the ability to add value in absolute terms is not related over 
time. Hence, an individual who exhibits positive ROI in previous periods is not 
likely to exhibit similar performance in future periods. All other independent 
variables are statistically insignificant except for the Duration and Long variables, 
which are only positively statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. As 
such, the longer the average duration of a trade, the higher the ROI. The reason 
is that trades are initially opened in a net loss due to the bid-ask spread, hence, 
it may take some time before the price moves in favour of the trader in order to 
cover the bid-ask spread and generate a profit. Regarding the Long parameter, I 
find a positive coefficient meaning that traders who predominantly have long 
positions tend to have positive ROI on future trades. Nevertheless, given the 
almost zero 𝑅2of the model, these findings should not be given much weight in 
the final conclusion. 
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I repeat the analysis including time and trader fixed effects in Model (2b), 
however, the results remain largely the same. Specifically, I find not significant 
relation between 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼 and 𝑅𝑂𝐼, meaning that performance based on this 
measure follows a random pattern. Again, I highlight that the 𝑅2of the model is 
almost zero, indicating poor explanatory power. 
Next, I divide the data into the different phases of a trader’s careers: first (N<=10), 
early (10<N<=25), middle (25<N<=50), and late (N>50) trades. I repeat the 
analysis in order to examine the impact of 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼 on future trading as a 
trader matures and progresses through his trading career. The results are 
reported in Table 2.1.1.2 under Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f), respectively, for 
each subsample. I find that the coefficient for 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐼 is statistically 
insignificant across all models as previously found on the full set of traders. 
Regarding Duration, I find a positive coefficient in Model (2e) of 3.8e8, which turns 
negative in Model (2f) with a coefficient of -7.78e6. This extreme shift in 
magnitude and sign in trade duration between traders with 25 to 50 executed 
trades and those with more than 50 trades shows that while traders are still 
maturing, they are able to generate highly positive returns the longer the trade; 
however, during the last phase of their career, they might have kept open some 
positions which have negative unrealised profits. As such, these longer duration 
trades are reflected by negative ROIs. With respect to limit orders, I report a 
positive coefficient for the SL variable for models (2d) and (2e), and a negative 
coefficient for Model (2f). This means that in the earlier phases of their trading 
career, traders profitably use stop-loss orders compared to market orders to limit 
their losses and improve their performance. As for the TP variable, I find a 
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negative coefficient for Model (2d) and positive coefficients for models (2e) and 
(2f), meaning that as traders mature, they tend to use take profit orders more 
profitably than market orders. This is opposite to the results found using the 
success rate performance measure; however, the 𝑅2 of the models in the analysis 
based on ROI are near zero and should be taken with a grain of salt. The Long 
parameter, is reported to have a positive coefficient in Model (2d) and negative 
coefficients in models (2e) and (2f). As mentioned earlier, this pattern can be 
explained by the notion that the FX market is typically characterised as a random 
walk with no drift over the long-term, where it is difficult to forecast the direction 
of the price of exchange rate in a consistent manner. Hence, it is expected that 
traders are not able to capture the direction of FX price movements in a consistent 
manner over their trading career as FX prices move in a random fashion 
(Pukthuanthong-Le and Thomas, 2008). Finally, I find statistically insignificant 
coefficients for the Volume and TradeFrequency variables. It is very important to 
highlight that the 𝑅2 of all subsample models is close to zero meaning that the 
models have very poor explanatory power. As such, these analyses should not 
be emphasised when making inferences about the relation between return on 
investment and trader characteristics. 
As an additional investigation, I repeat the analyses above where I include both 
Career SR and Career ROI as independent variables for each of the dependent 
variables SR and ROI, and report the results in table A.1 and A.2, respectively, 
in the Appendix. I focus the discussion only on the covariate of interest, namely 
Career SR and Career ROI. Regarding the models with SR as the dependent 
variable, I find that Career SR has a positive and persistent effect as found in the 
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initial analysis. In particular, the coefficient in Model (2a) is 1.08 and grows from 
0.216 in Model (2c) to 2.66 in Model (2f). This means that traders exhibit an 
autoregressive pattern in their ability to correctly predict future price movements, 
which can be interpreted as evidence of temporal heterogeneity. I find no 
significant relation for Career ROI, which means that there is no relation between 
a trader’s historical ability to add value to an investment with their future ability to 
predict the direction of price changes. As such, these two skills are independent 
of one another. 
Next, I examine the models with ROI as the dependent variable as presented in 
Table A.2. For all models, I find no significant effect for either Career SR or Career 
ROI on ROI. This result is similar to what I obtained in the initial analysis for ROI 
(i.e. no significant relation between ROI and Career ROI) and in tha previous 
analysis between SR and Career ROI. These results imply that a trader’s future 
ability to add value to an investment is not related to their past ability to either add 
value to previous investments or their past ability to predict the direction of price 
movements. It is important to note that the 𝑅2 for all the models is close to zero, 
indicating poor model fit. Hence, these results should be considered with caution. 
3.3.1.1.2 Daily Aggregated Analysis 
I repeat the analysis using daily aggregated data, where the daily success rate of 
the trader is the average success rate on a particular trading day. The results of 
Model 2 and its variations are presented in Table 2.1.2.1.  
The results of Model (2a) on the full sample of traders show that the career 
success rate of an individual is positively related to the tth day success rate. This 
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is indicated by the statistically significant coefficient of 0.7042. Similarly, to the 
transaction level analysis, this suggests that some traders exhibit systematic 
outperformance, which can be interpreted as evidence of cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in performance of traders.  
The mean trade duration of a trader is positively related to the tth day success 
rate as indicated by the significant Duration coefficient of 3.65e-8. While this 
number may seem small, recall that Duration is measured in seconds. Hence, the 
longer the mean duration of trades, the higher the likelihood of achieving a high 
success rate. This is partially due to the fact that trades are initially opened at a 
loss that equals the bid-ask spread, hence it may take some time before prices 
move significantly in a favourable direction to cover the bid-ask spread and 
generate a positive profit. 
Regarding limit orders, I find that the SL parameter has a negative coefficient of 
-0.0884, which suggests that traders may be selecting stop loss levels that are 
very close to the market price. Hence, any slight change in the price would trigger 
the stop loss order. It follows that traders who tend to have most of their positions 
closed due to stop losses may be placing suboptimal or very narrow limit levels.  
I find an insignificant coefficient for the TP variable, which is different than the 
result I obtained in the transaction level analysis. This suggests that traders on 
average do not use take-profit orders to realise gains or place very wide limits 
that are not triggered, which may be due to the notion that retail traders are not 
consistently placing feasible take-profit levels. 
170 
 
With respect to the direction of a trade, I find a coefficient of -0.0615 for the Long 
parameter, which indicates that traders with relatively more long positions tend to 
have less successful trades. This may be an indication that these traders have 
strict trading strategies that prevent them from taking excessive short positions, 
which are considered to be riskier in general.  
I find a significant coefficient of -0.0055 for the Volume parameter. This means 
that traders with larger positions historically tend to be unsuccessful in future 
trades, which may be a sign of overconfidence. Hence, as traders are more 
confident in their decisions and invest larger amounts, they may underestimate 
risk, resulting in losses on future trades. Note that while the coefficient is small, 
the Volume variable is measured in lots, where one lot is equivalent to 100,000 
of the base currency. 
Finally, for TradeFrequency, I report a coefficient of 1.06e-6, which is very small 
and suggests that trader performance does not improve much as they execute 
more trades. 
Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, and has an R2 of 9.64%. 
In order to account for time and trader fixed effects, I repeat the same analysis 
on the full sample; however, I include year, month and trader fixed effects. The 
results of Model (2b) remain largely the same. Most importantly, the Career SR 
coefficient is 0.7016, which is very similar to what I obtained in Model (2a). This 
further supports the evidence of significant heterogeneity in performance among 
retail FX traders. I obtain similar results for all the other control variables, thus I 
avoid repeating the discussion. The R2 of Model (2b) is equal to 9.73%. 
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Next, I divide the data into the different phases of a trader’s careers: first (N<=10), 
early (10<N<=25), middle (25<N<=50), and late (N>50) trades. I repeat the 
analysis in order to examine the impact of career success on future trading as a 
trader matures and progresses through his trading career. The results are 
reported in Table 2.1.2.1 under Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f), respectively, for 
each subsample. 
I find that the coefficient for Career SR is statistically significant and positive 
across all models, and it increases as a trader gains more experience through 
trading. Specifically, the coefficients for Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are 0.25, 
0.6244, 0.7433, and 0.9282, respectively, which shows that the estimated 
coefficient increases as a trader progresses through his trading career, since the 
average career success rate is estimated more accurately as the number of 
observations increases. This implies that heterogeneity in performance among 
traders persists and increases as traders progress in their trading career. My 
results are similar to the evidence presented by Hayley and Marsh (2016), who 
showed that there exists significant persistence in heterogeneity in performance 
among retail FX traders.  
Regarding the variable Duration, I find a positive coefficient across all models, 
which may be due to the fact that trades are initially opened in a loss due to bid-
ask spreads, and it take some time before prices move favourably and generate 
a profit. 
With respect to limit orders, I report a negative coefficient for the SL variable 
across all models, which is similar to the result on the full sample. Similarly, this 
means that traders may be placing stop loss levels that are very close to the 
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market price, such that any slight change in the price would trigger the stop loss 
order. Hence, this strategy would have a negative impact on the success of 
trades. 
As for the TP variable, which was statistically insignificant under the full sample 
analysis, I find that this parameter becomes significant for Models (2c), (2d), and 
(2e), with coefficients of 0.0494, 0.0378, and 0.0246, respectively, but remains 
insignificant for Model (2f). These decreasing coefficients suggest that as, traders 
progress in their trading careers, they use take profit orders less efficiently. 
Regarding the Long parameter for the four models, I report coefficients of around 
-0.0393, 0.0111, 0.0177, and -0.007, respectively. This suggests that during their 
early trading career, traders tend to execute unsuccessful long positions; 
however, as they progress in their trading career they become more successful 
in placing long positions. Nevertheless, this ability disappears as traders become 
very mature, which again is consistent with the evidence in the literature (Hayley 
and Marsh, 2016) that retail FX traders do not improve their performance over 
time. I find a negative coefficient for the Volume variable for Models (2d), (2e) 
and (2f), which means that traders who trade larger positions tend to be less 
successful in future trades. This may be interpreted as sign of overconfidence, 
whereby traders record losses on large positions, which they were expecting 
would return a significant profit. 
Finally, regarding TradeFrequency, I report a significantly negative coefficient of 
-0.0054 for Model (2c), and a positive yet very small coefficient of 7.09e-7 for 
Model (2f). This means that traders are less successful in the first trades they 
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execute (i.e. just starting out their trading career); moreover, they do not learn to 
improve their performance by a significant amount as they execute more trades. 
I repeat the above analyses using ROI and Career ROI instead of SR and Career 
SR, respectively, and I present the results in Table 2.1.2.2. In general, all models 
have very poor explanatory power, thus I will not go into too much detail about 
the results since they are mostly statistically insignificant. I find that Career ROI 
does not have any significant effect on ROI. As in transaction level analysis, this 
implies that previous return on investment is not related to the return of future 
trades, meaning that ROI is random over the career of a trader. All other 
independent variables are generally statistically insignificant except for Duration 
and the Long parameters. Specifically, the longer the average duration of a trade, 
the higher the ROI. This is because trades are initially opened in a net loss due 
to the bid-ask spread, hence, it may take some time before the price moves in 
favour of the trader in order to cover the bid-ask spread and generate a profit. As 
for the Long parameter, I find a positive coefficient meaning that traders who 
predominantly have long positions tend to have positive ROI on future trades. It 
is important to mention that, given the almost zero 𝑅2of the models, these findings 
should not be given much weight in the investigation of the effect of trader 
characteristics on ROI. 
As a robustness check, I repeat the above analyses on a dichotomised version 
of the daily success rate, such that 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 equals one if the daily aggregated 
success rate is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. The results are reported 
in Table 2.1.3.1. In general, the results obtained for all models are similar to my 
previous results; hence I keep the discussion brief in order to avoid repetition. I 
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find significant evidence of heterogeneity in performance, which increases as 
traders progress in their trading career. Specifically, the coefficient for Career 
Success is 0.1812 for Model (2c) and increases to 2.6751 in Model (2f). The 
Duration variable is found to be positively related to the daily success rate, which 
is similar to what I found in the previous analyses. SL has a negative impact on 
success, while TP is found to be positively related to it. The Long and Volume 
variables are negatively related to the future daily success rate, while 
TradeFrequency is positively related to it in general. Similar to the previous 
transaction level analysis, TradeFrequency as a proxy for overconfidence shows 
that as traders progress through their careers, they become more confident and 
comfortable with taking on more risk. As such, as traders become more confident, 
their success rate improves. 
When using ROI and Career ROI instead of SR and Career SR, respectively, in 
the dichotomised version of the daily aggregated data, I find no significant effect 
of Career ROI on ROI for the full sample even after accounting for both time and 
trader FE. I only find significant but very small coefficients for models (2d) and 
(2f). In general, the results from the dichotomised version of the daily aggregated 
data support my earlier findings, that there is no significant relation between an 
individual’s previous return on investment and their ability to add return in the 
future. 
3.3.1.1.3 Data Winsorisation 
As another robustness check, I winsorise the data by taking the middle 95%, 
90%, 85%, and 80% of observations based on the SR and ROI variables 
depending on the covariate of interest. In general, the results do not vary much 
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from the full sample analysis, and in order to avoid repetition I only report in the 
appendix the results for the 90% winsorisation. Moreover, since the conclusions 
are the same as previously mentioned I keep the discussion brief. The results for 
the transaction level logistic model are presented in Table A.3 in the appendix, 
and show that for the full sample, even after accounting for both time and trader 
fixed effects, there is a positive relation between Career SR and SR. This 
suggests a positive relation a trader’s historical ability to correctly predict the 
direction of prices, and his future ability to do so. Moreover, there is persistence 
in this relation as shown in models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f), where the Career SR 
coefficient grows as a trader matures. 
When I consider the ROI parameter at the transaction level (Table A.4), I do not 
find any significant relation with Career ROI as in the full sample analysis. This 
suggests that there is no relation between an individual’s historical ability to add 
value to an investment and his future ability to do so. 
Next, I aggregate the data on a daily basis and repeat the analyses using a linear 
model. The results for SR and ROI are presented in tables A.5 and A.6, 
respectively. As in previous analyses, I find only a significant positive and 
persistent relation between the Career SR and SR, and no significant relation 
between Career ROI and ROI. 
When I dichotomise the daily data and use the logistic model, I find significant 
results for both SR and ROI. Specifically, Table A.7 shows a significant positive 
and persistent relation between Career SR and SR as I found in previous 
analyses. However, I also find a positive relation between Career ROI and ROI 
which suggests that a trader who has generated positive (negative) ROI in the 
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past is likely to generate positive (negative) ROI on future trades. When looking 
at the subsample analyses, I find that the Career ROI coefficient decreases as a 
trader progresses through his career. This means that the relation between past 
and future ability to generate returns decays over time. One explanation is that 
the coefficient in model (2f) is a more accurate representation of such a relation 
since it is estimated using a subsample of traders who have more than 51 trades. 
Hence, the parameter is more robust and representative. An alternative 
explanation is that the relation between past and future ROI decays as a trader 
progresses through his trading career. As such, a trader’s performance 
converges towards a more random pattern, where historical performance is not 
indicative of an individual’s future abilities. It is important to note that the 𝑅2 of all 
models in Table A.8 are very small indicating a poor model fit, thus all results and 
conclusions should be considered with a grain of salt. 
As mentioned at the start of this section, while I only report the results for 90% 
winsorisation, the results obtained for the 85%, and 80% winsorisations are very 
similar, hence I avoid repetition. 
3.3.1.1.4 Discussions on Heterogeneity in Trader Performance 
The key finding of the above analyses is that there is significant cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in the performance of traders, which confirms the results of Abbey 
and Doukas (2014) and Haley and Marsh (2016). Moreover, my findings highlight 
that persistence in heterogeneity is consistent and increases as individuals’ 
progress in their trading careers.  
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The study of Hayley and Marsh (2016) is limited to the trader’s activity on an 
aggregated daily level. Hence, the data used in their study only shows the final 
trading outcome of the day and ignores any intraday variation in trader 
performance. Moreover, their data is limited in the number of control variables 
available. As a result, their model does not allow us to examine heterogeneity at 
the transaction level, as I do in my initial analysis, or control for trading 
characteristics which can affect performance.  
This is the first study that allows us to examine heterogeneity in performance at 
the transaction level and control for other factors, which may affect the ability of 
a trader to place successful trades. This research goes beyond the effect of 
learning on trader performance by investigating how a trader’s success rate is 
influenced by their average Duration, SL, TP, Long, Volume and 
TradeFrequency. My findings contribute to the literature of heterogeneity among 
retail FX traders by showing that trade specific characteristics have a significant 
impact on heterogeneity in performance.  
Hence, high levels of heterogeneity validate the argument that traders in the retail 
EUR/USD FX market perform differently mostly due to various trading strategies 
such as short-term and long-term and different levels of expectations. 
In addition, during any given trading day, trader decisions differ based on the 
direction of the EUR/USD spot rate, the duration of the price trend and the peaks 
and troughs in price movements. It follows that heterogeneity in performance 
arises from these different trader beliefs and that this heterogeneity is consistent 
throughout an individual’s trading career. This brings me to the second 
methodology to test for heterogeneity of trader expectations. 
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3.3.1.2 Heterogeneity of Trader Expectations of Spot Prices 
The results of both equation (2.3) and equation (2.4) are presented in Table 2.2. 
Starting with the full sample of traders, I estimate equation (2.3) and find 
significant evidence of heterogeneous expectations.  
Specifically, using a 95% confidence level, around 60% of traders are found to 
have heterogeneous beliefs of what spot EUR/USD prices should be. This 
percentage drops to 55% when I use a 99% confidence level. I argue that this is 
not due to asymmetric information held by traders, but rather due to the different 
trading models and indicators adopted. This is because information in the foreign 
exchange market is highly likely to be publicly disclosed and common to all 
participants, as contrasted to the equity market where there is a higher likelihood 
of asymmetric information resulting from private analyst reports or even insider 
information. 
With respect to equation (2.4), which accounts for idiosyncratic effects, the 
analysis on the full sample of traders shows that around 53% of traders have 
heterogeneous expectations. This is similar to my initial finding. Moreover, I find 
that between 4% and 6% of traders have only a significant idiosyncratic 
coefficient. Given the assumption that there is no information asymmetry in the 
EUR/USD market, the results suggest that these traders use different forecasting 
models with at least a two-period lag. Excluding these variables may bias the 
estimation of as indicated by the small drop in the number of individual effects 
reported for equations 2.3 and 2.4. Finally, I find that between 7% and 16% of 
traders exhibit both individual as well as idiosyncratic effects, meaning that these 
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individuals, not only incorporate lagged information into their models, but also 
have significantly unique expectations of the EUR/USD spot price. 
The full sample of traders includes individuals who have very few trades. Thus, 
analysing the uniqueness of their expectations with only a few observations can 
result in misleading inferences. In order to remedy this, I re-estimate equations 
(2.3) and (2.4) on a sample of traders with a trading frequency greater than 30 
trades (see Table 2.2). The results of equation (2.3) show that around 70% of 
traders have heterogeneous expectations when using a confidence level of 95%, 
and that this figure drops to 65% at the 99% confidence level. These results 
further support my argument that retail foreign exchange traders in the EUR/USD 
market have different expectations of spot prices. 
As for the results of equation 2.4 on the limited sample of traders, I find that 
around 60% of traders have a significant individual effect, suggesting that a large 
portion of the sample has heterogeneous expectations. In addition, I find that 
between 4% and 7% of traders have a significant idiosyncratic effect, which is 
similar to the finding in the analysis on the full sample. Finally, I find that between 
9% and 20% of traders exhibit both individual as well as idiosyncratic effects. This 
indicates that these traders use lagged market information in their models, as well 
as have significantly different expectations of the EUR/USD spot price. This may 
be due to traders adopting different technical indicators or having different 




3.3.1.2.1 Discussions on Heterogeneity in Trader Expectations 
Testing for heterogeneity in expectations allowed me to examine individual 
trading biases and validate the hypothesis that traders do not interpret public 
information in the same way. The high levels of heterogeneity show that traders 
stick in their own interpretation of information and continue to develop same 
routines, trading rules for their own trading style. 
The high level of details available in the dataset employed in this study allows me 
to model to exploit the information available at the transaction level of retail FX 
traders. Moreover, I use the model proposed by Ito (1990), which is a simple 
robust test that has been widely used in literature also applied by MacDonald and 
Marsh (1996), Elliott and Ito (1999) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2003), at the 
institutional level in order to examine heterogeneity in expectations, which has 
not been investigated before at the retail level in FX markets.  
My findings show that while traders receive the same set of information they 
interpreted it differently thus resulting in different forecasts of the future FX spot 
rate. This shows that an individual’s biases and characteristics influence their 
trading decisions resulting in their forecast to deviate significantly from the 
general market consensus. These findings echo my previous results on 
heterogeneity in performance and the evidence in the literature on heterogeneity 
in expectations.  
Given the significant evidence on heterogeneity among retail FX traders, I use 
the three performance measures presented in the methodology in order to identify 
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traders with consistent trading skills, the ability to generate positive returns, and 
those with big hit ability. 
3.3.2 Identifying Skilled Traders 
3.3.2.1 Success Ratio - Consistent Trading Skill 
I find that the mean and median of the Success Ratio (SR) across traders are 
59.59% and 61.33% respectively. This suggests that, on average, individual 
currency traders possess the ability to trade in a consistent manner by correctly 
forecasting future price changes (i.e. on average, traders have a SR > 50%). It is 
important to note that while traders profitably execute more than half of their 
trades, this does not mean that the sum of profits and losses is positive. As such, 
a trader may lose a significant amount after a series of small wins, which would 
result in an aggregated loss over all trades. 
Next, I transform the SR of each trader into a binary variable, which takes the 
value of 1 if the Success Ratio is significantly greater than 50% and 0 otherwise. 
Accordingly, I find that around 68% of traders in my sample can correctly predict 
future price changes more than half of the time. 
Since some traders in my sample may have very few past trades this can result 
in extreme values for the SR ratio which may not be representative of trader’s 
true skill. As such, I recalculate the Success Ratio by progressively increasing 
the restriction on the number of trades executed by each trader from 1 to 30 
trades. The results remain relatively the same where a restriction of 30 trades 
results in an SR mean of 63.65% and a median of 64.35%. If I transform each 
trader into a binary variable as above I find that 77.8% of trader can correctly 
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predict future price change more than half of the time. This shows that the results 
are consistent regardless of the trade restriction used meaning that currency 
traders do possess some degree of skill, such that they are able to forecast future 
price movements as indicated by the aggregated mean success rate which 
significantly exceeds 50%.  
While the success rate only takes into account the number of successful trades 
it does not capture the dollar value of the profit or loss. To illustrate this point, 
consider a trader who has executed 9 successful trades with 1 dollar profit in 
each of these trades, and 1 losing trade with a loss of 10 dollars. While the 
success rate indicates us that this individual is skilled in forecasting future prices, 
the total realised profit, in this case loss shows that this individual does not add 
value in absolute terms. Moreover, the success rate does not factor in the size of 
the trader’s wealth. As such, a one dollar profit for a trader with a ten dollar total 
wealth implies a larger return compared to a similar gain for a trader with a 100-
dollar account. These two drawbacks bring me to the next measure, return on 
investment which captures the size or the gain generated by the trader relative to 
his wealth. 
3.3.2.2 Return on Investment (ROI) - Ability to Generate Positive Returns 
The data I use in this thesis includes client balances, which allows me to calculate 
the return of investment for each trader. This information provides an advantage 
over previous studies (Haley and Marsh, 2016), which do not have access to 
detailed balance information. I calculate the ROI of each trader and find that the 
mean ROI across all traders in my sample is -28.88%, which suggests that 
traders lose money on average over their trading career. 
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This is a very interesting finding because, while 77.8% of traders are able to 
correctly forecast the direction of future price movements more than half of the 
time, they are not able to profitably capitalise on this skill. This may be due to 
traders recording greater losses on unsuccessful trades compared to the profits 
on successful positions due to undisciplined trading and poor risk management. 
In other words, traders use suboptimal trading rules for profitable positions 
relative to losing ones, which may be an indication of the disposition effect. 
Next, I transform the ROI of each trader into a binary variable, which takes the 
value of 1 if the ROI has a positive value, and 0 otherwise. This indicates whether 
a trader has added value to the initial investment. I find that only around 22.8% 
of traders possess the skill to generate positive returns, which add value to the 
initial investment. 
This shows that very few traders possess the ability to add value in an investment 
in absolute terms which is a striking difference compared to the average success 
rate of trades in my sample. Consequently, this suggests that while traders may 
be able to generate small positive returns on many trades their overall profitability 
is negative due to large losses on few trades, which leads them to lose money 
over time.  
3.3.2.3 Big Hit Ability (BHA) 
Success ratio and ROI do not take into account the size of the trade. For example, 
some traders based on their strategies and rules often make many small losses 
but in different market conditions can make few very large profits. This case will 
result in a low Success Ratio but would still be a profitable trader. In order to 
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measure this ability, I examine the profitability as a function of trade size and test 
for “big hit ability”. This will show if a retail FX trader is able to time the EUR/USD 
market and capitalise on opportunities by increasing his position size when the 
price moves favourably.  
Finally, with respect to BHA, I find that the mean BHA across all traders obtained 
from estimating equation (1.3) is -0.087. This means that, on average, retail FX 
traders have negative big hit ability, which suggests that most of the traders’ large 
positions result in losses and most of their small positions are winners. As a result, 
FX traders do not possess the ability to profitably increase their exposure to large 
price swings.  
Next, I dichotomise the BHA variable such that it takes the value of 1 if BHA >0 
and 0 if BHA ≤ 0. I find that only around 27% of traders possess positive big hit 
ability. Consequently, this means that the majority of traders have negative (or 
no) BHA, which suggests that these traders are more likely to increase their 
position size when they are on the wrong side of the market. This result 
complements the finding obtained for ROI, where I show that 77.2% of traders 
have a negative return on investment. As such, my findings show that traders not 
only lose money over time, but also have a tendency to be overconfident when 
their forecast of FX rate is wrong both in terms of direction and magnitude. 
3.3.3 Examining the Impact of Market Volatility on Skill 
3.3.3.1 Impact of Market Volatility on Performance - Transaction Level 
I begin by examining the impact of market volatility on a trader’s ability to correctly 
predict future price changes, which is represented by the success rate at the 
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transaction level. The results of Model (3.1) and its variations are presented in 
Table 3.1. For all models, the results obtained for the control variables are largely 
the same as for Model (2). Specifically, I find that Career SR has a positive impact 
on the current prediction of a trader, which suggests that traders with a better 
success rate reputation have a higher likelihood of correctly predicting future price 
changes. I find a positive coefficient for Duration, which indicates that traders with 
longer average trade durations have a better probability of executing profitable 
future trades. Regarding limit orders, I find a negative coefficient for SL, meaning 
that traders may be placing stop loss levels that are very close to the market 
price, where any small change in the price would trigger the stop loss order. This 
would have a negative effect on the success rate of future trades. As for the TP 
variable, I also find a negative effect of the success rate of the trade. The Long 
variable has a negative coefficient, indicating that traders tend to be less 
profitable in their long position compared to their short positions. I report a 
negative coefficient for Volume, suggesting that traders who trade larger 
positions tend to be less successful in future trades, which may be a sign of 
overconfidence. With respect to TradeFrequency, I report a positive but very 
small coefficient, which does not represent any significant increase in 
performance as individuals trade more. 
Finally, with respect to Volatility, I find that the volatility on the day the position 
was opened has a negative effect on the prediction of the trader across all 
models. This suggests that traders cannot gauge how the market will move given 
the uncertainty in the current period. For the lagged volatility values in Model 
(3.1.a), I report several positive coefficients, indicating that traders are able to use 
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information about past daily volatilities to correctly predict future price changes. 
This may be due to traders adopting stochastic volatility models or technical 
indicators that are based on volatility measures, such as Parabolic SAR (Stop 
And Reverse) and Bollinger Bands, typically provided by the trading platform. 
Next, I estimate three models, Model (3.1.b), Model (3.1.c), and Model (3.1.d), 
such that Volatility is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the volatility 
on that day is greater than the 70th, 80th, and 90th percentiles over the past 30 
days, respectively. This allows me to examine how heightened market volatility 
affects trader skill. Model (3.1.b) shows that high volatility in the most recent 
trading days (i.e. up to a lag of three trading days) has a generally negative effect 
on a trader’s predictive ability, while the volatility in earlier periods has a positive 
effect or a smaller negative effect. This means that traders have a harder time 
understanding the more recent uncertainty in the market relative to the events 
that have become seasoned for several days. Model (3.1.c) presents similar 
results in that the high volatility in the most recent periods has a negative effect 
on trader predictive ability. As for Model (3.1.d), the results show additional 
evidence that when volatility is high, a trader’s predictive ability perishes. This is 
shown by the predominantly negative coefficients for the volatility lags.  
3.3.3.2 Discussions on Market Volatility on Trader Skills 
I expand on the model proposed by Haley and Marsh (2016) by including a 
dynamic autoregressive variable on market volatility in order to examine the effect 
of heightened market volatility on trader skill.  
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In general, the results show that individual traders are unable to predict future 
price movements when uncertainty in the market is high. This may be due to the 
lack of accurate information in times of market turbulence, coupled with individual 
biases such as fear, which may drive traders to open positions based on 
sentiment and their own personal gut, rather than sound economic or 
fundamental analysis. As such the high volatility in the market leads to irrational 
trading behaviour, which negatively affects the ability of traders to correctly 
forecast the direction of future price changes. 
In addition, I find that as market volatility becomes dated it starts to have a lesser 
impact on trader skills as indicated by the decreasing higher-order volatility lags. 
This indicates that traders adjust to high market volatility over time. My findings 
are similar to those found in the literature on volatility (Olson, 2004; Qi and Wu, 
2006), which shows that volatility has a negative effect on performance.  
3.3.3.3 Impact of Market Volatility on Return of Investment 
Next, I fit Model (3.2) and its variations in order to examine how market volatility 
impacts the ROI of traders. The results are presented in Table 3.2. In general, all 
the models have a very poor fit as indicated by the low R2, and almost all the 
parameters are statistically insignificant. I find that Career ROI is insignificant 
which suggest that past performance is not associated with a trader’s future ROI. 
This suggests that traders do not learn to trade better in terms of adding value to 
their investment. The variable Duration has a positive effect on the ROI, meaning 
that it takes a longer period of time for a trade to turn profit. As for the Long 
variable, I also find a positive effect, which suggests that traders tend to close 
position with a profit more often when the position is long compared to short 
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positions. Finally, regarding Volatility, I find a generally negative relation with a 
trader’s ROI, specifically at lags of 4 and 10 trading days. While this evidence is 
weaker compared to the results obtained when using the success rate, the results 
still indicate that high market volatility negatively impacts a trader’s ability to add 
value in absolute terms. Nevertheless, given the poor fit of the model and the 
largely insignificant coefficients, the results of Model (3.2) should be interpreted 
with caution. 
3.3.3.4 Impact of Market Volatility on Performance - Daily Level 
As a robustness check, I repeat the analysis done for the success rate; however, 
I use daily aggregated data. The results are presented in Table 3.3. In general, 
the results obtained for all models are similar to those obtained using the 
transaction level data, hence I briefly discuss the results to avoid repetition. 
For all models, the results obtained for the control variables are largely the same 
as those obtained in the heterogeneity analysis. In particular, Career SR has a 
positive impact on the current prediction of a trader, which implies that traders 
with a good success rate history have a higher likelihood of correctly predicting 
future price changes. The other control variables also have similar coefficients; 
thus I do not discuss them here. 
As for Volatility, I find that the aggregate success rate on a given day is negatively 
affected by the volatility on that day. This means that traders cannot make sense 
of the uncertainty in the current period. Regarding the lagged volatility values in 
Model (3.3.a), I report several positive coefficients as in Model (3.1.a), indicating 
that traders are able to use information about past daily volatilities to correctly 
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predict future price movements. Models (3.3.b) and (3.3.c) show that high 
volatility in the most recent trading days (up to a lag of three trading days) has a 
generally negative effect on a trader’s predictive ability, while the volatility in 
earlier periods has a generally positive effect. This means that traders have a 
harder time understanding the more recent uncertainty in the market relative to 
the events that have become seasoned for several days. As for Model (3.3.d), 
the results indicate that when volatility is high, a trader’s predictive ability 
declines.  
3.3.4 The Impact of Behavioural Biases on Trader Skill 
The results of the regressions showing the impact of a trader’s behavioural biases 
on skill are presented in Table 4.  
3.3.4.1 Impact of Behavioural Biases on the Ability to Successfully Predict 
Future Price Movements 
I begin by examining the effect of a traders’ behavioural biases on their ability to 
successfully predict future price movement, which is measured by the Success 
Ratio (SR). Starting with the herd initiations indicator, HERD, I find that traders 
who initiate herds tend to correctly predict future price changes as indicated by 
the positive coefficient in both Model (4.1) and Model (4.2). This means that these 
trade leaders attract followers or copiers due to their ability to correctly forecast 
the direction of future price changes. Regarding the disposition effect (DISP), I 
also find a positive coefficient of 0.213 for Model (4.1) and a coefficient of 1.37 
for Model (4.2). This suggests that traders who have a higher tendency to close 
winning positions compared to losing ones, have a higher SR. This finding is 
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logical since traders who close more winning positions, will have a higher 
proportion of trades that are successful. As such, one would expect to find a 
positive relation between the SR and the DISP indicators. Next, I investigate the 
sensation seeking behaviour of traders and find that traders who use more 
leverage or who have a higher margin utilisation (MU) tend to have a higher SR; 
however, this result is only obtained for Model (4.1) with a positive but small 
coefficient of 0.006. Thus, traders who use more margin are able to exploit small 
price swings, which allows them to close positions once the trade is winning. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that this coefficient is relatively small, hence 
traders who use more leverage are likely to increase their success rate only by a 
small percentage. 
I also use the squared margin utilisation (MU2) in order to capture the non-linear 
relation between margin utilisation and SR. I find a negative yet very small 
coefficient of around -0.0001 for Model (4.1) and -0.001 for Model (4.2), which 
suggest a concave relation between margin utilisation and success rate, where 
very high levels of margin utilisation have an unfavourable impact on the SR of a 
trader. This is because, as positions become extremely leveraged, adverse price 
movements can quickly exhaust a trader’s margin, triggering a margin call and 
consequently forcing the trader to close the position in a loss. As higher levels of 
leverage are used, a trader would start accumulating losing trades, which would 
negatively impact the SR. With respect to inconsistent behaviour (INCON), I find 
a positive but extremely small effect for both Model (4.1) and Model (4.2) with 
coefficients of 3.7e-7 and 1.8e-5, respectively. This means that traders who vary 
their margin utilisation levels are more likely to have a very small increase in SR; 
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however this impact is almost insignificant and can be ignored. Finally, for the 
information advantage indicator, I find negative coefficients of -2.6e-6 and -2.9e-
5 for Model (4.1) and Model (4.2), respectively. This means that, the greater the 
time it takes a trader to cover the spread cost after opening a position, the less 
informed they are, and the lower their SR. In other words, traders who do not 
have an information advantage are less likely to have a high number of successful 
trades. The R2 and pseudo R2 of Model (4.1) and Model (4.2) are 29.82% and 
18.66%, respectively, indicating a good model fit. 
3.3.4.2 Impact of Behavioural Biases on the Ability to Add Absolute Value 
on Investing 
Next, I investigate the impact of behavioural biases on ROI. The HERD variable 
has a positive effect on ROI with coefficients of around 0.0004 and 0.007 for 
Model (4.1) and Model (4.2), respectively. This means that these trade leaders 
can add value to an investment through positive ROI. However, the small values 
of this coefficient show that this added value is really small which implies that it 
is very challenging to be a trade leader in market that is categorised in the 
literature as a random walk. Regarding the DISP variable, I obtain a negative 
coefficient of -0.046 for Model (4.1), which may be due to traders realising many 
positive but small profits and some significant losses. The result obtained for 
Model (4.2) is different, with a positive coefficient of 0.417, suggesting that the 
disposition effect (i.e. greater tendency to realise gains compared to losses) 
increases the likelihood of having a positive ROI in absolute terms. Moreover, I 
find that there is a positive relation between sensation seeking (MU) and ROI as 
indicated by the positive coefficients of 0.034 and 0.119 for Model (4.1) and Model 
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(4.2), respectively. This suggests that the greater the leverage used by the trader, 
the higher the ROI. Nevertheless, this relation is concave, such that extreme 
levels of leverage have a detrimental impact on ROI. Finally, I find a positive 
relation for the INCON indicator in the two models. This indicates that traders who 
use different leverage levels have higher ROI, which may be a sign of the trader’s 
ability to adjust risk-appetite depending on market conditions. The R2 and pseudo 
R2 of Model (4.1) and Model (4.2) are 3.35% and 5.11%, respectively. 
3.3.4.3 Impact of Behavioural Biases on the Ability that Retail FX Traders 
Adjust the Size of their Position Based on their Confidence in their 
Forecast 
In the third analysis, I investigate the impact of behavioural biases on the trader’s 
BHA. The HERD indicator is found to have a positive effect on BHA with 
coefficients of around 0.0004 and 0.004 for Model (4.1) and Model (4.2), 
respectively. This means that trade leaders possess BHA such that they trade a 
larger volume when they are more confident in their trading decision. The small 
values of this coefficient may be due to the fact that very few traders have a high 
BHA in absolute value. For the DISP variable, I only find a positive effect for Model 
(4.1) with a coefficient of 0.035, meaning that traders who exhibit the disposition 
effect also tend to have BHA. With respect to sensation seeking, I report positive 
coefficients of 0.01 and 0.049 for Model (4.1) and Model (4.2), respectively. This 
suggests that traders who use high levels of leverage possess BHA, such that 
the volume of the trade with the leverage accounted for is high when the trader 
is most confident in his decision. Nevertheless, this relation is concave as 
indicated by the negative coefficients of the MU2 variable. Finally, I find positive 
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coefficients for the INCON variable for the two models, which suggests that 
traders use different leverage and risk levels depending on the market state. This 
result is consistent with individuals who possess BHA, since BHA signifies a 
trader who is able to adjust the amount invested depending on his confidence in 
the market. The R2 and pseudo R2 of Model (4.1) and Model (4.2) are 1.74% and 
1.96%, respectively, which suggest a poor model fit. 
3.3.4.4 Discussions on the Effect of Behavioural Biases on Trader Skills 
In general, I find that skilled traders, regardless of the skill measure used, are 1) 
herd initiators, 2) exhibit the disposition effect, 3) are sensation seekers, 4) exhibit 
inconsistent behaviour and 5) do not have an information advantage.  
With respect to herd initiations, it is reasonable that skilled traders lead the herd 
since part of their ability to consistently predict future prices changes is their 
tendency to invest before others recognise the potential profitable opportunities. 
As such these individuals are leading others and benefiting from the momentum 
created by the herding effect. 
Regarding the disposition effect, skilled traders are more likely to realise profits 
compared to losses, which inherently increases the success rate of the trader. 
This is because as traders realise gains and wait for losing positions to turn into 
a profit, the proportion of successful trades realised by the trader increases, which 
translates into a disposition effect. While these skilled traders secure a certain 
level of profit they may be closing these winning trades prematurely, hence they 
are not realising the full potential of their trading decisions. 
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Thirdly, I find that skilled traders are sensation seekers which means that these 
individuals search for thrilling opportunities which in turn result in successful and 
profitable investments. This implies that skilled traders have a certain high level 
of risk appetite and the desire to explore unchartered avenues in terms of trading 
strategies in order to stay ahead of the game. 
Fourthly I find that skilful traders exhibit inconsistent behaviour which implies that 
these individuals change their risk exposure and trading strategies depending on 
their confidence in their decisions and the state of the market. In other words, 
these individuals are active traders who are dynamically changing their trading 
behaviour in order to adjust to constantly changing market environments. 
Finally, with respect to information advantage I find no evidence that skilled 
traders possess any superior fundamental information about foreign exchange 
rates. This implies that their skill is not derived from private information but rather 
from their ability to gauge the direction of future price movements, which may be 
due to their use of strategies, such as momentum, that are driven by short-term 
market trends. 
A key limitation of this analysis is the limited number of behavioural proxies used 
to explain the attributes of skilled traders. While the list of proxies I used is not 
comprehensive of all potential behavioural factors that may influence the skills of 
a trader, I created this list based on the most popular biases that have been 
investigated in the literature and it presents a starting point for us to understand 
some of the characteristics of skilled traders. The reason I use a limited set of 
behavioural biases is due to the significant computational power and time 
required to compute these proxies for all traders in my sample. At the time of 
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starting this analysis computational power was limited and expensive. However, 
as cloud computing becomes more efficient and affordable, I aim to expand my 
study to include additional biases. Moreover, I plan to use different variations of 
these behavioural proxies for robustness checks. 
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Section 4. Conclusion and Future Work 
4.1 Conclusion 
In general, this thesis investigates the performance and behaviour of retail FX 
traders, which is an area that has not been intensely explored by academics due 
to limited access to high quality, detailed data. 
I first began by examining heterogeneity among 21,300 retail FX traders in the 
EUR/USD market. Using popular empirical methods such as those employed by 
Hayley and Marsh (2016), and Ito (1990), I found significant evidence of 
heterogeneity in expectations of future spot prices and in performance among 
traders. Moreover, I found that persistence in heterogeneity increases as traders 
progress in their trading career. 
The evidence presented on heterogeneity among traders raises the question of 
whether some individuals possess genuine skill. In other words, do some traders 
have the ability to consistently and correctly predict future price changes in the 
foreign exchange market, and generate positive returns?  
Hence, the second part of my analysis examined the skills of these retail FX 
traders. I used three performance measures; success ratio (SR), return on 
investment (ROI), and big hit ability (BHA). In general, I found that although 
around 68% of traders have the ability to consistently predict future price changes 
more than half of the time, only 22.8% of them possess the skill to generate 
positive total returns as suggested by their ROI. In addition, the average ROI 
across all traders is -28.8%, which indicates that retail FX traders lose money on 
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average. This may be due to the random nature of the EUR/USD market which 
consequently implies random performance, and the latter coupled with spreads 
can result in negative performance among traders. Finally, regarding BHA, I 
found that traders exhibit negative BHA on average, with only 27% of traders 
showing positive BHA. This implies that the majority of individual traders do not 
have the ability to favourably increase their position size when the market is in 
line with their forecast.  
An important factor that affects the performance of traders is market volatility. 
Hence, I examined how market volatility impacts the ability of traders to correctly 
predict future price changes as well as their ability to add value to an investment. 
I estimated a series of models where I examined the effect of volatility on the day 
a position was opened, in addition to the lagged volatility of the previous 10 
trading days on the success and the ROI of traders on each trading day. I also 
used binary volatility parameters to investigate the impact of high market 
uncertainty on traders’ abilities. 
Overall, I found that traders are unable to correctly incorporate recent market 
uncertainty in their predictions. Nevertheless, as these high volatility events 
become seasoned for several days, traders are better able to use understand 
them in order to forecast future price changes. In addition, I found that high 
market uncertainty has a detrimental impact on a trader’s ability to predict future 
price changes. The latter may be due to lack of good quality information during 
times of market turbulence and to behavioural biases such as fear, which drives 




Regarding the impact of volatility on the traders’ ability to generate positive 
returns, the models have a poor fit and most parameters are statistically 
insignificant. However, I found some evidence that high market volatility has a 
negative effect on a trader’s ability to generate positive returns. 
In general, I found significant evidence showing that (high) market volatility is 
detrimental to both a trader’s ability to predict future price movements and to his 
ability to add economic value to an investment.  
I examined the relationship among five behavioural biases, which are herd 
initiations, the disposition effect, sensation seeking, inconsistent behaviour, and 
information advantage and the skills of traders, as measured by three 
performance metrics: Success Ratio (SR), Return on Investment (ROI), and Big 
Hit Ability (BHA). Generally, I found that traders who possess all three skills are 
herd initiators, hence they are closely watched and copied by other traders. I 
found that skilled traders also exhibit the disposition effect, whereby they are 
more likely to realise small gains and hold on to large losses. This can be 
interpreted as a beckoning mechanism such that these traders realise many small 
gains to signal to others that they possess superior trading skills. Skilled traders 
are also sensation seekers, indicating that they tend to use leverage to exploit 
price changes. Nevertheless, they tend to avoid extreme leverage levels, which 
can be detrimental to their performance and reputation. In addition, skilled traders 
are more likely to be inconsistent in the amount of leverage and margin they use. 
This is explained as the skilled traders’ ability to adjust the amount of leverage 
used depending on the state of the market and their confidence in their decisions. 
Finally, I showed that traders who have high SR tend to execute trades that 
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quickly move into-the-money, while those with low SR tend to have longer trade 
durations before the trade covers the spread cost. 
4.2 Contribution 
This thesis sheds light on the characteristics of retail foreign exchange traders. 
My findings showed that heterogeneity is a constant and significant feature of the 
foreign exchange market where retail traders exhibit differences in trading 
performance and expectations of the future exchange rates. This challenges 
traditional financial theory, which postulates that market participants are 
homogenous and should have the same expectations of asset returns. As such, 
I showed that heterogeneity is in fact a feature of the market and should be 
examined and incorporated into pricing and forecasting models in order to 
capture the dynamics of the retail FX market. 
With respect to the skills of retail FX traders, my findings contribute to the 
literature by showing that individual retail FX traders do not generate positive 
absolute returns on average over their trading career despite the fact that the 
majority of retail FX traders can forecast price movements correctly more than 
half of the time. It is important for retail traders to be aware of these typical 
performance patterns so that they are able to better manage their expectations 
when trading in the foreign exchange market. The sooner they understand that 
exchange rates move in a random fashion and that any predictive power their 
models may have are likely to be short-lived, the better they will become at 
managing their risk and adopting dynamic decision-making processes that factor 
in changes in the state of the market. 
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My thesis also highlights the importance of accounting for market volatility when 
making trading decisions, using a novel approach which incorporates market 
volatility to explain trader performance. While a chaotic market may provide many 
potentially profitable opportunities, retail FX traders should understand that 
heightened market volatility can have a detrimental impact on performance. As 
such, they should be constantly aware what the current state of the market 
volatility is in order to be able to better manage their risk and expectations of 
exchange rates. Moreover, looking at past market volatility may provide valuable 
information for traders to gauge the future volatility of the market, which would 
help them make more prudent financial decisions. 
The final contribution of my thesis sheds light on the behavioural biases of skilled 
traders and how they impact performance using a novel approach. To the best of 
my knowledge this is the first study that investigates multiple behavioural biases 
simultaneously in the context of retail FX traders. I show that common behaviour 
biases such as herd initiations, disposition effect, sensation seeking, inconsistent 
behaviour, and information advantage can explain whether certain traders 
possess superior ability. Hence, by understanding these behavioural biases and 
how they affect performance, individual traders can learn to be aware of whether 
they are likely to exhibit these biases and take precautionary measures to avoid 
succumbing to the negative effects associated with them. For example, traders 
exhibit the disposition effect when they realise small gains and hold on to losses. 
A trader who realises this can learn to avoid closing winning positions prematurely 
and limit their losses using stop loss orders. These behavioural patterns can also 
be used from a broker’s perspective in order to distinguish and categorise clients 
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into different behavioural groups in order to hedge against those who are likely 
top performers based on their behavioural characteristics.  
In summary, this thesis highlights the uniqueness of individual retail FX traders 
and calls for future work to further investigate the different attributes and 
behavioural characterises that shape the retail foreign exchange market. 
4.3 Limitations of this Thesis 
The scope of this thesis is limited by the data that was made available to me. 
Specifically, the data I obtained from the anonymous foreign exchange broker 
was only related to the EUR/USD market. As such, all my findings are specific to 
that market; however, due to the lack of literature that indicates variation in 
performance and behavioural patterns in other cross-rates, it is reasonable to 
assume that my findings and conclusion apply to other currency markets. The 
reason is because currencies are interlinked together such that the flight of cash 
out of one currency will most likely be exchanged into another. This relation is 
governed by economic theories such as purchase power parity (Cassel, 1916) 
and interest rate parity (Keynes, 1923). Hence, any activity in one currency will 
likely have an effect of similar magnitude (although of opposite direction) in 
another currency. However, there are several other factors which may affect this 
relationship regarding exotic currencies, including liquidity, spreads, and 
government policies. One can expect that with wider spreads, lower liquidity, and 
stricter government policies, a trader’s performance is likely to be lower, unless 
the trader’s skill is a specialisation in these factors such that the trader can add 
value by trading on these inefficiencies. In general, we can expect to find results 
similar to those presented in this thesis in other major currency pairs including 
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but not limited to GBP/USD, USD/JPY, CHF/USD, among others. It is important 
to note that at the time of obtaining the dataset used in this thesis, the broker 
mentioned that around 70% of all trading volume was conducted in the EUR/USD 
pair. While my analyses are yet to be conducted on other currencies to obtain 
empirical evidence, it is safe to say that my conclusions are related to a significant 
portion of trading activities in the FX market. 
The second limitation of my data is that I did not have access to detailed 
demographic data about traders in my sample. Hence, I was unable to control for 
demographic factors such as gender, age, location, education, among others. 
A third limitation of this thesis, and specifically related to the analysis of trader 
behavioural biases, is that I used a limited set of behavioural biases to explain 
the characteristics of skilled traders. While this list is far from comprehensive, it 
serves as a base to better understand the attributes of skilled traders. One reason 
I used a limited set of biases is due to the significant computational power and 
time required to calculate these parameters for all traders in my sample. 
However, with the increased efficiency and low cost of cloud computing, which 
has greatly evolved since I conducted my analysis, I plan to include additional 
biases in my study in order to get a more complete insight into the constituents 
of skilled traders. Some of these biases will include, but are not limited to, 
overconfidence, conservatism, and information availability. 
4.4 Future Work 
I briefly conclude by discussing some future work that I aim to undertake. While 
my current dataset is limited in the variables related to demographics I aim to 
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obtain a more up to date dataset which includes demographic features such as 
gender, age, location among other variables. This would allow me to control for 
the impact of these demographic features on heterogeneity and performance.  
Another aspect of foreign exchange trading that I want to investigate is the 
longevity of trader accounts. Trader accounts can have very short lifetime in the 
context of short-term trading in the foreign exchange market given the high 
leverage ratios offered by brokers which can be detrimental to their wealth. 
Examining how quickly a trader ceases trading activity and/or replenishes his 
account will provide a more complete picture of the performance of retail FX 
traders.  
Thirdly I aim to investigate the impact of volatility and behavioural biases on skill 
at the institutional level. To my knowledge there are no studies which investigate 
this area, thus I intend to conduct this analysis in order to compare and highlight 
potential differences between the behaviour of intuitional traders compared to 
individual traders in the foreign exchange market. I expect to find that institutional 
traders will exhibit fewer behavioural biases with a lesser magnitude compared 
to retail traders which will allow me to contact a comparative analysis that 
underscores the impact of behaviour biases at the retail level. Moreover, I expect 
to find a higher level of skill among institutional traders which may be driven by 
information advantage, where institutional traders have access to more relevant 
information and better risk management techniques. 
Another topic that I will investigate in the institutional level it is how order flow is 
distributed among the different liquidity providers and how a liquidity provider can 
optimise its inventory which has been discussed in the literature as the “hot potato 
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effect”. This means that liquidity providers can warehouse risk and optimise the 
holding time of trades in order to profit from the negative performance of some 
traders. I am already in talks with a multilateral trading facility (MTF) that has 
agreed to provide me this data which will make this study possible. Such an 
analysis would allow us to cluster traders into various groups based on risk and 
behavioural characteristics, which would grant brokers and liquidity providers 
detailed insight into their order flow. Consequently, they would be able to better 
manage their risks and hedge against profitable traders. 
As FX trading continues to gain popularity and traction, it becomes more 
important to investigate the behaviour and characteristics of traders from a 
theoretical point of view, and understand the micro dynamics of FX markets and 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Traders on the Anonymous Platform. 
The following table shows the descriptive statistics of traders on the Anonymous Platform. Several trading characteristics including Career SR, Career ROI, 
and Career BHA, account balance, trade duration, proportion of stop loss and take profit orders executed, percentage of long positions, volume, trade frequency, 
and account life are averaged first for each trader, and then across all traders. 
Number of Trades 4,119,479





Career SR Career ROI Career BHA Balance Duration (hours) %SL %TP %Long Volume Trade Frequency Account Life (Days)
Mean 0.60 -0.29 -0.09 1,806 24.3 18% 15% 46.10% 20,933 193 243
Min 0.00 -4.91 -1.00 0 1 (sec) 0% 0% 0% 667 1 0
Max 1.00 15.01 1.00 361,306 2,438.20 100% 100% 100% 7,611,111 87,354 918






Table 1.2: Correlation Matrix of Variables. 
The following table shows the correlations among the variables used in my analyses. These variables are the trading characteristics of traders on Anonymous 
and include Career SR and Career ROI, which are the average success rate and average return on investment of a trader over a specified period of time, 
respectively. Duration is the average trade duration of a trader. SL and TP are the proportions of trades for each trader that are triggered by a stop loss and 
take profit order, respectively. Long is the percentage of long trades executed by a trader. Volume is the average position size of a trader measured in USD. 
TradeFrequency is the number of trades executed by a trader. 
Career SR Career ROI Duration SL TP Long Volume TradeFrequency
Career SR 1.00 0.12 0.06 -0.34 0.31 0.02 0.06 0.07
Career ROI 0.12 1.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.04
Duration 0.06 0.07 1.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
SL -0.34 0.03 -0.05 1.00 -0.18 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04
TP 0.31 0.03 0.01 -0.18 1.00 0.06 -0.01 0.03
Long 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 1.00 0.00 0.00
Volume 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 1.00 0.33






Table 2.1.1.1: Heterogeneity in Performance – Success Rate - Logistic Model Using Transaction Data. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the jth trade success rate on the career success rate as well as other trading characteristics of traders 
over all previous trades. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including trade j, and include Duration, the average duration of a 
trade for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long 
positions, Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader 
fixed effects, while Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of 
trades executed, which is a proxy for experience. 
 (2a)  (2b)  (2c)  (2d)  (2e)  (2f) 
 Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.  
Career SR 3.3892 0.0080 ***  3.3848 0.0080 ***  1.0889 0.0161 ***  2.7852 0.02633 ***  3.4236 0.0275201 ***  4.6991 0.0115 *** 
Duration 2.50E-07 8.10E-09 ***  2.40E-07 8.15E-09 ***  6.65E-08 1.23E-08 ***  2E-07 1.9E-08 ***  2.4E-07 2.194E-08 ***  1E-07 1E-08 *** 
SL -0.3964 0.0071 ***  -0.4084 0.0072 ***  -0.4656 0.0183 ***  -0.2793 0.02226 ***  -0.19715 0.0218043 ***  -0.0943 0.0092 *** 
TP -0.0200 0.0057 ***  -0.0371 0.0057 ***  0.2614 0.0209 ***  0.1979 0.02174 ***  0.12332 0.0198761 ***  -0.0596 0.0066 *** 
Long -0.3628 0.0090 ***  -0.3651 0.0090 ***  -0.1781 0.0155 ***  0.0417 0.02324 .  0.07611 0.0255362 **  -0.0884 0.0141 *** 
Volume -0.0309 0.0016 ***  -0.0300 0.0016 ***  0.0026 0.0063   -0.0224 0.0073 **  -0.02199 0.0062013 ***  -0.0255 0.0018 *** 
TradeFrequency 1.00E-05 4.21E-07 ***  8.09E-06 4.41E-07 ***  -0.0311 0.0019 ***  -0.0013 0.00112   -0.0012 0.0006012 *  1E-05 5E-07 *** 
Intercept -1.2900 0.007 ***                     
Sample Full  Full  N <= 10  10 < N <= 25  25 < N <= 50  N> 51 
Year/Month FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trader FE No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 7.75%  7.78%  3.29%  6.36%  6.88%  9.87% 
  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 2.1.1.2: Heterogeneity in Performance – Return on Investment - Logistic Model Using Transaction Data. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the jth trade ROI on the career ROI as well as other trading characteristics of traders over all previous 
trades. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including trade j, and include Duration, the average duration of a trade for each 
trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, 
the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while 
Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which 
is a proxy for experience. 
 (2a)  (2b)  (2c)  (2d)  (2e)  (2f) 
 Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.  
Career ROI -6.06E-05 1.49E-03   -1.02E-04 1.49E-03   -8.25E-05 5.72E-03   -7.30E-05 2.20E-03   -1.48E-04 2.26E-03   3.00E-06 1.03E-04  
Duration 2.95E+08 1.21E+08 *  3.07E+08 1.29E+08 *  1.14E+09 7.00E+08   5.65E+08 2.58E+08 *  3.80E+08 2.35E+08 *** -7.78E+06 3.88E+06 *** 
SL -2.08E+13 2.04E+13   -2.08E+13 2.05E+13   -1.81E+14 1.04E+14 .  9.97E+13 4.05E+13 *  5.75E+13 3.70E+13 *** -3.92E+12 6.39E+11 *** 
TP 7.66E+12 2.33E+13   4.50E+12 2.34E+13   1.54E+14 1.23E+14   -2.51E+14 4.64E+13 *** 2.51E+13 4.17E+13 *** 8.29E+11 7.23E+11 *** 
Long 2.54E+13 1.08E+13 *  2.67E+13 1.09E+13 *  6.41E+13 4.48E+13   4.13E+13 2.05E+13 *  -1.47E+13 2.06E+13 *** -1.48E+11 4.01E+11 *** 
Volume 2.26E+12 3.30E+12   2.45E+12 3.30E+12   8.99E+12 2.50E+13   7.99E+12 8.49E+12   5.14E+12 7.06E+12   6.04E+09 8.35E+10  
TradeFrequency 2.89E+09 5.27E+09   2.44E+09 5.30E+09   4.13E+12 5.85E+12   2.68E+12 1.24E+12 *  3.77E+11 6.18E+11   -4.09E+07 1.19E+08  
Intercept -2.89E+13 9.19E+12 ***                      
Sample Full  Full  N <= 10  10 < N <= 25  25 < N <= 50  N> 51 
Year/Month FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trader FE No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0004  0.0001  0.0001 






Table 2.1.2.1: Heterogeneity in Performance – Success Rate - Linear Model Using Daily Aggregated Data. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the tth trading day success rate on the career success rate as well as other trading characteristics of 
traders over all previous trading days. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including day t, and include Duration, the average 
duration of a trade for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion 
of long positions, Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and 
trader fixed effects, while Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number 













  Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.  
Career SR 0.7042 0.0015 ***  0.7016 0.0015 ***  0.2531 0.0035 ***  0.6244 0.0056 ***  0.7433 0.0056 ***  0.9282 0.0020 *** 
Duration 3.65E-08 1.40E-09 ***  4.16E-08 1.46E-09 ***  2.25E-08 2.83E-09 ***  4.90E-08 3.99E-09 ***  4.74E-08 4.40E-09 ***  1.94E-08 2.28E-09 *** 
SL -0.0884 0.0015 ***  -0.0911 0.0015 ***  -0.1196 0.0042 ***  -0.0650 0.0050 ***  -0.0465 0.0048 ***  -0.0278 0.0018 *** 
TP 0.0013 0.0011   -0.0021 0.0011 .  0.0494 0.0043 ***  0.0378 0.0045 ***  0.0246 0.0041 ***  -0.0008 0.0013  
Long -0.0615 0.0017 ***  -0.0613 0.0017 ***  -0.0393 0.0034 ***  0.0111 0.0050 *  0.0177 0.0053 ***  -0.0070 0.0026 ** 
Volume -0.0055 0.0003 ***  -0.0054 0.0003 ***  -0.0003 0.0013   -0.0040 0.0016 *  -0.0045 0.0013 ***  -0.0039 0.0004 *** 
TradeFrequency 1.06E-06 7.98E-08 ***  6.76E-07 8.47E-08 ***  -0.0054 0.0004 ***  9.27E-06 2.41E-04   -0.0001 0.0001   7.09E-07 8.49E-08 *** 
Intercept 2.36e-01 1.38e-03 ***                     
Sample Full   Full   N <= 10   10 < N <= 25   25 < N <= 50   N> 50 
Year/Month FE  No   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Trader FE No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  9.64%   9.73%   4.52%   8.29%   8.78%   11.95% 




Table 2.1.2.2: Heterogeneity in Performance – Return on Investment - Linear Model Using Daily Aggregated Data. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the tth trading day ROI on the career ROI as well as other trading characteristics of traders over all 
previous trading days. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including day t, and include Duration, the average duration of a trade 
for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, 
Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, 
while Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, 
which is a proxy for experience. 
 (2a)  (2b)  (2c)  (2d)  (2e)  (2f) 
 Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.  
Career ROI -1.42E-04 1.49E-03   -1.35E-04 1.39E-03   -1.00E-05 1.49E-03   -1.20E-05 1.48E-03   -1.25E-04 1.34E-03   -1.38E-04 1.34E-03  
Duration 3.36E+08 1.38E+08 **  3.33E+08 1.33E+08 **  4.82E+05 1.38E+08   4.76E+05 1.38E+08   3.13E+08 1.24E+08 **  3.34E+08 1.32E+08 ** 
SL -2.12E+13 2.05E+13   -2.22E+13 2.01E+13   -2.94E+13 2.05E+13   -2.49E+13 2.05E+13   -2.11E+13 2.02E+13   -2.52E+13 2.01E+13  
TP 1.88E+12 2.35E+13   1.90E+12 2.34E+13   1.28E+12 2.35E+13   1.29E+12 2.54E+13   1.80E+12 2.64E+13   2.00E+12 2.34E+13  
Long 2.77E+13 1.09E+13 **  2.37E+13 1.19E+13 **  1.01E+13 1.09E+13   1.22E+13 1.13E+13   2.53E+13 1.16E+13 **  2.57E+13 1.18E+13 ** 
Volume 2.51E+12 3.30E+12   2.21E+12 3.20E+12   1.91E+12 3.30E+12   1.91E+12 3.40E+12   2.11E+12 3.40E+12   2.20E+12 3.20E+12  
TradeFrequency -1.47E+10 2.80E+10   -1.46E+10 2.75E+10   -1.19E+10 2.80E+10   -1.19E+10 2.78E+10   -1.56E+10 2.75E+10   -1.46E+10 2.75E+10  
Intercept -2.84e+13 9.13e+12 ***                     
Sample Full  Full  N <= 10  10 < N <= 25  25 < N <= 50  N> 50 
Year/Month FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trader FE No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 2.20E-06  2.50E-06  1.40E-06  1.83E-06  1.90E-06  2.42E-06 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
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Table 2.1.3.1: Heterogeneity in Performance – Success Rate - Logistic Model Using Daily Aggregated Data. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the tth trading day dichotomized success rate on the career success rate as well as other trading 
characteristics of traders over all previous trading days. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including day t, and include 
Duration, the average duration of a trade for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, 
Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does 
not include time and trader fixed effects, while Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected 













  Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.   
Career SR 1.0213 0.0187 ***   0.9938 0.0188 ***   0.1812 0.0263 ***   0.9298 0.0505 ***   1.4241 0.0606 ***   2.6751 0.0381 *** 
Duration 5.61E-06 1.16E-07 ***   4.97E-06 1.21E-07 ***   4.34E-06 2.45E-07 ***   3.81E-06 3.18E-07 ***   3.54E-06 3.37E-07 ***   2.97E-06 1.85E-07 *** 
SL -0.6686 0.0179 ***   -0.7060 0.0180 ***   -0.3348 0.0354 ***   -0.5177 0.0463 ***   -0.6323 0.0487 ***   -0.6615 0.0274 *** 
TP 0.4742 0.0202 ***   0.4452 0.0202 ***   0.3808 0.0424 ***   0.4186 0.0533 ***   0.5200 0.0553 ***   0.3583 0.0288 *** 
Long -0.0973 0.0095 ***   -0.0943 0.0096 ***   -0.1104 0.0152 ***   -0.0862 0.0237 ***   -0.0771 0.0270 **   0.0097 0.0172   
Volume -0.0139 0.0031 ***   -0.0146 0.0031 ***   0.0220 0.0083 **   -0.0098 0.0092     -0.0249 0.0109 *   0.0068 0.0038 . 
TradeFrequency 4.98E-05 4.07E-06 ***   5.27E-05 4.12E-06 ***   -0.0028 0.0020     -0.0010 0.0014     -0.0019 0.0008 *   4.08E-05 4.29E-06 *** 
Intercept -4.44e-01 1.42e-02 ***                     
Sample Full   Full   N <= 10   10 < N <= 25   25 < N <= 50   N> 51 
Year/Month FE  No   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Trader FE No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 1.10%   1.26%   0.84%   1.00%   1.34%   1.90% 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 2.1.3.2: Heterogeneity in Performance – Return on Investment - Logistic Model Using Daily Aggregated Data. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the tth trading day dichotomized ROI on the career ROI as well as other trading characteristics of traders 
over all previous trading days. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including day t, and include Duration, the average duration 
of a trade for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long 
positions, Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader 
fixed effects, while Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of 
trades executed, which is a proxy for experience. 
 (2a)  (2b)  (2c)  (2d)  (2e)  (2f) 
 Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.  
Career ROI 6.33E-19 1.30E-18   8.46E-19 1.31E-18   1.28E-18 1.45E-18   -1.09E-17 4.11E-18 ***  1.19E-17 7.30E-18   6.70E-17 1.81E-17 *** 
Duration -3.52E-06 1.16E-07 ***  -3.45E-06 1.21E-07 ***  -6.29E-07 2.66E-07 **  -3.00E-06 2.85E-07 ***  -3.86E-06 2.92E-07 ***  -5.56E-06 2.21E-07 *** 
SL -1.51E-01 1.77E-02 ***  -1.62E-01 1.78E-02 ***  -1.10E-01 2.75E-02 ***  -2.26E-01 3.86E-02 ***  -1.80E-01 4.46E-02 ***  -2.28E-01 4.08E-02 *** 
TP 3.75E-01 2.02E-02 ***  3.85E-01 2.04E-02 ***  3.10E-01 2.97E-02 ***  5.39E-01 4.42E-02 ***  4.63E-01 5.30E-02 ***  3.88E-01 5.03E-02 *** 
Long -1.11E-01 9.49E-03 ***  -1.14E-01 9.54E-03 ***  -1.21E-01 1.69E-02 ***  -1.55E-01 2.23E-02 ***  -9.36E-02 2.43E-02 ***  -8.31E-02 1.68E-02 *** 
Volume 3.66E-03 2.86E-03   5.27E-03 2.86E-03 *  -3.46E-03 6.99E-03   1.66E-02 7.47E-03 **  3.28E-03 6.56E-03   -5.88E-05 4.12E-03  
TradeFrequency -6.42E-06 2.37E-05   -1.03E-04 2.46E-05 ***  2.36E-03 1.86E-03   -2.25E-03 1.19E-03 *  -1.40E-03 6.88E-04 **  -1.03E-04 3.14E-05 *** 
Intercept -9.94e-02 8.00e-03 ***                     
Sample Full  Full  N <= 10  10 < N <= 25  25 < N <= 50  N> 51 
Year/Month FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trader FE No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.18%  0.34%  0.30%  0.34%  0.31%  0.42% 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.2: Heterogeneity in Expectations. 
This table shows the results of Equations 2.3 and 2.4 on the full sample of traders, as well as on a restricted sample of traders with more than 30 trades. The table 
shows the number of traders that are identified as having an Individual effect, an Idiosyncratic effect, Both effects, or Neither, at the 95% and 99% significance levels. 
  Full Sample   More than 30 Trades 
  Equation 2.3   Equation 2.4   Equation 2.3   Equation 2.4 
Significance 
Level 95% 99%   95% 99%   95% 99%   95% 99% 
Individual 12,968 11,770   11,262 11,657   11,628 10,754   9,473 10,317 
Idiosyncratic - -   1,264 829   - -   1,130 778 
Both - -   3,423 1,592   - -   3,320 1,572 
Neither 8,332 9,530   5,351 7,222   4,832 5,706   2,537 3,793 





Table 3.1: Impact of Volatility on Success Rate - Logistic Model Using Transaction Data. 
This table shows the results of four models that regress the jth trade success rate dummy on the market volatility of the EUR/USD as well as other trader characteristics 
that are computed as averages up to but not including trade j, which include, Career SR, the success rate of the trader up to trade j, Duration, the average duration of 
trades for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, 
Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Volatility is the daily standard deviation of spot price changes 
in Model (3.1.a), and it is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the standard deviation of spot prices on day t-q is greater than the 70th, 80th, and 90th percentiles of 
standard deviations over the previous 30 trading days for Model (3.1.b), Model (3.1.c), and Model (3.1.d), respectively. 
 Model (3.1.a)  Model (3.1.b)  Model (3.1.c)  Model (3.1.d) 
 Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.  
Career SR 3.3942 0.0080 ***  3.3938 0.0080 ***  3.3906 0.0080 ***  3.3886 0.0080 *** 
Duration 2.47E-07 8.14E-09 ***  2.53E-07 8.12E-09 ***  2.54E-07 8.12E-09 ***  2.53E-07 8.12E-09 *** 
SL -0.3926 0.0071 ***  -0.3951 0.0071 ***  -0.3995 0.0071 ***  -0.4011 0.0071 *** 
TP -0.0262 0.0057 ***  -0.0257 0.0057 ***  -0.0251 0.0057 ***  -0.0249 0.0057 *** 
Long -0.3649 0.0090 ***  -0.3631 0.0090 ***  -0.3623 0.0090 ***  -0.3604 0.0090 *** 
Volume -0.0307 0.0016 ***  -0.0306 0.0016 ***  -0.0310 0.0016 ***  -0.0311 0.0016 *** 
TradeFrequency 9.45E-06 4.25E-07 ***  9.84E-06 4.24E-07 ***  9.45E-06 4.22E-07 ***  9.43E-06 4.22E-07 *** 
Volatility(t) -102.0735 3.3836 ***  -0.0604 0.0029 ***  -0.0591 0.0030 ***  -0.0975 0.0035 *** 
Volatility(t-1) 30.3273 3.3521 ***  -0.0190 0.0032 ***  -0.0343 0.0034 ***  -0.0070 0.0040 . 
Volatility(t-2) 20.3820 3.4634 ***  0.0003 0.0036   0.0081 0.0040 *  -0.0236 0.0048 *** 
Volatility(t-3) -14.4807 3.4111 ***  -0.0215 0.0036 ***  -0.0419 0.0041 ***  -0.0412 0.0048 *** 
Volatility(t-4) 23.9693 2.6630 ***  0.0396 0.0035 ***  0.0178 0.0039 ***  0.0007 0.0047  
Volatility(t-5) 19.8492 2.5801 ***  0.0459 0.0032 ***  0.0313 0.0036 ***  0.0221 0.0044 *** 
Volatility(t-6) 18.4865 2.6671 ***  -0.0031 0.0030   -0.0172 0.0032 ***  -0.0211 0.0039 *** 
Volatility(t-7) 2.5257 3.6137   0.0093 0.0029 **  0.0010 0.0031   -0.0002 0.0037  
Volatility(t-8) -33.5763 3.3934 ***  -0.0220 0.0031 ***  -0.0198 0.0033 ***  -0.0110 0.0040 ** 
Volatility(t-9) -0.8681 3.4839   0.0115 0.0036 **  -0.0107 0.0039 **  -0.0305 0.0047 *** 
Volatility(t-10) 3.5886 3.3968   0.0151 0.0035 ***  0.0096 0.0039 *  -0.0096 0.0047 * 
Year/Month FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trader FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 7.80%  7.79%  7.78%  6.37% 







Table 3.2: Impact of Volatility on Return on Investment - Logistic Model Using Transaction Data. 
This table shows the results of four models that regress the tth trading day ROI on the market volatility of the EUR/USD as well as other trader characteristics that are 
computed as averages up to day t, which include, Career ROI, the return on investment of the trader up to day t, Duration, the average duration of a trade for each 
trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, the 
average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Volatility is the daily standard deviation of spot price changes in Model 
(3.2.a), and it is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the standard deviation of spot prices on day t-q is greater than the 70th, 80th, and 90th percentiles of standard 
deviations over the previous 30 trading days for Model (3.2.b), Model (3.2.c), and Model (3.2.d), respectively. 
  Model (3.2.a)   Model (3.2.b)   Model (3.2.c)   Model (3.2.d) 
  Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.  
Career ROI -5.28E-05 1.49E-03   -5.18E-05 1.49E-03   -5.14E-05 1.49E-03   -5.86E-05 1.49E-03  
Duration 3.16E+08 1.35E+08 *  3.20E+08 1.34E+08 *  3.18E+08 1.33E+08 *  3.10E+08 1.33E+08 * 
SL -2.09E+13 2.04E+13   -2.13E+13 2.04E+13   -2.09E+13 2.04E+13   -2.12E+13 2.04E+13  
TP 8.19E+12 2.34E+13   7.55E+12 2.33E+13   7.58E+12 2.33E+13   7.45E+12 2.33E+13  
Long 2.57E+13 1.08E+13 *  2.56E+13 1.08E+13 *  2.55E+13 1.08E+13 *  2.57E+13 1.08E+13 * 
Volume 2.38E+12 3.30E+12   2.37E+12 3.30E+12   2.37E+12 3.30E+12   2.36E+12 3.30E+12  
TradeFrequency -8.33E+09 2.71E+10   -6.37E+09 2.70E+10   -6.51E+09 2.70E+10   -6.53E+09 2.70E+10  
Volatility(t) -2.20E+15 6.10E+15   2.31E+12 5.47E+12   5.44E+10 6.04E+12   -4.68E+12 7.83E+12  
Volatility(t-1) -2.49E+15 6.47E+15   4.54E+09 5.73E+12   -1.86E+12 6.35E+12   2.52E+12 8.33E+12  
Volatility(t-2) 1.58E+16 6.57E+15 *  9.44E+12 5.96E+12   1.16E+13 6.68E+12 .  1.12E+13 8.86E+12  
Volatility(t-3) 3.61E+15 6.22E+15   4.03E+12 5.90E+12   2.50E+12 6.60E+12   6.29E+12 8.66E+12  
Volatility(t-4) -5.26E+15 4.97E+15   -1.33E+13 5.79E+12 *  -1.93E+13 6.43E+12 **  -6.32E+12 8.39E+12  
Volatility(t-5) -1.79E+15 4.95E+15   5.65E+12 5.70E+12   1.60E+12 6.36E+12   2.02E+12 8.24E+12  
Volatility(t-6) -1.16E+15 5.02E+15   1.58E+12 5.54E+12   6.58E+12 6.19E+12   3.18E+12 7.99E+12  
Volatility(t-7) 4.69E+15 6.14E+15   3.83E+12 5.52E+12   -2.20E+12 6.12E+12   5.15E+12 7.89E+12  
Volatility(t-8) -2.14E+14 6.28E+15   2.02E+12 5.66E+12   4.73E+12 6.27E+12   -3.01E+12 8.15E+12  
Volatility(t-9) 3.02E+15 6.35E+15   5.92E+12 5.88E+12   5.52E+12 6.60E+12   7.48E+12 8.62E+12  
Volatility(t-10) -2.10E+16 6.07E+15 ***  -1.38E+13 5.80E+12 *  -2.09E+13 6.55E+12 **  -4.01E+13 8.57E+12 *** 
Year/Month FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trader FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.000035  0.000021  0.000028  0.000029 




Table 3.3: Impact of Volatility on Success Rate - Linear Model Using Daily Aggregated Data. 
This table shows the results of four models that regress the tth trading day success dummy on the market volatility of the EUR/USD as well as other trader characteristics 
that are computed as averages up to day t, which include, Career SR, the success rate of the trader up to day t, Duration, the average duration of a trade for each 
trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, the 
average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Volatility is the daily standard deviation of spot price changes in Model 
(3.3.a), and it is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the standard deviation of spot prices on day t-q is greater than the 70th, 80th, and 90th percentiles of standard 
deviations over the previous 30 trading days for Model (3.3.b), Model (3.3.c), and Model (3.3.d), respectively. 
 
  Model (3.3.a)   Model (3.3.b)   Model (3.3.c)   Model (3.3.d) 
  Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef S.E.  
Career SR 0.705 0.002 ***  0.705 0.002 ***  0.704 0.002 ***  0.703 0.002 *** 
Duration 3.62E-08 1.41E-09 ***  3.71E-08 1.40E-09 ***  3.72E-08 1.40E-09 ***  3.66E-08 1.40E-09 *** 
SL -0.088 0.001 ***  -0.088 0.001 ***  -0.089 0.001 ***  -0.089 0.001 *** 
TP 4.16E-04 1.12E-03   0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001  
Long -0.062 0.002 ***  -0.061 0.002 ***  -0.061 0.002 ***  -0.061 0.002 *** 
Volume -0.005 3.33E-04 ***  -0.005 3.33E-04 ***  -0.006 3.33E-04 ***  -0.006 3.33E-04 *** 
TradeFrequency 9.22E-07 8.08E-08 ***  1.00E-06 8.03E-08 ***  9.57E-07 8.02E-08 ***  9.71E-07 8.01E-08 *** 
Volatility(t) -20.230 0.679 ***  -0.010 0.001 ***  -0.013 0.001 ***  -0.019 0.001 *** 
Volatility(t-1) 5.988 0.665 ***  -0.004 0.001 ***  -0.008 0.001 ***  -0.001 0.001  
Volatility(t-2) 3.984 0.686 ***  0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 *  -0.002 0.001 * 
Volatility(t-3) -2.816 0.679 ***  -0.004 0.001 ***  -0.006 0.001 ***  -0.010 0.001 *** 
Volatility(t-4) 4.814 0.529 ***  0.006 0.001 ***  0.003 0.001 ***  -0.003 0.001 ** 
Volatility(t-5) 3.955 0.512 ***  0.008 0.001 ***  0.007 0.001 ***  0.003 0.001 ** 
Volatility(t-6) 3.588 0.530 ***  0.001 0.001   -0.005 0.001 ***  -0.007 0.001 *** 
Volatility(t-7) 0.742 0.718   7.16E-05 0.001   0.002 0.001 **  0.001 0.001  
Volatility(t-8) -6.279 0.678 ***  -0.004 0.001 ***  -0.001 0.001 .  -0.012 0.001 *** 
Volatility(t-9) -0.108 0.694   0.001 0.001 .  -0.002 0.001 **  -0.007 0.001 *** 
Volatility(t-10) 0.577 0.675   0.001 0.001 .  0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001  
Year/Month FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trader FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 9.68%  9.67%  9.67%  9.67% 




Table 4: Impact of Behavioural Biases on Skills 
This table shows the results of regressing three performance measures, Success Ratio (SR), Return on Investment (ROI), and Big Hit Ability (BHA) on five behavioural 
indicators: herd initiations (HERD) is the correlation between the net open position of the trader and that of the dealer, disposition effect (DISP) is the proportion of 
gains realised minus the proportion of losses realised, sensation seeking (MU and MU2) where MU is the percentage of margin collateral that is used by the trader 
and MU2 is margin utilisation squared, inconsistent behaviour (INCON) is the standard deviation of the MU, and information advantage (INFO) is the average time it 
takes for a trade to cover the spread, as well as other control variables including average trade duration (Duration), account life (AccountLife), limit orders (SL and TP), 
position direction (Long), volume traded (Volume), and trade frequency (TradeFreq). Model (4.1) is a linear regression, which uses the continuous value of the 
performance measure, while Model (4.2) is a logistic model based on the dichotomized value of the performance measure. I also present the R2 and Pseudo R2 for 
the models. 
  SR   ROI   BHA 
      
  Model (4.1)   Model (4.2)   Model (4.1)   Model (4.2)   Model (4.1)   Model (4.2) 
  Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.     Coef S.E.   
Intercept 0.572 0.004 ***   0.508 0.051 ***   -0.301 0.011 ***   -1.186 0.052 ***   -0.100 0.007 ***   -0.976 0.048 *** 
Duration 4.44E-08 5.16E-09 ***   2.58E-07 7.64E-08 ***   1.37E-07 1.42E-08 ***   7.69E-07 7.34E-08 ***   6.24E-08 8.71E-09 ***   4.03E-07 6.31E-08 *** 
AccountLife 4.30E-05 6.35E-06 ***   5.54E-04 8.73E-05 ***   -2.27E-04 1.75E-05 ***   -1.30E-03 9.34E-05 ***   -1.87E-05 1.07E-05 .   -6.12E-04 8.17E-05 *** 
SL -0.240 0.006 ***   -2.579 0.074 ***   0.076 0.016 ***   -0.606 0.083 ***   -0.054 0.010 ***   -0.450 0.074 *** 
TP 0.229 0.006 ***   4.092 0.131 ***   0.069 0.016 ***   0.960 0.072 ***   0.091 0.010 ***   0.633 0.069 *** 
Long 0.001 0.006     -0.113 0.085     0.025 0.018     0.106 0.084     -0.002 0.011     0.008 0.079   
Volume 1.45E-10 3.93E-11 ***   1.08E-08 2.21E-09 ***   2.51E-10 1.08E-10 *   1.07E-10 5.71E-10     6.71E-11 6.63E-11     6.30E-10 4.84E-10   
TradeFreq 8.19E-06 1.37E-06 ***   4.58E-04 7.75E-05 ***   -2.46E-05 3.79E-06 ***   -3.62E-04 5.90E-05 ***   2.16E-07 2.32E-06     -6.66E-05 3.27E-05 * 
HERD 1.26E-03 3.94E-05 ***   9.88E-03 5.31E-04 ***   3.60E-04 1.09E-04 ***   6.74E-03 5.34E-04 ***   4.59E-04 6.64E-05 ***   3.53E-03 4.93E-04 *** 
DISP 0.213 0.005 ***   1.373 0.064 ***   -0.046 0.013 ***   0.417 0.062 ***   0.035 0.008 ***   -0.068 0.058   
MU 0.006 0.001 ***   -0.010 0.025     0.034 0.004 ***   0.119 0.019 ***   0.010 0.002 ***   0.049 0.018 ** 
MU2 -8.32E-05 1.89E-05 ***   -6.02E-04 2.65E-04 *   -5.52E-04 5.21E-05 ***   -1.57E-03 2.73E-04 ***   -1.36E-04 3.19E-05 ***   -9.22E-04 2.32E-04 *** 
INCON 3.73E-07 1.48E-07 *   1.83E-05 3.45E-06 ***   3.92E-06 4.08E-07 ***   1.06E-05 2.22E-06 ***   8.27E-07 2.50E-07 ***   1.46E-05 2.28E-06 *** 
INFO -2.63E-06 6.23E-07 ***   -2.95E-05 1.40E-05 *   6.59E-07 1.72E-06     -2.47E-05 2.42E-05     4.99E-07 1.05E-06     -6.65E-05 4.24E-05   
R2 / Pseudo R2  29.82%   18.66%   3.35%   5.11%   1.74%   1.96% 




Table A.1: Heterogeneity in Performance – Success Rate - Logistic Model Using Transaction Data Including Career ROI. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the jth trade success rate on the career success rate and career ROI, as well as other trading characteristics of 
traders over all previous trades. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including trade j, and include Duration, the average duration of a 
trade for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, 
Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while 
Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which is a 
proxy for experience. 
 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Career SR 1.08E+00 2.07E-02 *** 1.05E+00 2.08E-02 *** 2.16E-01 2.95E-02 *** 1.02E+00 5.57E-02 *** 1.44E+00 6.65E-02 *** 2.66E+00 4.13E-02 ***
Career ROI -7.43E-19 1.57E-18 -6.81E-19 1.57E-18 -8.05E-19 2.28E-18 -4.80E-18 3.49E-18 6.62E-18 4.09E-18 -2.42E-19 4.78E-18
Duration -5.87E-06 1.28E-07 *** -5.22E-06 1.33E-07 *** -4.13E-06 2.80E-07 *** -3.65E-06 3.53E-07 *** -3.96E-06 3.74E-07 *** -3.53E-06 2.00E-07 ***
SL -6.79E-01 2.00E-02 *** -7.14E-01 2.01E-02 *** -3.17E-01 4.06E-02 *** -5.17E-01 5.23E-02 *** -6.49E-01 5.46E-02 *** -6.70E-01 2.99E-02 ***
TP 4.79E-01 2.24E-02 *** 4.51E-01 2.24E-02 *** 4.25E-01 4.75E-02 *** 4.16E-01 5.93E-02 *** 5.20E-01 6.09E-02 *** 3.64E-01 3.19E-02 ***
Long -9.51E-02 1.06E-02 *** -9.39E-02 1.07E-02 *** -1.32E-01 1.74E-02 *** -8.82E-02 2.64E-02 *** -5.52E-02 3.00E-02 * 3.42E-02 1.87E-02 *
Volume 1.68E-02 3.51E-03 *** 1.84E-02 3.52E-03 *** 3.69E-02 1.23E-02 *** -6.98E-03 1.15E-02 2.36E-02 1.16E-02 ** 1.04E-02 4.21E-03 **
TradeFrequency 5.56E-05 4.43E-06 *** 5.79E-05 4.50E-06 *** -5.39E-03 2.28E-03 ** -1.33E-03 1.57E-03 -8.71E-04 8.89E-04 4.50E-05 4.69E-06 ***









N <= 10 10 < N <= 25
Yes
(2a) (2b)





YesNo Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A.2: Heterogeneity in Performance – Return on Investment - Logistic Model Using Transaction Data Including Career Success. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the jth trade ROI on the career ROI, career SR, as well as other trading characteristics of traders over all previous 
trades. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including trade j, and include Duration, the average duration of a trade for each trader, SL 
and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, the average 
volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while Model (2b) controls 
for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which is a proxy for experience. 
 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Career SR 6.02E-02 5.98E-02 6.11E-02 5.85E-02 2.03E-02 7.57E-02 3.02E-02 6.74E-02 5.52E-02 6.01E-02 6.50E-02 5.30E-02
Career ROI 9.39E-20 3.83E-19 -3.45E-19 4.96E-19 -1.60E-18 8.97E-18 -2.58E-19 2.56E-18 7.08E-19 2.42E-18 -8.41E-18 7.84E-18
Duration -7.30E-07 3.10E-08 *** -7.97E-07 7.23E-08 *** 1.91E-06 1.64E-07 *** -1.70E-06 3.07E-07 *** -1.82E-06 3.61E-07 *** -2.06E-06 1.47E-07 ***
SL -2.63E-02 4.80E-03 *** 1.63E-02 1.05E-02 1.55E-01 2.22E-02 *** -2.51E-02 5.07E-02 -1.32E-01 6.27E-02 ** -5.51E-02 2.26E-02 **
TP 8.29E-02 5.40E-03 *** 5.81E-02 1.16E-02 *** 5.28E-03 2.57E-02 7.86E-02 5.48E-02 1.56E-01 6.97E-02 ** 1.10E-01 2.43E-02 ***
Long -2.25E-02 2.56E-03 *** -1.68E-02 4.82E-03 *** -2.30E-02 1.11E-02 ** -4.17E-02 2.01E-02 ** -2.82E-02 2.40E-02 -1.13E-02 1.01E-02
Volume 1.38E-03 8.37E-04 -9.06E-03 2.06E-03 *** -2.50E-02 1.45E-02 * -2.55E-03 1.75E-02 8.53E-03 2.04E-02 -2.53E-03 2.87E-03
TradeFrequency -5.40E-07 1.04E-06 -6.40E-06 2.11E-06 *** -4.62E-03 8.20E-04 *** -3.72E-03 5.43E-04 *** -1.88E-03 3.08E-04 *** -7.05E-06 2.24E-06 ***





YesNo Yes Yes Yes Yes




N <= 10 10 < N <= 25
Yes
(2a) (2b)






*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A.3: Heterogeneity in Performance – Success Rate - Logistic Model Using Transaction Data – 90% winsorisation. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the jth trade success rate on the career success rate as well as other trading characteristics of traders over all 
previous trades. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including trade j, and include Duration, the average duration of a trade for each 
trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, the 
average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while Model (2b) 
controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which is a proxy for 
experience. 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Career SR 4.213 0.011 *** 4.219 0.011 *** 1.753 0.054 *** 2.784 0.035 *** 3.347 0.033 *** 4.625 0.013 ***
Duration 2.18E-07 1.03E-08 *** 1.95E-07 1.03E-08 *** 2.04E-07 2.49E-08 *** 2.89E-07 2.61E-08 *** 3.50E-07 3.00E-08 *** 9.86E-08 1.40E-08 ***
SL -0.166 0.008 *** -0.173 0.008 *** -0.418 0.030 *** -0.309 0.025 *** -0.211 0.023 *** -0.095 0.009 ***
TP 0.003 0.006 -0.016 0.006 *** 0.258 0.030 *** 0.175 0.023 *** 0.115 0.020 *** -0.044 0.007 ***
Long -0.006 0.010 -0.010 0.010 0.000 0.027 0.066 0.025 *** 0.086 0.027 *** -0.054 0.014 ***
Volume -0.022 0.002 *** -0.021 0.002 *** 0.005 0.008 -0.022 0.008 *** -0.020 0.006 *** -0.022 0.002 ***
TradeFrequency 9.93E-06 4.69E-07 *** 7.06E-06 4.94E-07 *** -2.40E-03 3.45E-03 2.03E-03 1.20E-03 . -2.00E-04 6.24E-04 8.01E-06 5.11E-07 ***
















N <= 10 10 < N <= 25
YesNo Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A.4: Heterogeneity in Performance – Return on Investment - Logistic Model Using Transaction Data – 90% winsorisation. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the jth trade ROI on the career ROI as well as other trading characteristics of traders over all previous trades. 
The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including trade j, and include Duration, the average duration of a trade for each trader, SL and 
TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, the average volume 
traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while Model (2b) controls for both. 
Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which is a proxy for experience. 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Career ROI 1.00E+13 2.31E+13 1.00E+13 2.41E+13 8.83E+13 1.73E+14 3.66E+13 5.21E+13 -4.26E+13 4.33E+13 -3.41E+11 3.21E+11
Duration 2.68E+08 1.35E+08 ** 2.85E+08 1.43E+08 ** 1.14E+09 7.53E+08 5.11E+08 2.81E+08 * 4.30E+08 2.63E+08 -7.38E+06 2.30E+06 ***
SL -2.02E+13 2.27E+13 -2.01E+13 2.28E+13 -1.65E+14 1.11E+14 1.06E+14 4.42E+13 ** 6.25E+13 4.11E+13 -6.79E+11 3.82E+11 *
TP 1.02E+13 2.59E+13 6.83E+12 2.60E+13 1.24E+14 1.32E+14 -2.42E+14 5.04E+13 *** 2.82E+13 4.64E+13 7.27E+11 4.27E+11 *
Long 2.94E+13 1.20E+13 ** 3.09E+13 1.20E+13 ** 7.15E+13 4.85E+13 5.11E+13 2.24E+13 ** -1.80E+13 2.30E+13 -1.12E+11 2.36E+11
Volume 2.12E+12 3.71E+12 2.30E+12 3.71E+12 9.40E+12 2.67E+13 6.90E+12 8.99E+12 5.29E+12 7.68E+12 -1.14E+09 5.04E+10
TradeFrequency 4.29E+09 5.72E+09 3.87E+09 5.76E+09 5.31E+12 6.35E+12 2.82E+12 1.35E+12 ** 3.57E+11 6.88E+11 -7.18E+07 6.83E+07












0.0002 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0000
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2b) (2c)
Full N <= 10 10 < N <= 25 25 < N <= 50 N> 51
 




Table A.5: Heterogeneity in Performance – Success Rate - Linear Model Using Daily Aggregated Data – 90% winsorisation. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the tth trading day success rate on the career success rate as well as other trading characteristics of traders 
over all previous trading days. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including day t, and include Duration, the average duration of a 
trade for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, 
Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while 
Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which is a 
proxy for experience. 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Career SR 2.1240 0.0320 *** 2.3142 0.0302 *** 1.645 1.94E-02 *** 2.0700 0.0247 *** 2.1390 0.0318 *** 2.3000 0.0318 ***
Duration 2.02E-06 1.09E-07 *** 1.68E-06 2.18E-07 *** -2.63E-06 8.64E-07 *** -1.79E-06 1.13E-06 -4.23E-06 1.40E-06 *** 2.75E-07 3.38E-07
SL -0.0415 0.0016 *** -0.0521 0.0054 *** -0.0339 0.0220 -0.0867 0.0317 *** -0.0020 0.0384 -0.0521 0.0083 ***
TP 0.0075 0.0012 *** 0.0334 0.0048 *** 0.0905 0.0232 *** 0.1949 0.0314 *** 0.2933 0.0376 *** 0.0056 0.0070
Long 0.0014 0.0021 0.0010 0.0038 -0.0281 0.0137 ** 0.0243 0.0193 0.0188 0.0242 1.17E-02 6.12E-03 *
Volume -0.0039 0.0003 *** -8.57E-03 9.13E-04 *** -0.0235 0.0108 ** -0.0257 0.0107 ** -3.38E-02 1.36E-02 ** -8.82E-03 1.07E-03 ***
TradeFrequency 9.47E-07 9.67E-08 *** -2.09E-06 1.96E-07 *** 4.33E-03 6.94E-04 *** -0.0032 0.0003 *** -1.95E-03 1.45E-04 *** -2.61E-06 0.000 ***


















25 < N <= 50
Yes Yes




*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A.6: Heterogeneity in Performance – Return on Investment - Linear Model Using Daily Aggregated Data – 90% winsorisation. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the tth trading day ROI on the career ROI as well as other trading characteristics of traders over all previous 
trading days. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including day t, and include Duration, the average duration of a trade for each trader, 
SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, the average 
volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while Model (2b) controls 
for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which is a proxy for experience. 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Career ROI 1.29E+13 2.31E+13 1.79E+13 2.43E+13 9.49E+13 1.44E+14 6.44E+12 2.37E+13 2.12E+13 1.59E+13 9.47E+08 8.31E+08
Duration 2.79E+08 1.48E+08 * 6.73E+08 2.36E+08 *** 1.84E+09 1.38E+09 -2.20E+08 2.95E+08 1.35E+06 2.13E+08 -2.33E+03 1.38E+04
SL -2.10E+13 2.26E+13 2.89E+14 3.48E+13 *** 7.75E+14 1.44E+14 *** -5.43E+13 3.99E+13 9.84E+12 3.10E+13 3.19E+08 2.35E+09
TP 1.01E+13 2.59E+13 5.94E+13 3.88E+13 1.08E+14 1.62E+14 2.89E+11 4.09E+13 2.87E+12 3.16E+13 2.47E+08 2.99E+09
Long 2.97E+13 1.20E+13 ** 6.86E+12 1.60E+13 3.09E+13 8.82E+13 1.18E+13 2.18E+13 6.38E+12 1.62E+13 -2.10E+08 6.61E+08
Volume 2.24E+12 3.71E+12 3.26E+11 6.27E+12 2.11E+12 7.42E+13 -3.50E+11 1.33E+13 8.75E+10 5.36E+12 -9.78E+06 2.34E+08
TradeFrequency -5.33E+09 2.93E+10 -8.52E+09 5.02E+10 -1.22E+12 5.38E+12 3.56E+11 4.22E+11 2.98E+10 1.62E+11 -1.13E+06 1.23E+06


















25 < N <= 50
Yes Yes




*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
265 
 
Table A.7: Heterogeneity in Performance – Success Rate - Logistic Model Using Daily Aggregated Data – 90% winsorisation. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the tth trading day dichotomized success rate on the career success rate as well as other trading characteristics 
of traders over all previous trading days. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including day t, and include Duration, the average duration 
of a trade for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long 
positions, Volume, the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed 
effects, while Model (2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, 
which is a proxy for experience. 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Career Success1.61E+00 3.16E-02 *** 1.61E+00 3.18E-02 *** 3.45E-02 7.94E-02 5.11E-01 8.12E-02 *** 1.02E+00 8.21E-02 *** 2.52E+00 4.43E-02
Duration -4.42E-06 1.35E-07 *** -3.87E-06 1.39E-07 *** -4.99E-06 3.57E-07 *** -4.06E-06 3.66E-07 *** -4.05E-06 3.65E-07 *** -3.05E-06 1.92E-07
SL -6.70E-01 2.09E-02 *** -7.04E-01 2.11E-02 *** -4.77E-01 5.63E-02 *** -5.43E-01 5.46E-02 *** -7.24E-01 5.38E-02 *** -6.87E-01 2.86E-02
TP 5.11E-01 2.37E-02 *** 4.76E-01 2.38E-02 *** 4.13E-01 7.16E-02 *** 4.41E-01 6.69E-02 *** 6.09E-01 6.47E-02 *** 4.23E-01 3.03E-02
Long -8.93E-02 1.07E-02 *** -8.34E-02 1.07E-02 *** -1.26E-01 1.97E-02 *** -1.17E-01 2.57E-02 *** -9.09E-02 2.83E-02 *** 1.94E-03 1.75E-02
Volume 6.07E-03 3.49E-03 . 7.19E-03 3.50E-03 ** 6.96E-03 1.08E-02 -2.28E-02 1.15E-02 ** 1.52E-02 1.31E-02 7.12E-03 4.12E-03
TradeFrequency 4.89E-05 4.12E-06 *** 5.09E-05 4.18E-06 *** -5.99E-03 2.54E-03 ** -4.80E-04 1.52E-03 -1.58E-03 8.32E-04 * 4.19E-05 4.33E-06





YesNo Yes Yes Yes Yes




N <= 10 10 < N <= 25
Yes
(2a) (2b)






*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A.8: Heterogeneity in Performance – Return on Investment - Logistic Model Using Daily Aggregated Data – 90% winsorisation. 
This table shows the results of six models that regress the tth trading day dichotomized ROI on the career ROI as well as other trading characteristics of traders over 
all previous trading days. The control variables are the averages for each trader up to, but not including day t, and include Duration, the average duration of a trade 
for each trader, SL and TP, the proportion of trades that are triggered by stop losses and take profit orders, respectively, Long, the proportion of long positions, Volume, 
the average volume traded, and TradeFrequency, the number of trades executed by a trader. Model (2a) does not include time and trader fixed effects, while Model 
(2b) controls for both. Models (2c), (2d), (2e), and (2f) are conducted on subsamples that are selected according to the number of trades executed, which is a proxy 
for experience. 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Career ROI 2.38E-01 1.92E-02 *** 2.26E-01 1.92E-02 *** 5.72E-01 4.35E-02 *** 2.88E-01 4.58E-02 *** 1.19E-01 4.34E-02 *** 1.19E-01 2.92E-02 ***
Duration -3.74E-06 1.22E-07 *** -3.62E-06 1.27E-07 *** -6.40E-07 2.79E-07 ** -3.24E-06 3.04E-07 *** -3.65E-06 3.11E-07 *** -5.76E-06 2.32E-07 ***
SL -1.69E-01 1.87E-02 *** -1.82E-01 1.89E-02 *** -1.09E-01 2.87E-02 *** -2.85E-01 4.13E-02 *** -1.72E-01 4.81E-02 *** -2.54E-01 4.32E-02 ***
TP 3.72E-01 2.13E-02 *** 3.78E-01 2.14E-02 *** 2.86E-01 3.12E-02 *** 5.12E-01 4.74E-02 *** 4.68E-01 5.65E-02 *** 3.99E-01 5.19E-02 ***
Long -1.11E-01 9.97E-03 *** -1.15E-01 1.00E-02 *** -1.22E-01 1.76E-02 *** -1.51E-01 2.38E-02 *** -1.17E-01 2.57E-02 *** -7.65E-02 1.75E-02 ***
Volume 7.14E-04 3.06E-03 2.86E-03 3.06E-03 -4.25E-03 7.28E-03 7.77E-03 8.17E-03 1.22E-03 7.39E-03 -1.31E-03 4.32E-03
TradeFrequency 2.37E-05 2.44E-05 -7.54E-05 2.53E-05 *** 1.15E-03 1.96E-03 -3.00E-03 1.27E-03 ** -1.46E-03 7.33E-04 ** -7.21E-05 3.23E-05 **






Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2b) (2c)







0.40% 0.38% 0.31% 0.44%
No Yes Yes
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
